POLISH VERSION

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Z dymem pożarów, z kurzem krwi bratniej
Do Ciebie Panie bije ten głos
Prośba to straszna jęk to ostatni,
Od takich modłów bieleje włos.

With the fires smoke, dust of fraternal blood,
To you, Lord beats this voice
The complaint terrible, the last groan,
From such prayers the hair goes white.

Chapter 3. The dead, empty, null and void universe.

Return and despair - a miracle wanted urgently - victorious Germany takes all, Poland is no more, how could this be possible with all aces in the hand of the Allies - the bad wolf makes killing his business, yet the lambs help him, wasting time, baa-ing about peace, conditions and appeasement - the main characters and persons of these tragedies - to survive in concealment behind Mum's apron strings, never, never! - what's the operating capability of an eleven-year-old boy - a monstrous injustice, whatever a teenager does, even if most vital, the older people never take him seriously.

Angus woke up in a full darkness and for a time could not guess where. There was something strange, queer. Yes, the abnormal point was that in a darkness, alone in an unknown place, he was not in the least afraid.

Unusual indeed, Angus, now three months over eleven years, was a boy with a vivid imagination even more overdeveloped by reading books, some part of them describing horrors, supernatural stories and worse. From earliest childhood he had firmly believed in all the fairy tales, and his first fears were of dragons, werewolves, bad witches and devils. As the years passed, developing an interest in occultism, black magic, sorcery, necromancy and all the other supernatural sciences his fears turned to more sophisticated. Now his evils and fears became like Draculas, living corpses, ghosts, ghouls, spooks, specialized demons - anything the foulest fantasy of horror authors could invent. He could clearly imagine the total spectrum, beginning with the invisible yet most deadly specters and extending to rather bizarre but just as deadly appearances like human heads on spider legs.

Nevertheless it is a well-known fact that a man - and more so a boy only aspiring to become a man - should be fearless. A coward is the ultimate spineless crawling creature, a dishonorable degenerate bringing disgrace to his whole family. Better perish ten times over, than panic once. There lay his dilemma - what should he do, if in the darkness he not only believed in all these ghastly wonders - he lived among them, saw them, felt them touching his skin, breathing cold along his neck. He consoled himself, the real shame was not to feel the fright, but to show it or act on it.

In books even the great heroes were sometimes afraid, yet despite this they managed to hold the fear in check and do great deeds. So there lay still some hope, if he could be like them. As a small boy, if - for example commanded by a parent to bring something - he had to go in his apartment through a dark corridor into a dark room, he always did it without hesitation. But coming back he was pale, with his teeth set so firmly together that his voice became unnatural. His mother commented at such times: "Oh my boy, you are catching cold again, your health is poor,, you should get more strength" - and usually tried to induce him to eat a little of something savory.

At the age of seven or thereabouts he resolved the problem of dark rooms by placing in every one at least one of his teddy bears. They were faithful pals, loyal to the utmost limit - like he to them. He could trust them with his life and vice versa, so he was never alone in any room now. Frights migrated from the apartment further afield, but lurked outside and he had still to cope with them if only in more distant and fewer many places.

In the summer vacation of 1939 he managed to slip in deep night from his quarters and walk at midnight across a cemetery. Next time, walk to a distant crossroads near the forest, drawing there a pentagram and with cold sweat running down his spine invoking the demons, after a rigid ceremony, an exact prescription read in some book. But he must have made some small mistake in the ritual, because nothing more than some distant shadows appeared. Returning home he came to conclusion the saying "his hair stood on end" must be a metaphor. Or perhaps maybe accurate only for some people, because nothing like this happened, even though he had never been so terrified in his life and could not imagine more intensity.

Now, suddenly this entire supernatural world was empty, nonexistent - more so, artificial, phony. It vanished just at the very moment when it could be of some use. The evil demons, devils and fiends existed - but they were very much material, in a human skin, and only these counted.

Those human fiends took his county, his dearest town and were destroying others, plundering and murdering his own people and family, as they shot, trying to kill his mother and - this being most impossible, unthinkable - beating the Polish Army. Sure, this could not be true, he was still sleeping, dreaming a bad dream.

Oh, if it would only be possible, if the genuine devils existed - he would be happy to make a deal with the most horrible one. To offer his body and blood, even the immortal soul for a temporary coalition against the Germans. His life nothing, he would gladly accept damnation in hell, the greatest torture forever. So where were all the evil spirits? He was ready to close a bargain. And a little sideline too with any vampire, spook, first come, first served. He was offering a bargain, a wholesale price for his soul. But there was no demand, no market for souls.

Yes, he already knew where he was - back in his town, in his flat, in his - well, this time it was his father's bed and bedroom. It was pitch dark, the window hermetically veiled - not because of the war, only the German "Verordnung" (order). There was no danger of bombardment, for the French or British planes the distance was too long. Anyway they never bombed anything, except with paper leaflets; more so the Polish air force. But if a light showed, the risk would be at best a shot at it, or the much worse "visit" by the German police.

The town and most of Greatpoland as well became now occupied territory. And he was alone in the flat because his mother had decided at the first opportunity, yesterday, to return to the evacuation train. She hoped to recover some of the things left there, be it only a part of the lost baggage.

It all came back to him. First the journey in a taxi from Żydowo - it was incredibly short. It took them a week to go there. No, in fact they were only three days on the way there, the rest lived in one place - yet it took little more than one hour to return. But already in Poznań the bad news confirmed: today the German Army would march in. This day as well as the next, all Poles would stay behind closed doors.

Angus could not restore himself with this reality, at every moment he expected something to happen. Well, perhaps the Polish Army had to retreat for some strategic reason, nevertheless how was it possible the people allowed the Germans just to walk in, why didn't they try to defend their town and homes themselves? At least try a shot, do something that would be honorable!

Angus daydreamed of this the whole day. Why, it was a pity he was in a private school, all the boys spread out across the whole town, more so, many from the country - if they were all together, they could organize a defense of their school. How wonderful it would be! They could hold on, even if the building turned into ruins, till the victorious return of the Polish Army, perhaps a week or two. They could eat a little supplies, taken from home; even without any food they would not so quickly die of hunger, rather from a bullet. And should they all perish, they would be honored in the memory of the community and possibly in a public funeral. The parents, the families could be proud of them!

However, this was not a regular war fought between Germany and Poland - and not only because the Germans invaded the country without any declaration of war. The international laws did not apply at all, it was plainly murder organized on a great scale - to be exact, murder and robbery conducted deliberately in a most barbarian, uncivilized way.

Angus was not yet aware of this. It was not until weeks afterwards that he met the families of some of the hostages. In Poznań there were not any public executions at the time, but the Gestapo was already working hard for its dire fame, arresting people and putting them in a provisory prison, Fort VII. Many of them they executed secretly, more died of ill-treatment or torture. Any three police officers could act as a court-martial and sometimes sentenced post fact, or should it be said postmortem - I mean, sentencing the already dead. It was an unexpected luck, to come out from there alive.

By the next day already German newspapers hit the street. Mother bought one - the "Posener Tageblatt." She sat a longtime reading, saying nothing, not answering any of Angus' eager questions, her distress distinct. But there were photos in the paper, evidence enough. There was the German Army parade-marching, and the German minority living in Poznań welcoming the enemy with flowers and celebrations. Angus was aware there was a German minority in Poznań. Not a big one - in the days before the war in the town of about two hundred eighty thousand people, lived about seven to ten thousand Germans. Not a great number, but well organized, with many clubs, companionships and friendship groups and influential economically; the well-to-do people, mostly. But this was not the cause of the burning shame Angus felt. The rather inaccurate, vague number, between seven and ten thousand, was not a matter of loose figures or lacking statistics. It touched the subject of the so-called "Volksdeutchen" and this needs some explaining.

The Polish people made it a point of great pride and merit, that never in the whole World War II there was any cooperation with the occupying force, like in the other countries. Never appeared any turncoats or collaborators ready to serve Hitler - in short, they assumed acting most honorably and paying for this a highest price. This is true enough, nevertheless the Polish community is and was not essentially different or better than those in other countries. Probably all nations and communities include some of bad and good people, also a smaller percentage of very bad and very good.

It was the way Hitler acted. After his unsuccessful play to win over Poland to his side, in fact the first serious mistake after a long run of successes he came to a point where he was fully sure of his calculations. This finally made havoc of his detailed time-table plans to conquer at once both France and England. After this blunder, his megalomania was offended in extreme. He now saw the Poles as natural, biological enemies of all Germans. Considered, any cooperation, or any plans to buy cooperation or help from the Poles would anyway end only with them turning against him at the most vulnerable moment. In short he decided to wipe out the whole Polish nation, except of those whom he could Germanize.

To formalize this he created the status of "Volksdeutschen" - for people who were not only ready to serve, but to declare themselves of the German nationality. If there was some distant German family (and sure there were some mixed families), it would help, but it was not necessary. Almost any man or woman ready to sign the declaration would be accepted, often if he did not speak German at all. Much more important was the physical type - especially the so-called Nordic type and this was a type common in Poland, more so than in Germany. About half of Poles were blond, for example in Angus' class most of the heads were light, only a few dark-haired, Angus among them.

Hard to believe, but the Germans were so anxious to extract the "Nordic types" as if afraid not to have enough people of the right blood - after their mad racist theory.

Anyway, this action was not a great success, only a small percentage of Polish people decided to take this way of final treason, though some did. On the other side there happened some unexpected effects. The people who did so, isolated themselves from the Polish community, commonly losing all contacts. So the occupant lost the reservoir of possible collaborators, secret informers, servile spies. For the Polish community it was purification, like a natural sedimentation process, with Germans getting the mud and scum.

In fact, after a time the Germans had to apply pressure to get any candidates at all. They divided the Volksdeutschen into four categories, the third and fourth not even asked, but inscribed compulsorily by administrative methods (any protest would be unhealthy). And so the classification became the more unattractive, hated. In fact, in the last year's of the war, an overwhelming number of the people executed for resistance or active fighting against Germany (on the former Polish territory incorporated into Germany) were formally Germans. In short an example of reductio ad absurdum of an idea, started from a mad conception; it degenerated, in part misfiring badly.

At the time Angus was not aware of all the details. He only knew there were Poles who wished to become Germans, which to him seemed impossible. Also, there were Germans who up to now had pretended to be Poles and now were dropping the mask. The latter was a rare event, because the Germans never had any benefit or advantage by pretending to be Poles. Polish citizens of German nationality had extra privileges over those of Polish nationality, thanks to the statute of protection of the national minorities. They knew well how to use this for their advantage. A statistical German was better-off than a statistical Pole and this resulted in a reluctance of the Poles to the Germans. Surely not a noble disposition, a plain jealousy, but people are just people.

So the only cause for a German to copy a Pole before the war would be his attachment with the V column to mask his actions, and this much Angus could fancy. But how there could be Poles wanting to turn into Germans, this seemed to him as absurd and monstrous as some terrible intellectual disease. The unknown, unheard-of, incomprehensible unnerved, terrified him. Was it madness, some form of mental aberration, fascination with evil? But above all, he felt a burning shame and despair to live in such world and in such a rotten society, which until now he had appraised high. But in the moment of proof shown include repulsive scum.

Too many facts he did not understand, could not even imagine. He must immediately go out from his house and see with own eyes what had happened and how his town looked now. Also how the Germans looked, because until now he had only properly seen aircraft, or some newspaper illustrations. This day was the one he must necessarily use, being alone; admittedly Mother had ordered to him to sit indoors and not go out at all. But she had turned fixedly to her affairs and could not appraise the conditions here. Only Angus now had the opportunity to see, think over the state of affairs and decide precisely what to do next.

Up to now, what he and his mother had done, amounted to returning to their hole to hide there, like terrified minks. These last days he had cared for nothing, never had set any plan. He had just passively accepted events which surpassed all he could understand, all for which he prepared; they should never happen.

Now the time had come to go out, review the position and form some plans, some new drafts, forgetting those which were no longer relevant. Angus was aware that he did not number among those people sparkling with invention, who in a changing situation may instinctively find the right way at a moment's notice. He needed time to think, best if there was a possibility to sleep on it and think it over a second time, to come up with the right analysis and conclusion. Thanks to the absence of Mother he should be able to inspect the city with his own eyes, collect information and plan therefore.

With these thoughts he took some clothes and went outside. On his street nothing had changed, only the leaves on the trees prematurely colored and already began to fall down, but this may be because of the wind. The pavements were swept clean as always. He walked along Śniadeckich Street first down and then back, up by the closed and calm Business School and University Collegium Anatomicum and Chemicum on the opposite side, it was quiet everywhere. He returned by the two little parks or rather green squares between the University territory and the quiet old Hebrew cemetery. Before returning home he went to a little shop in the basement of the house to buy bread and milk for breakfast. The shop was open as always, the prices hadn't changed and it was twenty groshes for each.

After breakfast he decided to take a longer walk. This time on a square between the entrance to Wilson Park and the old Hugger brewery, near the sport grounds of the University he met a group of lads., with whom he sometimes played ball. Mother didn't like him to keep this company, from other schools and older, but he occasionally ignored the prohibitions, or at least viewed the game. They took the ball with them, but didn't play; instead a few had with them sticks and exercised imaginary bayonet fights with some who said they knew how, explaining the principles. Angus had not the knowledge to judge if the basics were correct. However his experience told him the weight of a carbine, more so with adding a bayonet, is too much for him or other boys his age or a little older to move it freely and use efficiently. More so to fight with an adult man. That being so, he lost all interest in the matter.

But he did know how to use the carbine efficiently for the purpose for which it was designed, that is for shooting. That was why he stood quiet, not commenting on any of the pushes, parades, shields and unexpected strikes with the imaginary butt after avoiding the imaginary bayonet, hoping for an opportunity to play ball. Though unexpectedly, there sounded a cry: "We won't play, there is a German! We don't play with Germans." The group stared at one of the boys, who had a face like swallowing back the tears.

Maybe he was really a son of people who had accepted the "Volksliste," or possibly he had only a German name. Angus himself had colleagues with German names, who proved to be very good, zealous Polish patriots, although they probably were German descendants. In the centuries of Polish-German contacts many Germans had Polonized, as well as some Poles Germanized. The relic remained in the names. There were Poles with obviously German names and so too Germans with clearly Polish names, pointing to Polish ancestors. This fact Angus found astonishing, because in the last century, well, one hundred and fifty years, Germanized people could make a career. The Polonized on the contrary made a bad business and changed their lives for a much harder and more difficult one. Obviously the Polish community, even in the times of worst oppression proved an exceptional ability to assimilate, although unclear, what might be the attraction. There was no material advantage, the opposite, so it could be only personal features, even peculiarities or flaws. The only explanation that comes to the author's mind is, it happened because the Poles are, or were in the past, easygoing fellows.

For example, in Angus' school class none of the boys with German names changed their nationality during the occupation, even when badly persecuted and one of them killed. And, so it was in the whole city.

Meanwhile the nominal German nationality, the status of Volksdeutschen, accepted people without a drop of German blood and unable to speak German at all, only now learning the language. In fact, without any ties with Germans, except for of bad instincts, wanting to share in the robbery and commit criminal offenses unpunished. Because in accepting the German Volksliste they ended to be Poles, the procedure was a true purification of the Polish community. This resulted in the exceptional stabile and uniform proceedings of Polish society, resistance and struggle without any compromise with the occupants, as nowhere else in Europe.

The calamity did initially create some negative phenomena, a psychosis and tendency to suspect innocent people. In the catastrophe of war, in the multitude of refugees, often unexpectedly fell ungrounded accusations of treason. This was an easy and simple explanation for a lost war. It is true the V Column, organized and activated by the Nazis on a great scale, but in fact was neither efficient nor effective. One could say, the Germans invested there more than they got in return. One soldier was worth more than several irregular enemies and could copy with them without much trouble. It was the tendency to suspect and seek out possible traitors that was most harmful. Sometimes among the refugees happened be present a man from a great distance and speaking differently, for example a refugee from Silesia. Or even a refugee from Greatpoland might stick out as a sore thumb, if in running away he traveled far enough to the east or south part of Poland. And now, in the already occupied area, a similar hysteric distrust concerned the suspected Volksdeutschen. The boy could be innocent, suspected and already sentenced without any grounds whatever.

Meanwhile the group of boys dissolved and Angus went up the Śniadeckich Street and past the zoo to the main Dąbrowski Street. He had already heard, the local "skyscraper" (a poor imitation with only ten levels, anyway the tallest building in the city), former place of the county Social Security, Insurance and Welfare Company had become the site of the Province's Gestapo. He had to walk around the building by a distant pavement, because before the entrance stood armed sentryies. On both sides hung extremely long flags in aggressive colors and with an ugly Swastika in the middle of a great circle. A sight, previously known only from illustrations, that evoked a condensed anger, hate and abomination. For a while he was tempted to bring down the symbol of evil, never mind the sentries would shoot him. But there came the reflection that this would be only a gesture of no significance, not worth perishing for. His weight might be not enough to bring the flag down and very likely the sole result would be a promotion for the one of the two sentries who shot him first.

He skirted the building and regarded what happened around him. It was the first time he saw the German uniforms, military and some exotic, brown or black, also men in civilian clothes but with swastika armbands. Obviously speaking of Gestapo only was a simplification; the place was housing miscellaneous police units as well as the party office.

He went further. By the Theatrical Bridge he saw a machine gun mounted inside a circle of sandbags and two German soldiers with helmets on. He turned right and before the Caponiere saw a second nest of a machine gun. And then he saw no more soldiers, despite going now left, between the University Collegium Minus, closed, and the German House on the opposite side, in which the headquarters of many German organizations had functioned legally before the war. They had many imposing buildings in Poznań, an outcome of much money. It surprised Angus to see this former center for German organizations was quiet and closed, as was the University across from it. He did not realize he had chosen for his walk the exact hour of the German Victory Parade on the Old Market in front of the historic medieval Town Hall. Nearly all the Germans, both civilian and in uniforms, were taking part. Rather lucky for him, because if he had gone there and not shown much enthusiasm, he might not have returned with a whole skin, if at all. But as it was, he turned right, meaning toward the Railway Province Direction, where his father had worked before the war.

The central entrance he found closed, but to his astonishment the side door leading to the library was open. It was a place often visited by him before the war. He went in almost automatically, seeing the library open and functioning, if empty. He did not have with him his (or rather his father's) card and besides the full quota allowed for the family, six books, was also not returned. He had not hoped for any such opportunity, but the librarian told him he could in these exceptional circumstances take as many books as he liked without formalities, only on a personal note. Books were sure most vital for him, more important than the food supply. He was sure the Germans had taken Greaterpoland only temporarily, in a short time the Polish colors would return and the Germans run away. But he could only wait for this passively in his flat and the only way to survive the time, to bear it at all, would be reading. If he had no books, he would go crazy.

Over the next hours he threw himself on the catalog and chose a mountain of books till he noticed the librarians looking at him with wonder. A good part of the chosen books he had to leave behind, there was no way to carry so many, but he took about twenty. Shortly afterwards the Germans closed all public libraries and recycled the books for paper. A lion's part was destroyed, but some left over in the storehouses and dumps, survived to the war's end. The librarians gave away the books, trying to save as many as they could. Angus could come again and take a second load, but he didn't realize what was happening and thought he had already exceeded the limit. Anyway, in his home the books had not a chance, nothing there survived the war.

The freight of books was not heavy, but rather uncomfortable to carry without a bag and Angus arrived home weary, but content that he had seen all worth seeing, or rather what he wanted not see. For now he could only wait; as all people he hoped the Germans would shortly run away. It was difficult to say exactly when, but the day must come. So it might be soon.

Only much later did Angus pick up what dramatic events happened in those hectic days. Poznań was the only town in Greatpoland where the German Army did not arrange public executions of the hostages. But it was touch and go, the hostages were taken several times, or rather volunteered themselves.

With the retreating Army Poznań, in the general evacuation took part also the police, the appointed commissary president, the county sheriff and with them most of the city and state officials and officers. Nevertheless the German Army delayed its progress, in fact they moved in rather timidly and slowly, maybe remembering the 1918 uprising and wanting not entangle in irregular fighting with the high patriotic population. In fact the capital Poznań remained unattended and unprotected, one may say, left in a deep anarchy.

In such a position, the remaining, incomplete City Council chose as a temporary president, the formerly chosen (before the government set him aside and chose a commissary) Cyril Ratajski. He, a man of great authority, returned into the office the former Board of Directors and set up a provisional Citizen Watch. For almost a week Poznań functioned like a small independent, quasi-suzerain state and quite efficiently. The remaining part of the population was cared for, the city institution functioned, the material needs and supplies put in order and the people lived through these critical days in order and safety. This is not the right place to write about Cyril Ratajski, one of the outstanding persons of Polish history, civil hero (and next the first Government in Exile Deputy). The point is that after almost a week fell on him the duty to surrender the town to the Germans. The commanding German general arranged this as a great show and victory, although in fact he was only taking an open, undefended capital. He wanted a surrender, and because there were no Polish Army officers, the capitulation had to by done by the city president. This ceremony was happening in the historic, renaissance City Hall at the exact time Angus was in the library.

Nominally the city president remained temporarily in office. In fact he lost all power, but still tried to prevent the worst, the public executions in town. Probably the Germans were specifically instructed to find the paramilitary groups, because just as with the youth workers' company in Czerniejewo they wanted to execute the people from the Citizen Watch. Despite the fact the Watch was unarmed, well, at least not with firearms but only with sticks and police batons. They demanded of Ratajski that he should name the hostages and he proposed himself and the Directory Board of the City Council. But the German general did not want to execute the person who only a day before had surrendered the city to him. He said such a proposal was impossible, the hostages must be the members of the Citizen Watch. Now promptly stepped up Celichowski as the Commander, but Ratajski declared Celichowski was only his deputy, it was he, who was the supreme in command. Again, the members of the Board and the City Council held in unity, and with them a lot of local commanders of the Watch. This time they remained in custody a couple of days, so to speak in front of the gun. It was a pat position, the German police authorities demanded their offer should be taken literally and the men shot, but the General still said no. Later the people heard this was the end of his career in the Wehrmacht, after this he was accused being a weak softie and vain, held only a second- or even third-rate position. He had his great day and he might be vain, but at least civilized, with more of such men the world would be better. Anyway, these were only rumors and Angus didn't know anything concrete.

Angus remained home, reading, till next day his mother returned, careworn indeed. There was no way to get back any baggage, or even get close to the train, the Germans had set sentries around and held it under watch as booty. People told her, that just before this, in the nick of time, some farmers from the area had taken some left luggage, sometimes carts loads, and with full approval afterwards divided the recovered possessions with the former owners. But she was unable to determine what had happened with her belongings and could not talk with anyone, because just then the tragedy in Czerniejewo happened and all people were terrified, herself included. She returned home as speedily as possible. She did not know the details, but the news from Czerniejewo suggested that several homes, at first two were torched to the ground and the inhabitants killed by German soldiers. Next also the neighboring houses caught fire, a great luck the fields were already bare of grain and the wind blew from the forest, not against it, it was dry and it could have been much worse.

The Germans in the Polish campaign favored the use of fire, the same applied later to the strafing expeditions of the SS and police forces in the occupied territory. Angus himself was to see torched houses with people killed in them in the time to come. Also on the front, the German progress could be surveyed by the smoke or glimmer of fires, as may be read in many memoirs from the time, for example those of General Maczek. But there was not a front near Czerniejewo and no fighting. Hitler expressis verbis demanded the warfare should be cruel. With time such atrocities became a daily routine, the Germans were explicitly instructed that fire is efficient and inexpensive weapon. At first it was for the people an unexpected, great shock, and so it was for Angus' mother too; better to lose property than life. Nevertheless it was not the main cause of her low spirits:

"We didn't know, we didn't recognize, with what a great power we had to contend with. We simply believed what we wanted to believe."

"Ma, don't take it so bad, one-way or another, the Germans are in a bad position, they are fighting at once against three countries, not only with us. Sure, they are stronger than us, they have a population of more than eighty-six million compared to thirty-seven in Poland. But we are not alone; against the united forces of Poland and France the chances would be equal and what about England? With England in, too, Germany has not a chance. In a short time they must understand they are at the losing end and the war shall be over," Angus comforted.

"Well, no doubt they must lose in the end, but I am not sure how quickly. You still don't know the worst, today they announced news about a great battle, supposedly victorious for them. I hid the newspaper, wanting not to depress you, but here it is."

Mother gave him the newspaper, printed with edgy, sharp pointed letters, unlike any human writing accepted in most of the territory of Europe. The strange, grotesque letters prevented him from reading the words, which anyway he could not understand. For example the characters n, e and r were so much alike, almost without difference, that he could not at first distinguish them. The other letters also were a guess.

Mother summarized the news for him, and then read him the quotations aloud and began, step-by-step, to translate the sentences, statements, opinions and comments about the war. They told of a great battle termed by the Germans the battle of the river Vistula and known in Poland as the battle by Kutno, or by the river Bzura. The Germans wrote, the Polish Army had tried to come over to an offensive, but after several days of heavy fighting most of the Polish troops became enclosed and were now awaiting total destruction. They stated this was the end of organized resistance and indeed of the whole war. They described the fighting as extremely hard and stubborn. The newspaper often repeated expressions: "with fanatic rage," "suicidal attacks" or "unconcerned by losses." In consequence the substantial majority of enemy power was now encircled and held static, unable to withdrawn and forced to continue the fight. Its destruction or surrender was only a matter of time, despite a crazy resistance they still presented, not counting their losses. "This is how the inspiration of a great leader and commander, sent by Providence from the upper region to Germany, solved the problem and ended the whole war with victory." The tone was as if they were announcing a new prophet.

About the battle by Kutno exist detailed books and elaborate descriptions; also the matter has already been mentioned in this volume. There would be no sense to add the comments of an amateur. Probably the descriptions in German papers began promoting Hitler as a major strategist and tactician, a genial supreme commander, whose destination was to lead Germany to ultimate Victory. Now he was made to appear as a commander in whom all soldiers and ranks might and should feel an absolute faith. Up to now, Hitler had presented himself as a political leader, a chief of state who nominated competent, responsible army generals, but not as a universal genius. And in the former Generalstab, or even in the new structures such as the OKH, he was seen as an amateur, talented, but without professional expertise and knowledge. Now, he was taking over personal command organizing such instruments as the OKW and "Fuehrerhauptquatier," which would give him absolute, full control over the Army. It was necessary to create a legend.

Maybe from this exaggerated account of the battle in German papers leaped an opposite opinion that this time Germany was on the brink of a crash anyway, even without a French offensive. France, according to agreement, should start substantial army action by the tenth day of war at the latest. Still, even sole intervening the air force, temporarily engaging the German Luftwaffe, would be enough to achieve the success of Army Poznań over the German 8 Field Army. (General Ironside, visiting Poland shortly before the war, made clear the UK could not guarantee direct military help except on French soil. However, he assured Poles that British planes should certainly engage the Germans - these were only empty words).

Capsule: Chances of the Polish campaign. (Almighty God, we know what to expect from enemies, but save us from our friends and allies.)

Doubtless, Hitler was a born, natural gambler, but he won this party with a weak pair against opponents with all the aces. He threw almost all his forces against Poland, leaving a bare bottom on the French side. Well, to be exact, he used in Poland about eighty great units, including thirty-nine divisions of infantry, all the tanks in seven armored divisions, four so-called light armored and four mechanized (in future they were called "Pancer Grenadieres Divisions"). On the French front he left at first only seven infantry divisions, no tanks at all and almost no planes. Only during further mobilization on the French front were formed the third and fourth line troops of the so-called "Landsturm". During the Polish campaign about twenty divisions were made ready, in the following month thirty-eight and all in all forty-seven (according to deposition of General Jodl before the IMT at Nuremberg suit). Contrary to the newspaper reports, the battle at Kutno was by no means the end of the Polish war. To the end of September fighting was so intensive the Germans were able to remove from Poland to the West Front only two of the thirty-nine first-line infantry divisions. So there were only nine such crack troops in the West (the freshly mobilized or only just now mobilizing Landsturm could be considered at best a temporary cover, delaying the expected French offensive).

If the French acted fair and honorably, fulfilling the alliance treaty, if they began the offensive on the agreed tenth day of the war, it would be exactly when Army Poznań was and at the peak of his early success. There would be no way Hitler could win.

This is the unanimous opinion of all army experts on both sides, not only the Polish command, but also shared by the other side, by German generals.

"If the French would really attack… we could only keep up the appearances of defense" - from General Jodl's deposition.

"Could they really miss the weakness of our fortifications?" This was Guderian.

"If the French attacked… they could arrive at the Rhine in seven, at the most fifteen days. What would this mean? …a deciding chance of changing Europe's fate…. Without great efforts and risk… the Nazi regime would definitely end in 1939" - General Westphal.

Similar opinions expressed generals von Lossow, von Brauchitsch and others.

But the war would probably end without further fighting, because within two days General Ludwig von Beck, as the new commander and temporary chief of German Government would propose a cease-fire, with Hitler in a mental asylum in Stralsund. Von Beck determined to start peace talks immediately, before the anticipated misfortune of war on two fronts was a reality.

The Germans were almost as unwilling to go to war as the French. Hitler manipulated them, but still many, in the first place those who remembered WW I and the professional soldiers, were unhappy, most of all, the military experts.

Ludwig von Beck had still a great authority and influence among the high ranking generals. However, reputedly Halder presented a view that it was necessary to wait for Hitler's first set-back, because as long as his luck continued the soldiers might follow him and not take the orders of the generals. As yet, Hitler continued from success to success. The start of the French offensive would be such a signal, but the attack never came about. Interesting, if only a temporary air attack on the Germany airfields in the west and the eventual deteat of the 8 Army in the battle by Kutno, would have been enough to precipitate the change of regime? Even after the end of the Polish campaign, a good opportunity for French attack continued, because the German Army had only a ten days' supply of ammunition left. (In the Polish campaign they used about five times more than in France and indeed all the West). The German Air Force a two-week supply of bombs (the data from the IMT suit). Only about twenty percent of tanks remained operational, the bulk had to be repaired - but first extracted from a heavy terrain and transported by bad routes, which took all of October. But in the spring of 1940 not only were these tanks restored, the Germans had about doubled the number, because they adapted and rearmed to their standards the excellent chassis and constructions of the Czech tanks.

After the 1939 campaign and especially after the 1940 campaign the public spirit in Germany changed drastically, Hitler was considered a true prophet, almost God incarnate. A genuine paradox, that at the time of his best luck there was much doubt. However next, as one calamity followed another and it was unquestionably the result of bad judgment, the Germans still believed in Hitler to the bitter end.

The Army Poznań at the beginning of the campaign had at its disposal only fifteen hunter planes, six remained after the first day of offensive including those in repairs and none two days later. Germans all the while had unquestionable rule in the air, now they used against Poland, mostly Army Poznań, all the available planes from the overall number of about four thousand. The German armored corps, already cut off on the approaches to Warsaw and seeming lost, without ammo and fuel, received a full supply by air. Resigning from futile attack on Warsaw, they turned back and cut the communication lines of the Army Poznań.

General Kutrzeba, commanding the Army Poznań, wrote: "All the sites of troops concentration, movements and all ways were under constant rapid-fire from air. The bridges were demolished, river fords and ferries blocked, the artillery positions destroyed. Continuation of battle would be a suicide; we could not remain in position…having no hunter planes."

It is clear, though, that even one defeat of the Germans, one lost battle, which first looked probable enough, could not change the result of a whole campaign. With a zero engagement of the remaining members of the coalition, the disproportion of numbers of men and especially arms between Poland and Germany was too great. Each day brought more details about the battle. Step-by-step, Angus had to accept that even the most intense wishes and trust couldn't change the fact the Polish colors had suffered a heavy hit. Two Polish Armies were almost destroyed.

And soon followed the worst: the Red Army in coalition with Hitler invaded Poland from the back.

The German papers announced this with triumph immediately after the end of the Kutno battle. This seemed impossible, improbable, incredible - never-never. For as long as both sides had existed, relations between fascism and communism had been based not only on theoretical, but almost zoological hatred. Fascism made from this hatred its ideology, warranted from this its cause of existence. The communists tried to emerge from the isolation in which they had placed themselves following their inhuman methods and a true hell they created on about one sixth of the globe (they called it "a paradise"). They assembled a popular front and next copied the pattern with many such fronts run in many countries. These should form a wide union of liberal people, who on a base of democracy and humanism opposed spreading of fascism.

Both sides denounced the opponents with such morbid deeds that average people could not believe the reports, considering them propaganda. Nevertheless Angus sometimes read crypto-communist editions and fascist publications, commenting on the news about the civil war in Spain. (Also the rightwing Catholic press, like that from Niepokalanów, which came down strongly on Franco's side, to the point of reprinting obviously fascist sources.) After reading what the two adversaries had to say, well, to write about each other, Angus came to the conclusion that it was a sort of catch-as-catch-can in the mud. A very dirty reciprocal campaign, open sale of falsehood, pelting the antagonist with splutters, effusing squalor with conjunction of terror so nightmarish that it could not be true. His parents said about the same, but added that there is not smoke without some fire and if only a small percentage of the events in question had really happened, the world had by no means bettered with age. Rather, it had become a worse place than in barbarian centuries. And yet, it was not a horror fantasy of editors with sick imagination, with time he could ascertain that the pieces were written by professional men. Competent and with knowledge of facts, because they themselves took part in the dirty work. With full truth, they assumed the other side applied exactly the same methods as they did. All that the fascist said about the communist was on the level, but also the entirety of what the communist wrote about the fascist was straight truth. If there was something wrong, the information about both sides was scraped too short and the facts presented too weak and pallid against the live realty.

Yet the greatest wish of both sides was the altruistic desire to save mankind from the threat of their opponents. One side summoned all honest and proper people to the defense of European civilization from the bloody mob of Bolsheviks. The other replied that without communists there would be no chance to save the ethical and moral values of democracy and humanism from the evil fascists. In the communist doctrine, fascism was explained as a bestial, degenerated form of imperialism, imperialism being the supreme stage of capitalism, a condensed evil. Again Hitler in his "hit of the centuries" book Mein Kampf (my fight or my battle) presented as the mission of his life the destruction of the Soviets. Following this he would take the Russian and Ukrainian soil for his major purpose, to breed more Germans. Naturally of the most valuable, Nordic type.

Capsule: Russia and Germany, a merger of assets for the revolution; copyright and idea by Lenin.

The thought of cooperation, coalition between Germany and the Soviets seemed absurd as partnership between flames and water. Yet both countries had a common, superior task: it was the unleashing of war, WW II. They both wanted to conquer the world, but neither had the forces to start the war single-handedly, under its own steam.

The fact remains that it was not Hitler alone who began the Second World War. Well, he tried and in the spring of 1939 this threat became real, but British diplomacy effectively blocked it. By offering guarantees to Poland and later subscribing an alliance, the German were put in an impasse, a stuck position. They couldn't make the first move, because it would mean a risk of war on two fronts. To be sure, Hitler evaluated the Western democracies low and sorry to say so, accurately. He believed they would do nothing and allow him to beat the enemies one after another, which actually happened. But his faith was too little for the Army command and in fact for most of the Germans, who considered such a venture an unacceptable risk. Hitler was aware that he could not move his subordinates, including even his trusted partisans, to take the chances of such a gamble. (Still in September 1939 the Germans lacked enthusiasm for the war, but obediently accepted the push, if with reluctance. Only after the victory and with the possibility of helping themselves to material gain, booty and robbery, did this spirit change.)

Stalin too wanted war. But the Red Army had lost its force after a bloody Jacuzzi that Stalin directed in 1937. There was not a chance to start an invasion of Europe, prepared in all details in former years, at least not for a longtime yet.

It may seem impossible, but Stalin executed nearly all the active top commanders, about ninety percent of generals and colonels and maybe sixty thousand regular officers and specialist technicians. If the armored divisions of the SS without a moment's warning were to invade the staff of the Red Army, they could not match such efficiency. Despite the compliments of his yes-men, Stalin must be aware the Red Army was not fit for any serious business now (but even so, he didn't recognized the half of it, was not enough pessimistic in his evaluation).

That is why he backed Hitler, supplied his endorsement to aggression but didn't push for first place, stayed behind with caution. Only after it was obvious the Western democracies weren't engaging themselves and Poland must fall, did he send the Red Army to fight in alliance with Germany. As a premium from Hitler he accepted about half of Poland, and he continued the policy of close collaboration and accepting yields without risk. As the merit of breaking Rumania's defenses got Moldavia and Bessarabia (Rumania didn't take an active part in war, but formally was an ally of Poland and France; after the Soviet aggression, the remaining population accepted the protection by Germany). Hitler allowed the Soviets to take the Baltic countries, yet already the attack on little Finland proved almost too much and cost the Red Army dearly.

In short, Stalin tried to restore the Army, recommencing an armament program, and meanwhile supported Hitler and took all the leftovers from the stronger predator. He hoped with caution to build up his forces and planned to come into WW II only as all others taking part were already weak, worn out and finished. He wanted to take as prey the rubble and ruins of all Europe, or at least Germany, the promised land of communism Lenin had pointed to.

From the beginning of the Revolution and the coming into existence of the Soviets, Lenin was obsessed to unite the Soviets with Germany, to put together Russia reserves with German technology and knowledge. This would be a guarantee of a successful world revolution, and this was the heritage he left to his successors.

There was a widespread claim the Germans provided the transport for Lenin and the managing board of the Bolshevik party via German territory and after the neutral Sweden with a concrete mission, to crash and destroy Russia. Revolution should - some analogy to biological warfare with Bolsheviks as vector of pestilence - destroy the enemy. This is obviously a vicious simplification, although as in all successful lies, there is a grain of truth.

The fact remains that Lenin before the journey, as well as during the transport, continued talks with the German General Staff including such commitments (low-level talks, being obviously initially undervaluated). After that he performed his duties on the playing board, removing Russia from the war. Nevertheless, Lenin was too great a person to be considered only an agent. He fulfilled the contract, but only because this had always been in his plans and on top, gratis, spread the germs of the same pest between German soldiers.

To be sure, the Germans at the last minute made problems, pulling out from the already agreed and accepted deal and demanding more territory and extra conditions. But Lenin lavishly and freely disposed of large areas of Russia and accepted all demands, because his purpose was a future takeover of all Germany. As earlier in Russia, he applied to the German Army the tried-and-true ways of Bolshevik propaganda. The more German soldiers came and the deeper into Russia, the better it would be. Especially, contact between the common soldiers, the low ranks of the German Army and the loyal Bolsheviks remained good. In result, a plurality of Germans on the east side, except for of the officer corps, got bolshevized. They accepted even the trivial communist forms, as for example the councils of soldiers, or soldiers and labor.

Impossible to forecast exactly the future, history did not take the shape expected by Lenin. First, WW I ended and Germany surrendered too early, before the communists had convinced enough German soldiers and prepared the ground. Then, the first revolution in Germany succeeded and the country after the truce became a Republic; but the second, tried by the communist Spartacus Bund (Union) in December 1918, failed. There was more fighting, but the communist did not get the upper hand, although for a time the balance was unclear and the Communist Party remained in Germany the strongest, but alone.

Also in Russia, when the Bolsheviks lost their patrons and protectors, a heavy fighting resulted and for a time the white counterrevolution had better chances, but finally the Red Army overcame. It was a half triumph, the Bolsheviks kept Russia, but could not at the critical time help their comrades in Germany, where still they had some chances.

Immediately after deciding civil war in Russia, Lenin collected all disposable power and threw all the troops toward Germany. Intentionally the author does not mention Poland, the matter would not have concerned Poland at all and Lenin would have left the country in peace, if there existed any other way open. This exactly was the only cause of war with Poland, not any ethnic questions nor dispute over territory, nor even the ambition of Poles to restore the old border on the east of the former Res Publica. Borders historic, but already not ethnic, because a big part of the population there was already russicized. Maybe Piłsudski and some number of Poles, who dreamed about reviving the old model federal state, involuntary helped Lenin to create a pretext for war. However, even if Poland resigned from any questionable territories, accepting the border on Bug or leaving a large part of its people even to Vistula, it would make no difference. Lenin could take only one-way to the glorious triumph of global revolution via Berlin. His access there lay over the dead body of Poland.

Attack on Poland met with full approval and satisfaction in Germany. Although the recently defeated Germany could not take an active part in this war, except for of local fighting in Silesia, it backed Russia all the way. First, they cut all transports to Poland, not only the railways, but also the ships including the seaport Gdańsk. The town was formally a free city, but had to admit transport needed by Poland, with full autonomy and liberties left. At war, supply from the west had for Poland a vital importance. Tension mounted on the Polish-German border. If an all-out attack was not expected, nevertheless this claimed some forces much needed on the front. And finally in the Red Army fought regiments of German Volunteers, experienced soldiers of WW I, similar to the later "International Brigades." But probably this fact was not a mark of hostility from the Germans, only a few may have had personal or ideological grounds. Rather, it came about when many German soldiers could not evacuate in time and now took the opportunity to move west and if possible, to return to Germany.

Any luck of the Red Army the German press met with full enthusiasm, rather curious, because the German government had only temporarily quelled one communist revolt. The approaching Red Army would again activate the communists and result in great problems.

The Soviets officially announced that, when they won, they would create a Soviet Poland, which with other similar "autonomous, independent republics" would become an internal part of CCCP. However, the Polish lands annexed by Prussia, including Silesia, Greatpoland and Pomerania, were to return to Germany. To the Polish communists they explained that in the future, united Europe, the question of borders would take a secondary importance. Anyway all people would be brothers and just now such a declaration was a tactical need to win over the sympathy of Germans.

Lenin planed, after winning the war, to fix a "border of friendship" with Germany, allowing for close contacts and a step-by-step infiltration with amicable affiliation and use of the already-settled collaboration of German communists. To say it short, to finish the task started so effectively in the German occupation army, prematurely stopped by the surrender and evacuation from Russia. Nevertheless, it would cause creating strong and numerous party that almost took the upper hand. With a little help from the neighborhood, accompanied secretly by supply of arms and material from the Red Army, the proceedings could still be completed. Comrade Carl Radek (Sobelson), Lenin's expert and proxy on contacts with KPD (German Communist Party), was sure the balance of power would sway inevitably to the communist side. The "considerate help" of the Red Army would be unnecessary, if nothing unexpected occurred; but forces should be held close as a reserve.

Only the Poles looked at this matter without such a sympathetic, broad understanding, for them it was a necessary defense. The same invader who had destroyed their country and for a century and a half had held them in slavery, now came at them again, attacking their freedom.

The Warsaw battle, obviously planned by Piłsudski after the Prądzyński model from 1831 (a wide banking from the right side and cutting the back lines of the Army, attacking Warsaw), was decisive. Piłsudski might not have the military experience and expertise, but he had studied in detail the history, strategy and tactics of the Polish risings in 1831 and 1863 and had noticed the analogy. For the next eighteen years the future of Europe changed, maybe the whole world too.

A large communist power including both Russia and Germany did not come into existence. The future of the world turned another way. The Soviets and Germany remained separated, couldn't produce a military superpower, guarantee the success of the communist revolution. This determined not only the next year's, but probably also the reality we live in now, our contemporary world.

To start with, the German General Staff stopped to exist, and a few years later came the death of Lenin. But the mutual testament about merger of assets and power remained current and looked attractive. Did not Germany for four years oppose almost the whole world, did it not for a time look as if, with only second-best allies, she might best the prime powers? What could she not carry out, if she had the huge reserves of Russia's raw materials, the vast, fertile soil and many people at her disposal and not against? In the last year of WW I Germany lasted not only on borrowed time, but also on power taken, saying it plain, robbed from the Russian Empire. It came too late to turn the tables, but anyway mastering of Russia was beneficial for the declining German economy and production.

The ravenously predatory Bolshevik fought with everyone around and wanted to increase his reign to the entire world, to expand the revolution at any price. The Germans, but only the defeated Germans, wanting revenge, would be a great ally. What could the Soviets carry out with German economy, technology and engineering? The idea seemed terrific for both sides; there was only a small flaw. Who in the unit should be a horse and who the rider? With Lenin the problem would not have arisen, he would be the natural chief. But now, both sides had already specific expectations and expected the question would resolve to their advantage.

That being so, the representatives of the Soviets and Germany closed in Rafallo a secret treaty. Officially it concerned diplomatic and economic questions, including international commerce between the two countries. Unofficially it allowed Germany to produce and develop on Soviet territory weapons restricted after WW I, meaning a cooperation in preparing for WW II. This cooperation could not be too extensive or made too obvious to the world, but it was important. Few people know now the basis of the German Air Force with the most outstanding pilots, almost all the aces, so-called Eichenlaubtraeger mit Schwerten and Brillanten (the top German decoration) with Moelders, trained in the Soviet Union. Exactly near the site where at the end of 1918 and in 1919 started and sometimes returned to Germany the evacuated soldiers, if they had luck (many, both trains and soldiers, dissolved into thin air and vanished).

The flier, adjutant (and galloper) of Hitler, Nicolaus von Below also trained in the Ukraine (probably it had to be Vivupal near Lipetsk). Either von Below got mixed up, or still in his memoirs wanted not to give the exact details). He left memoirs relating his talks with Hitler, who much interested, asked about every detail reported by the officer. Reportedly, Hitler asked specially about the time when the deep mud there dries, and that is why he planned to attack Soviets about the middle of May. However, delayed by the Balkan campaign, he missed the best days. The reports give the impression the elaborate plans for starting WW II were prepared already by the so called "Truppenamt" (meaning the old General Staff in disguise). Hitler changed little, at least before 1939 when the German Army was ready to attack Poland having a force of over two and a half million men. Or maybe he turned back to the options prepared in the past by the Truppenamt, when his plans to win Poland over to his side failed.

This is only a loose impression and the author is not sure of his conclusions. But one is sure: the German-Soviet alliance and decision to start the war together were not a spontaneous improvisation of Hitler, but had a long history. For a time Hitler seemed to give up on this project, he proposed to fix the West in a short Blitz (first taking revenge on France). Only then to invade the Soviets and take all - but put at an impasse, he unexpectedly drew out an ace from the sleeve (or maybe the rabbit from a hat). But these plans were prepared a longtime before. Hitler only continued the task started by others.

Capsule: Lenin's project, creative developments by Hitler and Stalin.

Hitler arrived at the top across the dead bodies of the German communists. Without these victims, he would remain a nobody. After the lost war, which caused a swift expansion of communism, private armies created in Germany, called "Freikorps", fought for money, mainly the communists. They consisted of former experienced front soldiers, now mercenaries and professional killers, who on return from the war did not find their place in the community, nor work and means of support. Hitler, who got an engagement as propagandist and an educative-recreation instructor, proved to be good talking to the Freikorps members, adapting the ideology to their low intellectual level. And next decided to enrich this mixture with the most popular slogans, borrowed directly from the communists and directly encouraging the worst, undermost instincts. But they were catching to the ear and he became popular in the mercenaries' circles.

From this moment, Hitler advanced from success to success. The men from Freikorps took to him at once and he was able to recruit in addition many strong, brutal primitives. Streets of German towns literally flowed with blood, mostly of communists, who fought back. Being efficient in organizing such crimes, Hitler got rich sponsors and protectors of influence, the patrons of Freikorps transferred their patronage to him. He never disappointed them, united the extreme radicals and the private troops in one party. After coming to power, he destroyed the biggest German party, the KPD. Applying the most bestial methods of state terror, he added to them a new expertise copying freely from the pattern developed by the Soviets. The bestial ways and means fetched abomination in the civilized word, but some part of people excused this, claiming that although inhuman, these tortures apply to those who had introduced them. They may now taste their own medicine. But Hitler used the terror not only on communists but transferred these tools to all the opposition and especially the Jews. At last this touched the public opinion, especially with murders following, not yet in mass but individual.

The obvious mental aberration of racist theory caused Hitler at first to reject any plans of cooperation with Russia, not even if controlled by Germans. He was sure there existed not any Russian nation, but only a worthless mixture of mongrels, not fit to be even a horse honored to bear a German in a saddle. At most they could be a manure to fertilize the soil which in future would be needed to breed a hundred, next two hundred million Germans of clear Nordic type.

But the most extraordinary was that Stalin not only looked on passively, but in deep secret actively helped Hitler to kill the communists in Germany. Stalin could chose among several options to help, if only in part, the German comrades, from a material help to allowing them shelter, a political sanctuary in Russia, not mentioning conspiracy and secret illegal means. But he clearly did not want to. To the contrary it was his doing that ruined the last reasonable chance of communist revolution in Thuringen, where they still kept a strong position. Stalin replaced the Soviet spy net and agents in Germany, ordering the new men never to help German communists. This could be explained by the need for conspiracy, but he ordered also the secret liquidation of some outstanding personalities, natural leaders and whole cells of communist organization.

The KPD, the most sturdy party in Germany, could not survive the blows of Hitler's ax simultaneously with poisonous stings from Stalin, the top leader and commander, prophet, saint and supreme God to all communists of the world.

The fugitives who expected to find shelter in Russia were executed except of those, who agreed to help the executioners from the GPU, next the NKWD and later the KGB betraying their comrades, going back on friends. The rest of the German fugitives remaining under investigation, Stalin sold down the river directly into the hands of the Gestapo. It was a gesture of goodwill to Hitler and took place just after conqueringoland and the mutual parade of victory in Brześć (Brest).

In Russia remained secretly only the worst scum, proven provocateurs and collaborators of the NKWD, guilty of the murder of their comrades. They would form a base for future reconstruction of a new communist party in Germany, dedicated fully to Stalin.

Even today the motives of Stalin are obscure. Sure it is not an easy task to understand such a dark, muddy mind. Did he, backing Hitler, hope to find a satisfactory and necessary instrument to destroy the Western democracies and destroy order and law in Europe, creating an easy prey? And incidentally, let the Germans too lose much blood? Making from the Nazi a temporary, exchangeable tool to plow the bloody soil, giant graveyard with rubble and corpses for the splendid crop of communist revolution?

Or was it only a personal fascination of one monster with another? A great love for a brotherly soul, as bad as his own?

The one doesn't exclude the other. Only one of these two, let's use an inadequate word, "people" could survive, as they both wanted the whole world. But there are mental deviations in which one person wants to destroy another whom he worships and glorifies. Apllying a pattern: this was indeed a mighty and formidable hunter, but finally it is I who ate him, not the other way around. The worth of killed opponent increases one's own value, power and edge.

To a sound common sense both of the eventualities seem unbelievable. The first appears absurd, because it would be necessary to presume Stalin had an extraordinary capacity for anticipating the future, more than a prophet, instead rather like a professional fortune-teller. An exceptional knowledge of human or maybe bestial nature would be needed. To breed a tiger till he grows strong and big, feeding him with the flesh of his comrades. More, finally direct him so that he selectively attacks victims inaccessible any other way and so blindly, he becomes seriously wounded or killed? An complicated and risky plan. Until now, Stalin had never played such elaborate games and was only too concerned with his own security. Nevertheless, he allowed this tiger to attack himself unexpectedly, almost to the point of being wolfed down. And carried out in a short time so many obvious and stupid blunders it is as plain as the nose on your face that never could a person continue such a devilish business for more than a decade.

The second theory, though, seems taken from a fantasy novel. The only point that speaks for it is the complete breakdown, crumbling to pieces of Stalin personality, when contrary to his opinion, evaluation and assurance the tiger followed him. Never before had Stalin showed symptoms of such panic. For a couple of weeks, he was unable of any role. And this was a man who had experienced many defeats.

To be sure, Stalin was a constant failure; whatever he did went wrong. For a longtime he could not take any independent single task, remaining always in the secondary position. The disaster of the Polish war was his doing, it was he who distracted the "Konarmy" (horse army, the First Cavalry Army) of Budionny (Semyon Budyonny). It was the only reserve Tuchaczewski had at his disposal, at the critical time, in the battle by Warsaw. Stalin wanted at least one private victory, to take Lwów, at the time unmolested, but didn't achieve even this local advantage and finally brought the Red Cavalry to calamity by Komarów. In the Party he went to the top after Lenin's death, as the competing leaders agreed to put him temporarily in front. They assumed such a little no-good creature, a harmless-looking complete zero, may stay put till they decided who should be the chief.

Yet right then and there he proved that he had one talent, ability and zest, which he further developed. It was to manage and organize the deaths. Stalin not only butchered lots and lots of people, which was at the time rather ordinary, not only in Russia, resembling Hitler's strategy and tactic of slaying. Stalin had a preference for murder, including his nearest setting, the people around him, he could not held back. This was his nature, as in the proverbial story about the scorpion.

First he liquidated his patrons and protectors, next all the top leaders and almost every person he met or had worked with, before he went at the top. Next he constantly exchanged his subjects and coworkers, all went the same way at such a tempo that nobody could feel safe in the saddle before his end came. The alternative of a longer life was reserved only for those, not exactly servile and submissive, because he trusted nobody, but rather more obtuse and stupid than himself. The marked failures, primitives with a low mind, unable to solve problems even if their life depended on it, sometimes unable even to perform his plain orders, met with tolerance. So survived Budionny, too stupid and primitive to express any opinion, so after many changes of security chiefs for a longtime stabilized in this position Beria, so survived Chruszczow, who like Claudius mimicked stupidity.

On the tablet of mass-murderers Stalin takes the indisputable first place. The ancient, cruel tyrants are only small potatoes; Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, presented by Hitler as examples when he started the WW II with an attack on Poland, mere hucksters. Even Hitler holds a poor, second place. Well, but Hitler had less time, only one decade in comparison to about three for Stalin. If he had as much time as Stalin to develop his inner ability, maybe it would be a more serious competition. Stalin probably murdered about forty million of his own people in Russia, including those who starved to death, but without counting in the war casualties and those killed in other countries.

With Hitler he prepared the Second World War and then he put fire in the hands of the madman and in the crucial moment of doubt backed him, induced to commit arson. Among the ordinary venial sins there should be mentioned the murders in the neighboring countries, beginning with Poland with about one and a half million dead. (To be exact: there were about one and a half million of ethnic Poles, but about three million Polish citizens, similar to the case of Hitler, who murdered about three million ethnic Poles, but more than six million Polish citizens).

The number of people murdered in the other countries, with Germany included, was also great, but distinctly smaller.

Surely any chain-murder, never mind the scale, is a mental aberration, but such giants we ordinary people are not able to understand. It could develop from the instinct of a beast, the leader of a pack, or a savage tribe cacique, needing erase any competition. Or perhaps the compensation for an inferiority complex, as many say of Hitler. The latter explanation may throw some light on the purpose of secretly seeking out and transporting to Moscow Hitler's skull, which wreckage Stalin ordered conserved. Well, after that, Beria failed the coup to kill Tito, because Stalin demanded his skull too. (Beria tried as hard as he could and returned in panic, but did not meet with punishment. On the contrary, when Stalin saw a failure greater than himself, he decided the man is not dangerous.)

Hitler never felt a similar fascination with Stalin's person; he despised all governments he met in all countries, but Stalin he held in a special contempt. He grew and flourished on communist blood and flesh, at the same time copying their effective methods. He simply continued what bought him success. As we have seen, his career began with creating ideology for gangs of professional killers and mercenaries. In his only political trial he declared the mission of his life to destruct all Marxists. Interesting, how would he react, if hewere made aware he was inspired and aided secretly in the task by Stalin.

In this show he was so convincing that he united all the armed bands and became their prophet. The secret was simple, he promised easily whatever people wanted and instinctively guessed at the right moment what appeared most attractive. This, and much more - he even took over many popular slogans, copying Lenin (who came to the top promising soil to the peasants and next took away all their soil). But this proved practical: enormous lies brought enormous results.

He had no restrictions, always ready to pick anyone's mind property, if the thought looked promising. Hitler had an eclectic mind, the pattern he created consisted of a new combination of already known elements, rather than original ideas. So he copied lavishly and liberally, not only from the communists. He presented as examples Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, but also the effective and ruthless Caesar and other ancient Romans. Memorized the effective in full extermination of the Carthaginians and applied to the Helvets. These, called allies of Rome, must first disarm and then got impossible tasks. Finally became displaced where no one believed in the possibility of survival the winter, the mountains of today's Switzerland. At the same time Hitler was interested in ways of mafia and even more in the medieval secret organizations, from the Round Table Knights to the Knights Templar and the Rosicrucians. He ordered extensive, almost mad explorations hoping for some usable pattern, gave orders for the serious study of the ways of these groups, from US gangsters to ancient Pythagoreans.

To say it short, he never neglected any possibility, however faint or unlikely, to find anything that could be useful and did not give a damn if the found fragment surpassed normal ethics, if only there was some temporary profit. And then he would move on to the next plan, a game with higher stakes, like a player who, winning or losing, gets more and more deeply involved in the gamble. It was a hard need, there were serious problems and he could only run away forward.

The point is that if he became simultaneously Alexander the Great, Emperor of China and Caesar of Rome, he still could not pay off all the gangs of ruffians, mercenaries, strong men, roughnecks and simply common hooligans. All the bandits and criminals who had promoted him and up to now, only for promises. They wanted to get something for their services, or take it themselves.

That is why he created a special, formally open but internally top secret organization, quasi-knight order, quasi-religious order, dedicated to death, the art of killing, fidelity and worship of his person. This closed organization, temporarily restricted to one hundred thousand members of picked men, the black SS, was given his blessing and set on the SA, producing a slaughterhouse. After the murder of all the leaders, the remaining three million brown SA, yelping with their tails between their legs, never dared to demand anything or to be anything other than humbly obedient.

It is a well-known fact that every culprit will in time return to the arena of his first crimes, especially if they ended successfully. Hitler missed the taste of communist blood, after they were already liquidated in Germany. This splashed blood assured his financing, in secrecy or open, from rich, influential and powerful people. People who considered communism the essence of evil and a dangerous pest and accepted the idea to fight the devil with Beelzebub, let one monster devour another monster. This was precisely the basis of his former success and Hitler hoped be able to expand this on a global scale, offering something like a profitable international system of protection.

In Germany, his promised effect being already accomplished, he was theoretically dispensable, but he had become so powerful now that he needed no financing., It was a privilege to offer money to the Nazi, he could take anything wanted. But on the other hand, finance could not be ignored entirely as he must still buy more and more dedicated subjects. So he now institutionally robbed his former patrons, but not too much, at first with some temperance.

For centuries in Europe, especially in Germany, traditionally the persecuted and robbed part of the population were the Jews. That was the main cause for migrating almost all of them to Poland, but as this country dropped and Europe turned more civilized, they again moved west, some further over the ocean. They were industrious people and on average better educated, and those living now in Germany were well off. The historic experience prompted Hitler to the opinion they represented a fat bite and had not enough strength to defend themselves. In fact, an ideal prey he could throw to his believers. (Meanwhile the cult of Hitler, like the cult of Stalin, lost rational appearances, becoming a quasi-religion.)

It is difficult to understand the events that followed, robbery is not equivalent with murder. But history has preserved many examples when the meekness and lack of resistance of the victims increased the fury and passion of the aggressors. For example the Irish monks at first were for the Vikings only easy victims, but with time they became a prey hunted down for pleasure, like the national sport of the fox chase. Only not just over fields a few miles, but overseas and via ocean, beyond the limits of the known world. The Vikings chased the Irish monks to Iceland, Greenland and finally North America, just so, in the frenzy of murder. There is some analogy with the Jews. Hitler's followers gradually lost sound reason, their leader being a raving maniac, right from the start fit for a mental asylum. In this Beck was absolutely correct.

Beyond Germany's borders, Hitler found powerful backers with much influence, but gradually they backed out, preferred to remain in the background. So it was not after all an absurdity when in the middle of WW II, after attack on the Soviets, he tried to change alliances and make amends with Britain. He expected that as a, God forbid, crusader, fighting the communists, he might again influence public opinion, regain the confidence of the "Beautiful People," the great, powerful and rich. Now he could realize their deepest dreams, liquidation of the home of global Marxism. But his proxy Hess met decidedly closed doors.

At the peak of his career, Hitler forgot all about the inferiority complex of youth. He was sure now he was a genius and saw no need to hide his light under a bushel. He never declared in public how stupid other people were, but he considered them all fools. He was enlightened at the WW I, when as a company and later battalion runner he survived by four the average half-life term of runners, simply because when possible, he transported the orders and news after dark. This should be obvious to anyone, however clearly it was not.

He only then understood what stupid fools the officers were, so proud of their education, how idiotic were the standing orders. Only the captain Hess had enough brains to accept the sound proposition and allow the soldier to keep a little dog. A fainthearted doggie, which Hitler had to carry along, but with a good nose. Sensing the enemy's smell it began to tremble with fear, an excellent private warning system, better than today's radar. Inconsistent with the standing orders this made the soldier careful. (Later, a small doggie would be not good for Hitler's image, it had to be at least a wolf).

However, one clever captain could not win the whole war. Maybe there were other intelligent officers too, but Hitler never met any. About the generals and top commanders, not only Hitler, but all the soldiers with front experience had no illusions. For sure Germany would win the war ten times over, if only on the top was someone with a head. Hitler was convinced, he in person would do much better, simply removing the most inept, ridiculous or rather tragic blunders of warfare. With luck, the philistines opposite were not a bit wiser. Only too late, in the last offensive did Germany apply some better, sober-minded tactics, but the Americans came, too much for them.

After WW I as well, the flow of current affairs should be clear to any sound mind. The Bolsheviks spread their influence because they told the people only what they wanted to hear. Promised anything, never mind the truth. The obvious course now would be to do the same, tell and promise what the people wanted most. Pick out and copy the most popular phrases and slant, the opposite side was only telling lies. This was true, about both sides. Confrontation of mercenaries with a mass movement was not enough, but confrontation of two opposite mass movements with mercenaries and better paid killers on one side should succeed. A regular or paid force is always a deciding extra ace, as confirmed by the example of the German Army in Russia, the presence of which allowed the communist Revolution to start.

Hitler's expectations came true, he from the start never doubted they would - and he snatched the power, determined never to let it slip. (As we have seen, he was probably unaware of the secret backing by Stalin). The next step was clear and simple. Around Germany, all the countries were steered by cretins and imbeciles, he could always make them dizzy. Feeling his superiority, could persuade them to anything. In fact, they never had any real power, they merely fought constantly among themselves about small fragments, for the appearance of power. So busy with competition that for a small advantage, a short moment on the top they would be ready to ally with the devil. He could manipulate them at will, even more easily than his subjects. Even if he appeared a bad wolf, they would show they could cooperate with a dangerous strong neighbor with less problems than their competitors. They would accept any deal he offered, in fact it would be they who would come with servile propositions, offer better deals, care about his best interest. No need to make demands, they would fetch him anything he desired and be happy if he only accepted the offer from their hands. The competitors wouldn't be able to act so polite, so diplomatic. That is exactly what they call appeasement.

So what could go wrong? There was this tomfool behind the ocean. Making himself ridiculous with preaching, moralizing, meddling into Europe's affaires and trying to tutor a regular genius. But with luck, he had enough problems in his own backyard, too much for a serious intervention. The genius on top (that being him, Hitler) had a precise plan, a detailed account for every future day and hour.

Only Stalin might be dangerous, well in control and sitting strong in the saddle. But impossible as a serious opponent, only a stupid, bloody beast. Hitler as a genius had a sky-high advantage over the obtuse primitive, could always manipulate him. He understood him just as if he could look straight into his head.

And right, now this was to be proven. In the year 1936 Hitler had only just began the armament program, Stalin had already finished his.

Over the last fifteen years the Soviets, at an unbelievable cost of renouncements, offers, starvation, accidental deaths from exhaustion or bullets, flogging - had achieved something astonishing: the strongest army in the world. An army where the privileged officers, united by an "esprit de corps," and the privileged soldiers strongly believed they were chosen for great deeds, for spreading The Great Revolution across the whole world. An army equipped in all the new wonders of technology that other armies only discussed and studied, with divisions and corps fully mechanized. The Red Army had in-service almost ten thousand tanks when Guderian was only just making plans for organizing an armored division and the German soldiers were studying the tactics with wooden models. Much later, Germany started the war in 1939 with only about three thousand.

At the maneuvers near Kiev in 1935, the Soviets made a show-landing of a whole airborne division, while in Germany General Student had just persuaded Hitler of the possibility of dropping soldiers with parachutes. Elsewhere dropping of a few platoons was almost a wonder. Besides, the Red Air Force had more than five thousand planes, about ten times as many as Germany, which reached four thousand only in 1939. German pilots trained in the Soviet Union by the Soviets.

The Soviet tank designed by Christie came into mass production as the BT model ("Bistrochodnyj," or "speedy" tank), able to move at speeds of up to a hundred kilometers an hour. With machineguns, only American gangsters were so equipped. Yes, the Red Army was ready and should begin action now.

Could all the fools still be unaware of this? All of Europe, including Germany, remained unprepared for even defensive warfare, not to mention an early preemptive attack.

Hitler commissioned a detailed study, which suggested the Red Army now would be able to push through Poland in a couple of months, and continue on Germany. Any delay in Poland even with German help would be immaterial, because the Red Army could begin the offensive in Germany before closing the Polish campaign. That was why the divisions of paratroopers trained - and the flying tanks were devised. (To be exact, they were actually gliding tanks. They could glide in the air only once and with luck, might arrive in one-piece. Before action, the wings had to be destroyed with explosives.) In either case, traditional tanks would be enough, the speedy BT on good expressways could in just days cross Germany to the Maginot line (eventual changing the tracks for wheels in about half an hour). From there Stalin would have several choices, from amicable contacts with the "Front Populaire" in France to applying force; anyway in a short time all Europe could become communist.

"Well," continued Hitler, "a good point, Stalin is a suspicious coward, slow with decisions. He probably will wait, skulk, lurk and wait again. Then he'll ask if all is ready and if there is any chance of possible misfortune, and all around will assure him success is guaranteed. Then he will wait again for some shock or ugly business happening in Europe. The only time he will ever act with lightning speed is when he is afraid for his safety. Then he will kill first, think later."

Hitler inferred himself to be the person in Europe making the worst turmoil. If for a time he could speak about peace and how bad and ugly war is, which he knew from experience as former front soldier, it would temporarily soothe all around and allow him time to plan. He, in Stalin's place, would not wait a moment, since the moment all is perfect ready, it begins to become outdated. An army is an expensive instrument and should be created only for a concrete task. If it does not fight, it decays. If it was possible to delay the deciding moment a few years, the Red Army would go down from a maximum potency, while the Wehrmacht, on the other hand, would improve.

It would be best to find any temporary engagement for Stalin, spur him with some problem. What may interest him most? The answer on this question was not too difficult. Right from coming to power Stalin saw around only never-ending gangs of degenerates, renegades, perverts and of course traitors. His preferred hobby was crushing them, damage, destroy, maim, mutilate, smash, squash and grind. Look a the chapter titles of "The brief course of affairs of WKP(b)" - history of Bolsheviks, his straight words in ugly slang.

He was, like Hitler, a natural, born killer, all the time the first, with Hitler on a poor second place. Well, but he could murder easy and never cared about keeping up appearances, when Hitler at first tried to control himself, and next had not enough time. If Hitler may continue some umpteen years longer, maybe the top place would become his. Anyway, Hitler did it from preference, when Stalin from need. He automatically suspected all people he saw, especially from close environment. His first thought, at any new contact, would be: "Can he kill me?" - and the second: "Can I do kill him first?" He never tried to resist his instinct. So most logical would be to push a suspicion, there is something rotten in the Red Army, in the Command, between people he knew and already must have suspect.

Hitler ordered in a deep secrecy, not to the German State or Military Intelligence ("Abwehr"), suspecting the Soviets may watch this, but to his new, private SS Intelligence fabricating of false documents. For the forgery they used original documents from bygone times, when Red Army cooperated close with Reichswehr; also the best „artist" in profession, pulled from prison. Not a smallest footprint remained. However, after years people tell the name of Franc Putzig, a superstar, who about the time vanished from prison, the world and never reappeared.

Next, so prepared masterpiece SS allowed to pilfer by a known and stalked by Germans agent of Czech intelligence, seemingly a superhuman task, ostentatious despite great dangers. He too was slain, but only in the Czech capital Prag. President Benesh, who persistently took utmost care about good relations with Soviets sent the papers straight to Stalin.

Capsule: History of the Decline and Fall of the first mechanized army.

Hitler never expected such an extreme reaction from Stalin, exceeding his greatest hopes. It was too good to be true, out of proportion. Over the next few years the impressive Red Army, the most modern, bold and powerful in the world, crumbled to a ruin, lost any fighting ability. Neither the number of men nor the budget shrank, but the army, beheaded and decaying, lost its proper organization. The institution became a vague leftover, a confused mob in panic.

The memoirs of the "less guilty generals," who with luck missed the shooting party and survived the Gulags, tell they had to start from scratch to form the troops again. About 1939, because of the alarming international conditions and under tight control as possible traitors, some described their efforts. A difficult work, to compose those books and journals, only cautiously mentioning the true condition of soldiers. More so, in the later "Winter War" with Finland they had to present the story as heroic and famous from the viewpoint of the Soviets. Yet it was a war between a vast country with more soldiers than the entire population of the small opponent. Despite all the propaganda, the Red Army suffered a terrible toll and discredit.

The divisions, including the elite Guard, stationed in Leningrad (the former Petrograd), the second capital of the Soviets, surely had a full quota, but not of soldiers; it was a demoralized, rotten crew without elementary knowledge in warfare. They learned only the political and ideological indoctrination from the commissars and this with zeal under duress, but forgot any combat training. Besides, the soldiers had to care on their own living needs. Supplies didn't dry up full, to be sure, but came irregular and not exactly what was necessary. Transports were a guess, they could contain food or just as likely anything unexpected. Occasional shooting of the officers responsible for logistics didn't correct the sad circumstances. During the summer maneuvers especially, the troops had to build or arrange for themselves their quarters, supplies and living conditions; the combat exercise, if any, came last. (On the other hand, thieving a few potatoes surely is a practical war exercise.)

Both the ranks and the plain soldiers hadn't a bloody notion about servicing and maintenance of the technical equipment, especially if modern. This happened because not only the officers had been subjected to the purges, some soldiers too, especially the educated specialists and technicians. It was not so much an issue of them all having been shot, but a matter of simple caution: an education equal to a ticket to the Gulag. In such conditions it was better to hold a distance, "don't touch or you may click it the wrong way" and if something broke down, the responsibility for a deliberate sabotage could be death. Besides, the equipment might be in the troop's register, but only a part was in proper condition, a part not functioning at all, or functioning but defective and faulty. Nobody was willing to inspect either the books or the gadgets, taking on himself the responsibility and danger. In fact all the specialized services of the army remained, but paralyzed: nothing functioned correctly, a clear pell-mell.

Of course, none of the reinstituted commanders dared to report openly about what he noted. It would be a suicide in the most distasteful way. Each must cope with these matters himself, if not, he would be sentenced again with less chance of survival the second time. Back came the old saying, more sweat in training means less blood in real fighting. The commander had to make the soldiers, and the remaining old and newly promoted officers, sweat, but heavy, including himself too.

A good question, whether the whole deadly purge with its effects for world history, could be the result of a simple provocation by Hitler? Was it only a devil's idea, a perfidy, a cunning if smart untruth, or was there any ground in facts that eventually emerged? In short, could there have been any real conspiracy in the Red Army?

Until today, this question remains unanswered and probably never shall be. They are neither living witnesses nor anybody who has any knowledge, however distantly related, of anyone involved. This case was like a fatal virus: everybody who had any contact, died.

But sound reason, plain logic dictates the existence of any conspiracy within the top command of the Red Army was hardly probable. First, there was never any resistance, none riots occurred. If there were any organization, any corporate body, then in face of a supreme threat, where nobody could survive and nobody had anything more to lose, there would have been some response. It is impossible, that all culprits would drop defense, passively awaiting their fate, not even trying to run. In fact, if there had been a secret organization, the men would have been better prepared. A standard procedure between professionals, especially the staff, would be to have ready an alarm plan. They could at least try to fight. It is much better to die fighting than to be executed, and it seems impossible that all would accept execution without resistance (more so if they were professional warriors and so conditioned). Yet nothing like this happened, even though the killing continued a longtime (well into middle of 1938) and the numbers grew rapidly.

The lack of any proof, material evidence may be for a proper communist considered only a bourgeoisie superstition, no sense to stretch this point. In Russia all accused people always admitted their guilt and this was enough for the jury, without further evidence. In fact there was no difference between accused and guilty.

But the second and most important, deciding argument is that before rubbing out the Red Army cadres, Stalin "fed and bred them," in fact brought them large profits. He was not only a useful and necessary man, but a providential benefactor. The premise is simple enough: an army is always an expensive game, needing money, more money and again money. On the other side and luckily for the people, modern military regimes or governments have been unable to produce the money they needed themselves, as if military and economic education excluded each other. From times of the Roman Empire, every time the army took over the finances, it ended with ruin and economic disaster, subsequently affecting the army itself. To say it short, in the long run the purse controls the army, if it is enough heavy to guarantee the necessary resources.

Russia after its lost war and terrible revolution was a penniless country, with minimal national income. Nevertheless even with the people weak and hungry, living in extreme poverty, Stalin compelled them to work beyond their limits for a nominal pay of maybe twenty percent of the work's real value. Of all the budget, probably half was spent on industrialization, armaments, weapons development (research included) and the Army. The rest on the security forces, the Party and administration. Regardless of how many million died, the ironworks, blast furnaces, metallurgical great ovens in Magnitogorsk, had to work on full-time. Even more so, the factories for tractors and bulldozers in Kharkov and Stalingrad, unofficially producing tanks (the BT, T28 and the T34 models). In the armaments program no extension was allowed, better respect the timetable or heads would roll. Already in 1935 and 1936 the Red Army had achieved a degree of power the German Army was not able to gain until the end of 1939. No other leader could bring such effects; no one could employ such duress, stress and inhuman methods, exacting obedience and discipline. Make the poor creatures work without rest, with not enough food - in fact without hope - till death. And without protest, which would speed up the death.

The Nazi slogan "cannons instead of butter" was by comparison small potatoes. The Soviets got no foreign credit, no loans; they could not build the army on borrowed money as Germany did. The total monstrous weight, in form of indirect tax, a deep cut in effective wages, rested first on the leading, progressive classes of workers and peasants. Even the so-called "parasites" cached and imprisoned in the Gulags, had to work first and die later. As in the verse about building Petrograd: "Tsar Peter bid a hundred thousand peasants to place in the earth a hundred thousand wooden trunks, on these trunks mixed with dead bodies of Muscovites he build…." But now it concerned not hundreds of thousands, but millions of dead, under the monstrous constructions.

Compared with the common inferno, the Red Army surely represented the privileged upper crust. They had a better life, didn't know hunger, worked hard but felt the sense and value of it. Prepared themselves to great doings, with possible loss of life, but certain of being the chosen "to saddle and ride the mare of history," taking their position on "the edge of the proletariat's sword." What united them was the feeling, that soon it would begin, an all-out offensive on all fronts, nobody and nothing could hold them back till they conquered the world. Those who survived would take the honor. It was an army created for victory; with one strong thump, pass to the Atlantic Ocean, or perhaps only to the Maginot Line, to France. This country with its Popular Front under Blum might be prompted to join with the Soviets, adding a combined weight in the Spanish civil war.

If not the whole world at once, then at least all Europe. Forgetting the primary task of the army, protection of its own territory, they threw their hearts over to the cause of the Great World Revolution. All the great prospects being the doing of Stalin, the Red Army was aware of this and loyal in full, or at least temporary.

Perhaps after the triumph of the Red Army, conquering the world or a large part of it, the command would exchange the Great Leader; Stalin might become unnecessary. Sure Tuchaczewski and his close coworkers had a low opinion of Stalin, inept in strategy and tactics, as shown by the Polish war. On the other side, Stalin for a longtime suspected the former top commander, Frunze, of Bonapartism. And after his death (probably aided by Stalin), suspected now Tuchaczewski.

But Tuchaczewski was not a Napoleon, had neither the eagle eye nor the ambitions. Yes, he was a competent and outstanding officer, then a good general, but not good enough for the role of top commander. Rather an obedient and servile subordinate, performer of orders, as he showed during the marines' revolt in Kronsztad. He executed them in mass, although he didn't like pushing the mob of prisoners under the ice in the freezing seawater. Not for a moment did he consider the possibility of a coup d'etat, although at that point he had in his hand enough power. Could take the government and close a deal with the marines, holding all the aces with great chances for continuation. But he had the nature of a subject and remained so, only wanting some independence in his professional capacity, when working for the Army. He was sure he knew his job better and could be stubborn, even in front of Stalin.

Angus had some sense of this, as around June 1937 he heard his parents discussing the Tuchaczewski trial, in company with other top commanders of the Red Army. Or rather a show conducted in public, in the presence of newspaper correspondents, being surely a top hit of the universe. Father said he couldn't understand why the accused abstained from all defense and declared themselves guilty. On this Mother commented, this happened before, the accused in the witches' trials also confessed all and often added more imaginary sins.

"Yes," answered father, "but they were women, the weak sex, and these are cool and hard customers, who repeatedly stared in the face of death on the battlefield. Came to their rank in the war, many times promoted for courage and bravery; the chosen best."

These overheard words aroused the boy's interest. He even bought a copy of the "Illustrated Courier Daily," always first with sensation news, with excellent reportage service. He also read any newspaper he could lay hands on. Because of dwindling finances, next he began to read the news in the Railroad library, where he often changed the books in place of his father. As usual, the different papers presented different comments, but similar descriptions of facts. The correspondents of all countries hunted in Moscow for facts and extra bits, even slight ones. Again the Illustrated Courier was the first where he read about the death of Jan Gamarnik, which preceded the following arrest.

Gamarnik was a Jewish renegade, an ardent, fanatical communist, the head of the Political Education Directorate, first Deputy of the People's Commissariat for Defense and a member of the Party Central Committee responsible for the Army. In fact, it was a more complex pattern, in the Army he was first deputy of Tukhachevsky but in the Party his superior. Anyway, it has no importance, because the two worked closely together, both in the Army and in the Party. Maybe close friends, but it needs telling that Gamarnik came from the Far East Army, where he had a similar duty by Marshal Bluecher. They too called themselves friends, nevertheless Gamarnik in his new role denounced Bluecher both in the Party and in the Army. The word friendship had probably a temporary meaning, based on common interest.

According to the news, Gamarnik was working late at night over a pile of papers, when the crew of NKWD forcibly entered the house. On announcement of arrest, he protested fiercely, showing the papers. Said he was working on an important report he must present at the Central Committee session the next day; after that, he would be at the disposition of NKWD. Gamarnik was a large and powerful man, but without a chance. Shot repeatedly through the head he dropped on the table, and a pool of blood made all the papers unreadable. This point was excessively stretched by all the sources, but perhaps necessary to leave unanswered the question, what did the papers contain. Or maybe the GPU agents, after seeing them, were terrified that anyone knowing the contents had not a chance for survival. So they tried a lie, hoping by this to cheat their own death. We shall return to this story later.

Within a few days, NKWD arrested Tukhachevsky and seven top generals and in rapid session the military tribunal sentenced them all to death. They were executed the xt morning. The tribunal continued in the presence of Soviets correspondents. According to their reports the defendants did not defend the imaginary crimes, telling names, confirming whatever the investigators demanded from them.

Afterwards appeared in the press the retroactive news that already at the May 1st Parade, Tukhachevsky stood alone, isolated and was transferred from Moscow as Commander of the Volga District. Also Marshal Yakir from the command of the Kiev District got a transfer to the Leningrad District. This was a bad omen, but Tukhachevsky had been transferred before, once to the Leningrad District. However he came back and even learned much there, about technique (this knowledge resulted in his ideas of a Mechanized Army and a deep breakthrough).

The accused not only confessed all that their tormentors demanded, but invented more crimes, adding others to the list of accused. The tens of those first sentenced and killed, pointed out hundreds. The hundreds became thousands and then started an avalanche, without public trials and a great part killed without any trial at all, or the formalities fixed after the death of the suspects. This was called a purge in the army.

Similar purges had happened before, but never with such high numbers of guilty=dead. In the Party, in the security organs (Czeka, GPU, NKWD, KGB, the labels changed), most of the top functionaries ended their career in a death cell. But in the Army, all active top commanders were executed and ten of eleven deputies in the People's Commissariat of Defense. All except the old crony of Stalin, Budyonny and the Commissar of Defense Voroshilov. He was the commander at Volgograd with Stalin as political commissar. Stalin first tasted the mass murders on a river barge, where he could conveniently dispose of the dead bodies in tens and hundreds. They could not effectively defend the town, the "Whites" took it, but all the counterrevolutionaries were so completely wiped out, the Whites gained nothing. Now Voroshilov remained in office, necessary to sign the death sentences and put up the military tribunals. The second of Stalin's old cronies, the mentioned Budyonny, presided over the more important ones.

Except for these two, all Soviet marshals were shot, all contemporary top commanders, about ninety percent of generals. (This included 60 of 67 corps commanders, 136 of 190 division commanders, 221 of 390 brigade commanders.) Also about ninety percent of colonels, all in all about thirty-five thousand officers and an unknown number of noncommissioned officers and soldiers. Nobody made out a total account, but the number of victims probably exceeded seventy thousand, chicken-feed comparing with all victims in all the purges.

But the result was devastating. Already in 1940, when in the face of imminent war Stalin tried to rebuild the armed forces, of the two hundred twenty-five investigated regimental commanders on active service, not one had been educated in the military academy. Only twenty-five had finished an officer school, the remaining two hundred were graduates of courses for second lieutenants. More than seventy percent of division commanders, about seventy percent of regimental commanders and about seventy percent of division commissars and military commissars occupied the position only for months. (From the report of the Inspector General of Infantry.)

It was slightly better in the Fleet, although all the Fleet Admirals, all Admirals of the first rank too, and nine of the fifteen Admirals of second rank the jury sentenced to death. The marines and officers had already met the purges earlier, after the Kronsztad and Black Sea riots. The Fleet kept more fighting ability.

For some time it seemed as if the Red Army of the Far East might just save their souls, standing in battle readiness against the Japanese troops. The Commander being Bluecher, the famous civil war hero, probably the best tactician of the Soviets, but like McArthur in the US a difficult "enfant terrible." There was bad blood between him and Tuchaczewski, but being too good to be ignored (some said he was better than Frunze himself), Tuchaczewski sent him to an autonomous position far, faraway. Now there constantly occurred incidents with the Japanese Army, a scenario recognized already as leading to a serious war. In 1938 Bluecher announced the Red Army in the Far East was on alert, preparing for any eventuality and able to resist any aggression. This impressive statement made a splash in the world press, but later appeared an try to save his own life (people consider it rather bad policy to change top commanders just before the battle).

(Lubianka, before the Lefortowo, was the main political prison and slaughterhouse of the Soviets).

This limerick, which Angus read probably in the small Catholic journal from Niepokalanów, appeared oracular (or considering the source, would we do better to call this a prophecy, if sinister?). Even facing the crisis of immediate war in the Far East, Stalin wouldn't spare the last of the great warriors, especially as Bluecher was an old friend and coworker of Gamarnik.

To start with, Stalin sent to Bluecher as his deputy a trusted, but still relatively unknown general Zhukov. He was not outstanding, rather a young general, physically reminiscent of Tuchaczewski: strong, athletic, rather fervent, but particular in following the orders word for word. Soon Bluecher was called to a conference in Moscow, pulled out of the station solemnly with pomp and ceremony in two special salon cars, with many aides. But wouldn't you know it, the train arrived in Moscow without the salon coaches and all the passengers had vanished into thin air. The government issued a general search and a wanted warrant and the foreign press made much funny business. Nevertheless, this time there was no show-trial followed by an avalanche of arrests.

People in Poland supposed that either Bluecher had proved himself a real man and did not go to pieces even under duress and torture, or died quickly following the shock. The second eventuality would appear rather unusual, considering that torture of a VIP would be necessarily carried out under the supervision of a physician. (Considered in Soviets a honorable work indeed, a direct way to earn a rank of academy degree, supposing the doctor didn't commit a blunder.) Anyway, as a show-trial of Bluecher didn't take place, he confessed nothing and accused no one; the Red Army of the Far East had a lucky save. Maybe such luck came only because soon thereafter began in truth the expected Japanese invasion.

Zhukov in all details carried out the plan wrought by Bluecher and trashed the Japanese good and proper in what was until then the greatest tank battle. This was the beginning of his career; without doubt, he learned a lot from this tutor, if only realizing one plan, taking advantage of the exceptional crisis. And he held this advantage for good, topping all generals advanced meanwhile by Stalin. For instance Timoshenko, commanding next the whole Red Army, considered an offensive to be a headfirst powerhouse drive to the wall. Planning would mean estimating the quality, weight and accounted strength of the wall, the number of heads needed as well as the density and saturation of them on every square meter. If there was time for fine details, he would calculate the types of helmets and transport of bandages, dressings and plasters for the broken heads, but this only if Stalin allowed the delay.

To be sure, Zukow too remained a partisan of the powerhouse. Nevertheless, the short contact, in part postmortem, with such a master of quick movements as Bluecher did enormously broaden his views. Although never could he act equal to the tutor, because tutelage is not enough, it is necessary to be born with a feeling, a natural predisposition - nevertheless he became a star of first quality. If there is a lack of fishes, the crab shall become a capital fish.

The Mechanized Army passed the first practical test with flying colors. With the ideas of Tuchaczewski accepted in the theory of modern warfare, he became an authority after his death. This concerns also the Germans, Guderian copied the tactic and later also the new strategy. But in Russia the obtuse Voroshilov was busy with taking apart the great units and next creating his own. Wasting all modern technique he came back to the corps, worked with sweat on his back running in circles till the Finn campaign, when even Stalin saw his incompetence. From that time he remained still Stalin's yes-man, but didn't make any decisions.

Nominally the Soviets had already fifteen thousand tanks, more in 1941. However, they became unfit for a battlefield, well, about three quarters unfit for anything, already outdated, full of mechanical faults, ruined without proper maintenance. The majority could just move till the next breakdown. The Army should have disposed of them in the nearest scrap metal depot, but they presented a giant investment and nobody from the personnel had the courage to report this to Stalin. And so they remained, not an advantage but a heavy burden for the Red Army in the 1941 campaign. After a few days about fifteen percent of the Soviet tanks survived and fought effectively, about an equal number were destroyed by enemy fire. About two thirds were abandoned on the road, they became stationary real estate after a few kilometers of retreat. The German newspapers were full of photographs of the huge monsters with several turrets, mostly two or three. The record number was, I remember distinctly, seven turrets. They looked like an evolution of dinosaurs, a few of the older ones astonishing tall, with a giant profile and weak casing, good only for small caliber fire. But the behemoths were so great that even wounded by artillery they still could continue the fight, the greatest evolved from the armored train wagons. Or the sloped armor: it had also evolved, but in this case resembled the armor of the medieval knights. It would be interesting to view the old newspapers.

In fact, the Soviets had many projects and constructions. It is true they brought the constructions of Renault, Vickers, even of the German von Gotte and the most important and progressive of Christie from the US, but they also introduced many novel ideas. They had outstanding engineers, project crews and offices, and in bygone years these tanks were not worse, rather better compared to their contemporaries. But the Red Army should have liquidated the old ones long before. However the internal conditions became so tense and dangerous that nobody dared to do the most obvious.

Maybe not all exactly for scrap metal (and much first-class steel it would supply.) The Army could install the weapons in the abandoned fortifications of the Stalin Line. After taking the armory plates and weapons, the remaining motors, or motors with fuselage could be used for transport in an army which had obviously too few trucks. Or use the outdated tanks, entrenched, as pillboxes. The point is, they not only were not good, but also demanded much blood and sweat, one more reason the Red Army performed at first so badly. It would be better to cut the losses or use the unfit tanks for improvised tasks, than lose men and freedom of movement; the investment anyway came to nothing, become a total loss.

Being a Pole, the author does not regret that Tuchaczewski could not use the Mechanized Army at the right time and in the most effective manner. Poland surely would not have any chance, the rest of Europe's countries probably not, either. But Stalin decided to kill, cut out the heart of the Red Army, before other commanders become victorious and more popular than he. What would be the sense of the world revolution triumph, if it was not him standing on top?

Addendum.

There may be another explanation. A rumor, without material evidence and in fact based only on some tales and circumstantial evidence, unproven. At first the author thought this could not be taken seriously, but with time there have appeared more and more serious publications about this theory. Here is a short report of the story, without comment:

The rumors began before the Second World War with two men, Walter Kriwicki and Alexander Orłow, who ran away from the Soviets in 1938. Or rather declined to return after the purges, they were spies in Europe. This is what they told: in 1937 an officer of the GPU the name of Stein, researching old archives of Ochrana (the tsar's secret police) found a file of Joseph Dzugashvili (Josef Dżugaszwili), a paid informer and agent provocateur. Dżugaszwili later called himself Stalin.

Stein was afraid to go with the papers to his superiors, but he consulted with his cousin, name of Katselson, his protector in the GPU, who decided to go to his protector, the Party's first secretary in Kijów, Kosior. Kosior discussed this with his pal Yakir, chief of the Military District of Kijów and Ukraine and this went with the problem direct to Tuchaczewski. Tuchaczewski decided to present the information before the Central Committee, which would amount to a disgrace of Stalin (ending straight with a bullet). He left the file in hands of his friend and first deputy, Gamarnik.

All this is only a tale, but a fact is, a person unknown shot Walter Kriwicki in Washington in 1941 directly after publishing his book "I Was Stalin's Agent". (The first edition was published in London in 1939 but went unnoticed because of the beginning of WW II.) This somehow corroborates his story and besides may appear a "testimony in the face of death" (he was fully aware of living on borrowed time). But in a short time the German attack brought Stalin to the side of the angels, and this was not the right time to discuss the ugly story, he became in the US an "Uncle Joe."

Orłow was a much superior master spy, more experienced. He published his book "The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes" in London in 1954, after the death of Stalin. Mentioning the same story he announced that he had prepared a statement with details, names and places to be published after his death. He died peacefully in 1973, but no publication appeared, so perhaps it was only a form of blackmail or a safety line.

Also there was a Henry Liushkov, head of the GPU in the Far East, who after Bluecher vanished, crossed over to the Japanese. It was a sensation not any worse than the defection of Światło (the Deputy of Surety minister Radkiewicz). However the media at the time had not such an impact as today. Angus could not find any more about this, than Liushkov didn't make any public statements, but only to the Japanese officers who held him. In award of this, he was allowed to commit "seppuku" as the Kwantung Army surrendered, but he felt unworthy of such a honor. He simply shot himself, maybe with the help of his guardian. But there were some late editorials about him, mentioning similar details.

All in all, nothing decisive, but for the author the most convincing fact is that after the executions in the Red Army, the purges continued with executions of the executioners. It was Stalin's manner of acting, a characteristic pattern - to leave no living witness. By 1938 and 1939 Jeżow and more than nine tenths of his top deputies, coworkers and associates were dead. Thus also all minions of these, who "worked over" the Red Army and who might have heard something about the matter.

In Chapter 8, "Capsule: The fate of the Soviet captives" there is description of the tragedy of Soviet POWs. A vast number, up to six and a half million of them captured the Germans. Hitler murdered the majority, but the remaining part, maybe one and a half or up to two million survivors were executed by Stalin after the war. Stalin was guilty of the whole war disaster, but decided to falsify the history, presenting himself as a genius of a leader and strategy wonder, who never made a mistake. To keep the truth a secret he decided to kill all the witnesses, any who knew about his incompetence. By rubbing out all who could tell the truth, he created his own private history, the only one allowed by the Soviets.

All the events - the purges in the Party to wipe out the vintage Bolsheviks, the destruction of the Red Army, the murder of the surviving prisoners of war - have a common denominator, to erase any possible observer, suppressing the truth. Of course, if it would be only the matter of the treason of a few generals, there would be no need for such extreme measures. But if the affair concerned the image and the safety of the Great Leader, thousands or millions dead troubled him not.

To be fair, it is necessary to mention also the facts against this theory. One of them is that elimination of Yagoda and nomination on the Head of NKWD Jeżow and resulting radical changes in the personal arrangements preceded both the Hitler provocation and the supposed find of Stalin's Ochrana file.

Yagoda was the former deputy of Dzierżyński, one of the first "Chekist" of high standards, dedicated and incorruptible (but fanatic, a bloody monster, as well as his master). Later he further developed the death machinery and kept up his reputation for great efficiency and a great (and terrible) name. He entrenched himself well and had his own private army, few in numbers but much better equipped (heavy weapons included) and trained than the regular Red Army, with picked men. A battalion of NKWD troops was as bad and dangerous, as three or more of the Red Army. Almost an analogy with the German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS but with the difference the NKWD troops never fought any enemy, but only Red Army soldiers, if they performed inadequately.

The NKWD had never yet seriously interfered with the Red Army command or the General Staff (or rather the Main Staff), but the top commanders with Tuchaczewski had strong objections about the parallel army and the dual pattern. When Stalin promoted Yagoda to a full Marshal rank, it was too much for them. A man who had never fought in a battle, a man who only persecuted soldiers! From this moment Stalin made Yagoda a most wanted prey and easy game for all the military. It was a Judas kiss and when subsequently he named the "bloody dwarf" Jeżow in his place and dismissed Yagoda and next arranged his execution, he had the full backing of the army. With this, Stalin took the NKWD fully in hand and the next task would be to do the same to the Red Army. All the preparatory steps he had taken already in the year 1936.

This could be an exceptional coincidence. The history is much more complicated and here only a dilettante presents his opinion. There are proper sources and in this age of information, accessible to all, if some undervalued.

For example, Kosior obviously could never survive, but the question is, why did the whole Kiev Committee of the WKP in the Ukraine perish with him? Could this have anything in common with the purges in the Red Army? The press was so busy with the main dish sensation, there were almost no comments. It was exactly the time when the place of Kosior took the less known Chruszczow. A similar coincidence happened in Byelorussia.

The author knows only a few details which spread from a parallel and strongly separated, but rather close by, the Soviet paradise.

On the 17th of September the Red Army attacked Poland, a week later than agreed in the alliance with Hitler. This was widely supposed to be a precaution of Stalin, who preferred to wait until the scales of the battle by Kutno turned to one side. But Stalin did not have any choice, he had brought the Red Army to a disastrous level, though he was not yet fully aware of this. Although for about a year the executions had stopped and so had new arrests, nobody dared to report to Stalin the basic truth. The Red Army was already on way to restoration, but even so, for several days before the 17th of September it was impossible to move onto Polish territory any of the great units. Yet the orders should be executed at all cost, a bid for delay could be like an ugly suicide. So the generals came to an idea of creating summary corporate bodies, consisting of several small troops chosen from the different great units, best prepared for warfare duty. Those fighting groups, similar to the Polish so-called detached troops, now stormed the border. The great units followed, some a day, some, several days later.

However, these groups met almost no resistance. From 1924 on, the Soviet border was looked after by the KOP (Border Protection Corps), after first the Border Watch, Customs and finally police proved ineffective against customers and visitors armed with heavy weapons. The KOP, responsible to the Minister of Interior Affairs, was a small professional part of the regular army, where soldiers could find long-term contracts after compulsory service with good opinion. They were as good as today's mercenaries. The KOP started with twenty thousand, and was so successful that it grew , accepting duty for more borders, because the "tourist groups" from Russia begun to travel by the neighboring countries, sightseeing Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, even East Prussia. In the last year the KOP had inflated to some sixty thousand, but most of them were now on the German front. Only about twenty thousand remained at the Soviet border.

To start with, close by the border were the sentry-stations with watchtowers; at the south side, opposite the Ukraine, they were called "stanitse." But there remained only the skeletal crews, usually two rifle teams totaling eighteen men. The cause was simple: unexpectedly at the last minute, Slovakia allowed passage to three German divisions through her territory creating a new front of over three hundred kilometers more. There was no way to close the gap, only to pull out two more regiments of experienced soldiers from the KOP, and they, with spare companies of National Defense, improvised the Slovakian Front. And the rest of the available men pulled back, behind the main resistance line and prepared to turn against the Germans.

The Soviet fighting groups consisted usually of two thousand men, from which about two hundred and fifty picked soldiers conducted the shock attack, all at exactly two in the morning. The attackers, allowed not a shot, had to use only the grenades and paid the toll only to own grenades in the dark. The Poles had no chance, captives were not taken at all. Soviets like Germany never declared the war, only after the fact the Soviet diplomacy announced a note about invasion of the Red Army "to protect the population from war." Some weeks ago, they declared, they had been considering some material relief to Poland and wanted an index of the most-wanted supply of raw materials and humanitarian articles.

After this, the troops of the Soviets met no organized resistance, because the command of the Polish Army ordered avoid fights with the Red Army except for necessary self-defense.

Only rarely occurred fighting, as for example around Wilno, where youth from schools spontaneously and without orders, feeling the patriotic duty, tried to defend their town. Like as the mentioned boy scouts in Katowice did against the Germans. Also in Grodno, after the Army left for the German front, there remained the mobilizing troops and many volunteers - and these troops, still in the process of organization, effectively repulsed the Red Army attacks. Finally they pierced the encircling force and moved against the German Army towards Warsaw, but were unable to overcome there and laid down their weapons on the Lithuanian border. There was more of such fighting and the Polish Army often did not badly, but most of Polish Colors accepted the command orders and stopped fighting the Red Army. More so, as both their own command and the Red Army declared they came not as an enemy, but rather with help as a future ally. Many Soviet troops, commanders and soldiers announced, they came to fight the Germans. Maybe they thought so, or they were deceived by the Red Army command. This may have deceived the Polish Army, its chief commander included. Considering the Red Army as future ally was an absurdum, but France and England never declared war on the Soviets and denied the existence of warfare, suggesting this to the Polish government. People easily believe what they want to believe. For example the city of Lwów, defended successfully for five days against the German Army, surrendered to the arriving Red Army. Polish troops, cut off from the Rumanian border by the Soviet troops, still tried to break through the Germans to the Hungarian border and some hundred thousand succeeded. They later continued the fight in France and a great part of them in England.

All in all, the first Soviet wave amounted to some six or seven hundred thousand men collected in a hurry in varying conditions, later resulting in the tales about Red Army soldiers going barefoot with rifles on twine. Angus' father, after the evacuation train broke down under bombs between Warsaw and Brześć, traveled on foot and finally found shelter in his parents' house near Białystok. There he survived the Soviet invasion. Angus many times could corroborate, that Father's tales were never exaggerated. He may only sometimes shorten the details, missing something out. Father told him, he really did see the soldiers with rifles on twine and if not exactly barefoot, in astonishing footwear, once even made from birch bark. Also some yeomen, who at first entered several stores, in every one of them buying a piece of bread, disbelieving that food could be not rationed, but simply accessible to everyone. But he also saw crack troops with regular, presentable soldiers. In short, there were no rules, the Red Army varied much, some looked so, some opposite.

This territory, incorporated later into the Byelorussian Republic, invaded four armies: the 3rd and 4th, consisting of six divisions each, and the 10th and 11th. Not all the divisions could move at once, so the exact number is unknown. The territory south of Brześć, incorporated into the Ukraine Republic, contained the 5th Army with six rifle divisions, the 6th with six divisions and one tank brigade, the 12th with nine divisions, and armored corps with four tank brigades and one mechanized division.

The day 17 of September was the worst, the bottom of the campaign, but what suggested the allies, not to fight the Red Army was an absurd. It was an end, a direct path to surrender. This can be seen from results. Although most Polish colors still fought the Germans, nevertheless the Soviets took about a quarter million captives. Some of them preferred to surrender to the Soviets than to the Germans (for example in Lwów), but it was a bad mistake. The captives taken by the Germans, despite long stays in POW camps and bad treatment, still had a chance to survive, unlike the Soviet captives. The difference was, Germans sometimes broke the international laws, but Soviets never, because they never applied them. The fate of the officers, the homicide of Katyń is now a public knowledge, although for many dozen years these facts were strongly denied. But what happened to the plain soldiers? At first, they had a better chance to run away, so long as they remained in military hands they were not firm watched and their number was rare checked. Sometimes they were even let go. But as active fighting ended and they came into the hands of the NKWD, it was the end of a fun. From the remaining one hundred fifteen thousand POW only about fifteen thousand came out alive, the rest perished. In fact, more than four times as many plain soldiers lost their lives as officers, yet this rarely is mentioned now.

To say it short, an officer might have on average perhaps a ten percent chance to survive and a soldier about fourteen percent, not much better. Only those who decided to throw off the uniform and run, rescue themselves, were better-off, because in the general confusion it was easier to take cover in the Soviet than in the German zone. But only at the start, because soon the NKWD terror became worse than the Gestapo.

In fact, a try at an "appeasement" with the Soviets ended worse than "appeasement" by Western nations of the Germans. Only the ordeal of the defenseless Jews to the Germans ended similarly tragically. What may soothe, fetch results with a normal creature, only gives more satisfaction and encourages a pathological murderer. A deal with Stalin was as likely as a deal with a scorpion or rattlesnake. And in the long run (all the fourteen years), he treated Poland worse than Germany and Austria, or any country that fought on the German side. All this happened, in fact began, after the "general directive" of the Polish top command, forbidding the Army to fight with the Soviets.

Polish Marshal Rydz-Śmigły made a bad blunder, but he was not fit for the role of giving orders. He was good at receiving and fulfilling orders, but unable to think independently, to form his own opinion. He accepted what the Allies told him, and these mostly wanted only to find someone who would take the beating, as faraway from their own border as possible. They never considered Poland a real partner, especially now that Poland already did what they expected and could only became an embarrassing nuisance, if there followed a declaration of war with the Soviets. So they did apply pressure. And much pressure came also from Rydz-Śmigły's own people, the escort surrounding him, they persuaded him he was necessary in France to restore a new Polish Army. He is the man who had settled the alliance and with him only may the French top commander speak as equal (only an imbecile could think something so stupid). He wanted to remain with the army and fight to the bitter end, but he had not enough character to stay with this first sound impulse.

And what were the chances? Well, the Polish Army was badly beaten and mauled by the Wehrmacht, but still existed and fought. The main, plain soldiers still wanted to fight. Despite all they suffered, their spirit never broke. Most of all, they were deadly tired by the constant competition of legs against the German motors, but if they could find a little time for sleep, they fought as new. In the second half of the campaign they fought the most intensive and bloody battles south of Lublin and east of San. If they could fight stationary, without the long and irrational retreat, they would perform much better. It was anyway impossible to outrun the comfortably driving Germans, but if it came to battle man against man, they were at least equal or better.

All in all, the Poles still had more men available, three quarters of a million men at arms, of these about half a million on the east, and up to two million unarmed volunteers. Mobs of them came over the terrifying and long way, all the time under fire of planes, wanting to join the army, wanting to enlist and fight. About one and a half million of them were Poles and about half a million Polish Jews, who also determined to fight and wanted weapons no less than the Poles. More about their tragic fate see in Chapter 8.

With these already proven men and using the Soviet arms and the rest of the Polish magazines, it would be possible to mount a Volunteer Army of a million men and quickly. Next to organize more reserves, survive in defense in worst case till the winter. With arms in hands these men would have a better chance of life. It was the unarmed who would be most easy to murder.

It is plain that Poland, attacked by Hitler's accomplice in the crisis moment of war with Germany, automatically was at war with the Soviets and should defend herself. As with the German aggression, the attack happened without any declaration of war and breaking an international law, the treaty, and the no-aggression pact. The only difference as Hitler at least denounced the treaty earlier, which was illegal, but some declaration of intent, whereas Stalin didn't take the trouble at all, to the last minute keeping up false appearances. It was a simple duty of the Polish government to stress the point, and of the top command to express orders to the Polish Army to fight, not obediently go with the Allies' suggestions.

If Russia had formally declared war, when attacking in 1939 Poland, according to international law the homicide in Katyń could not have happened. It would be not so easy to murder the officers if they had the official status of POW. The same concerns the Polish soldiers. True, knowing Stalin and the Soviets one may doubt, if this could have saved them permanently, probably Stalin would anyway find ways and means to murder them. However, it would mean a little more sweat for him, and sometimes a delay in execution may translate into a long life.

Also, it would make a point for Poland in the dispute about the east border with the Soviets, the territories lost in the war with Germany and the allied Soviets. In 1941 Stalin would have to make peace with Poland and eventually Britain, if this country had acted honorably and made a binding declaration in defense of her first, and then only ally. So should be proper, before closing the next alliance, with the Soviets.

Maybe in the peace pact Poland would have to cede some territories to the Soviets, but it would be a matter of negotiations, not up against a wall. Anyway, all the problems, desperate pains and all-out efforts during the occupation would be unnecessary, even the Warsaw rising could probably end with active Soviet help. In short the Poles would be in a much better position and save much blood. And obviously, Poland would remain more independent. In fact, by this decision the Commander of the Polish Army caused the loss of all the major tenable rights. In the years of war and the years that followed the war they could never be, despite desperate efforts and many lost lives, recovered.

But could this change the course of history, push Stalin closer to Hitler? Sure not, Hitler would attack the Soviets anyway; this was his main mission, the task of his life. For any literary man who read his book Mein Kampf or only a commentary on it, this was obvious. Besides it was the top of his reign and the "ultimo ratio" of all his doings. He started his career with slaughter of the communist, who put in danger the rich and powerful, and for protection took for himself their full purses and wealth. Now he wanted save all Europe, be praised as the redeemer and at the same time take it all for himself, the communists as competitors were his worst enemy. Anyway, Stalin remained an ally of Hitler, aided him in everything he was allowed to. Russia remained a source of raw materials, supplies and strategic goods, like the USA to Britain. Right to the last moment, in 1941 the trains with Soviet goods rolled in past the attacking Germans. Whatever the Poles did, it would be important only to them.

The rest of the Polish Army and the multitude of volunteers, dedicated and patriotic, would be enough to put up a serious fight. On the other side, the Poles and almost the whole world held the Red Army in great respect, valued as a great power, a giant and strong power - but this was the past. Nobody recognized in time, how deeply this excellent and huge army had been devastated by Stalin's purge.

Only the part of the Red Army in the Far East remained intact and performed well against the Japanese. But the Winter War with Finland showed to all the Red Army in Europe had fallen in a deep hole. Maybe it already was kicking back up from the bottom, but despite all the efforts had not yet got its strength back. Finland was only a small country and never armed for war, had only a territorial defense, no experience and almost no heavy weapons in the field. The Red Army applied about twenty times more men, in fact they jostled in so many soldiers that they could not mop the floor without tripping over each other. Also all sorts of heavy weapons, in fact the only problem was transport. Yet successive attacks from the troops turned them in minced meat. And these conditions persisted and persisted for months, before at last the sheer weight of country of two hundred million against one of seven million caused the cease-fire, a Pyrrus victory of the Soviets. It was this moment, when the soldiers lost confidence in the Red Army Command, most negative influence during the Hitler attack. Finland would never have entered alliance with the Germans and Leningrad would not have been cut off, if not for this stupid action by Stalin.

There is no question that at the time an average country could wallop the Soviets with one hand in its pocket. Well, so long as the Army from the Far East did not show up in support, part of the former excellent Mechanized Army, untouched by the purges.

In the few battles which happened in tight corners, when despite their Command directives the Poles had to fight, they managed well against the enemy's superior numbers. In fact, the Red Army with its broken backbone could become a source of weapons for the crowds of volunteers. But even if the fight was hopeless, it is better be killed in a battle than to be butchered without resistance. Anyway, if all is so bad that it could not get worse, the unexpected remains the only chance.

And what about the Germans? Their offensive was already losing impetus. At the end of September the Wehrmacht had almost spent their reserves. For one, the use of ammunition was about five times greater than in the whole French campaign. At the end of September the available supply was low, enough for only ten more days of warfare (from the documents of the Nuremberg IMT trial). Just before the Soviet aggression, the French experts presented an opinion the Poles would be able to hold out in the southeast corner of the country, called the Rumanian Bridgehead, for two to three months more. The Polish Commander was sure, at least six months. But even if they could take a last stand as long the Warsaw defense had lasted, it would make a great political difference to the future of Poland.

And one more important point: the weather continued ideal for the Germans, the tanks could perform anywhere, no rain, no mud, the roads dry, even the oldest men didn't remember such an autumn. But the winter which followed was even more exceptional, midway through December began a real deep freeze and for this the Wehrmacht never prepared, it would be much worse than in 1941. Over the next two years "Wehrmacht" dealt with the most obvious problems.

Up to now, the author has presented only the facts, but let's allow for a moment of speculation: if some part of the Polish Army had survived to mid-December 1939, the military situation would have reversed. The German Army would be completely paralyzed; the soldiers would be unable to shoot a rifle, let alone make use of heavy weapons or motors. The Polish colors could unhampered retake their lost country, take as many captives as they wanted, maybe even walk into Germany. The author saw this winter with own eyes and knows what he is talking about.

In the second half of September the people in Poznan still believed in the final victory, but they began to reflect, harshly judging the Polish government. Angus too repeatedly returned to bygones and speculations. This was natural in the face of calamity, but to be just, the Polish government had narrow scope for maneuver and did what it had to. Delaying the final answer to Hitler till the last possible moment, it won more time for all the Allies. For Hitler the 1939-year was already wasted, which made all his detailed plans too late.

But still resounds the question, whether Poland could have prevented the worst woes, stop the hecatomb? No people, except for of the Jews, suffered as badly as the Poles, the ones living in other countries unable only to imagine such atrocities.

It appears, though, that no other course would have opened a better alternative, a luckier status. The Polish government committed many mistakes, but its overall angle was correct. Others made more serious blunders, in fact the best-known description of the early period of WW II calls it "an attack of furious, rabid bandits on mental asylum". However, the other countries did not pay for their blunders so dearly, and psychologically it is obvious the citizens for the calamity to accuse their government. For example, the war happened in the worst moment for Poland. A few years earlier Poland's army had been better equipped, to be sure not from its weak financial resources, but from French loans. True, most the weapons already outdated, the French sold the equipment rejected by their own army. A large part from WW I, some almost museum pieces. It was plain business.

But Germany was not better-off, Hindenburg personally directed the last exercises before his death and assumed Germany could not effectively defend East Prussia if Poland were to attack it. This was pure nonsense, Poland did not want any more territory, only peace. Most probably, the Germans made this up deliberately to justify their own armaments. After this, the danger increased with German armaments, but exactly then the French loans stopped, because of France's economics collapse in result of the final declaration of Hitler, refusing any reparations. Not to mention the astronomical cost of Maginot Line construction.

Well, it would be too much to expect the war to happen exactly at the best moment for Poland, it is the aggressor who chooses the time to his own advantage. But even at the last moment, Poland could try to get some support in army equipment and if this was impossible, at least a quick loan for a short-term. As much as was necessary to get her own armament industry working full-time for her own Army without the need to sell a substantial part of production to other countries.

In fact, the Polish government as the first recognized this danger and tried to arrange some steps to avert it, but could not persuade the Allies, move them to a collective action. At the time Poland kept to the pattern of French alliances. To be sure, it was never a united, proper arragement. The French preferred separate treaties with individual countries, not a block, because this way they had a better control over each individual partner. They held each of the partners dominated in a weak position, on separate strings; a coalition would not be so easy to run.

For instance, the biggest partner in Eastern Europe was Poland. However for the prime position there was a strong competition with Czechoslovakia, possessing excellent industrial potential (especially producing the best weapons), but less than half of the Poland population. Poland and Czechoslovakia together could be a counterweight to Hitler. In fact, France could easily have influenced her partners in this direction, but obviously wished not to. Well, perhaps this was a political advantage, but neither for Poland nor for Czechoslovakia, as may be seen from the course of history. The moral is, better apply a limited trust to a stronger ally.

Poland experienced this too, several times before omitted in international treaties, guaranteeing the border with Germany. The worst incident happened, as Hitler for the first time broke the Versailles Treaty, commanding the Army into the demilitarized zone. It was the best opportunity to stop Hitler cost free and Poland sent a special envoy to France, confirming that she was ready to act according to her treaty with France. But France not only did not take up this alternative, but seriously abused the confidence, communicating the information to German diplomats, an obvious malpractice.

Hitler with satisfaction communicated this to Poland, considering this a good moment for his try to turn the sentiments, to win Poland on his side.

In the second half of September the people in Poznan still believed in the final victory, but they began to reflect and to harshly judge the Polish government. Angus too repeatedly returned to bygones and speculations. This was natural in the face of calamity, but to be just, the Polish government had narrow scope for maneuver and did what it had to. Delaying the final answer to Hitler till the last possible moment, it won more time for all the Allies. For Hitler the 1939 year was already wasted, which made his detailed plans too late.

But still reverberates the question, whether Poland could have prevented the worst woes, could the hecatomb have been averted? No people, with the exception of the Jews, suffered as badly as the Poles, the ones living in other countries were unable only to imagine such atrocities.

It appears, though, that no other course would have opened a better possibility, a luckier status. The Polish government committed mistakes, but its overall angle was correct. Others made more serious blunders, in fact the best-known description of the early period of WW II show it as an attack of furious, rabid bandits on a mental asylum. However, the other countries did not pay for their blunders so dearly, and psychologically it is obvious the subjects burdened the crash to the government. For example, the war happened in the worst moment for Poland; a few years earlier Poland's army had been better equipped, to be sure not from its weak financial resources, but from French loans. True, a great deal of the weapons were already outdated, the French sold the equipment rejected by their own army, a substantial part from WW I, some almost museum pieces. It was plain business.

But Germany was not better off, Hindenburg personally led the last exercises before his death and assumed Germany could not effectively defend East Prussia if Poland were to attack it. But this was plain nonsense, Poland did not want any more territory, only peace. Most probably, the Germans made this up deliberately to justify their own armaments. After this, the danger increased with German armaments, but exactly then the French loans ceased, because of France's economic collapse as a result of the final declaration of Hitler, denying any reparations. Not to mention the astronomical cost of Maginot Line construction.

Well, it would be too much to expect the war to happen exactly at the best moment for Poland, it is the aggressor who chooses the time, and to his own advantage. But even at the last moment, Poland could try to get some support in army equipment and this was impossible, at least in the short term. However, a quick loan, as much as was necessary to get her own armament industry working full time for her own Army without the need to sell a substantial part of production to other countries, that would have helped.

In fact, the Polish government at first recognized this danger and tried to arrange some steps to avert it, but could not persuade the Allies, move them to a collective action. At the time Poland kept to the pattern of French alliances. To be sure, it was never a united system, a solid structure. The French preferred separate treaties with individual countries, not a block, because this way they had a better control over each individual partner. They held each of the partners dominated in a weak position, on separate strings; a coalition would not be so easy to run.

For instance, the biggest partner in Eastern Europe was Poland. However for the premier position there was a strong competition from Czechoslovakia, with its excellent industrial potential (especially producing the best weapons), but less than half the population of Poland. Poland and Czechoslovakia together could be a counterweight to Hitler. In fact, France could easily have influenced her partners in this direction, but obviously wished not to. Well, perhaps this was a political advantage, but neither for Poland nor for Czechoslovakia, as may be seen from the course of history. The moral is, better apply a limited trust in the strong ally.

Poland experienced this too, having several times before been omitted in international treaties, guarantees of the border with Germany. And a most bad incident happened, as Hitler for the first time broke the Versailles Treaty by commanding the Army into the demilitarized zone. It was the best opportunity to stop Hitler cost free and Poland sent a special envoy to France, confirming that she was ready to act in accordance with her treaty with France. But France not only did not take up this option, but also seriously abused the confidence, communicating the information to German diplomats, an obvious malpractice.

Hitler with satisfaction let this be known to Poland, considering this a good moment for his try to turn the sentiments, to win Poland for his side.

Capsule: The original war plan of Hitler: swiftly conquer Europe with Polish help. A short summary.

As already told in Chapter 1, Hitler fundamentally reversed the trend of German politics. Up to his coming to power, the Germans strained for amity westward, trying isolate the nations which had gained independence since WW I (and eventually recover the territories lost east). They concentrated the brunt of this policy in particular against Poland. Hitler had a more impressive vision: first conquer the West, after which all the remaining, weaker neighbors, including those to the east, would declare submission and obedience. But this was to be only the beginning, an appetizer. The main dish being, not only to subdue, but to conquer all the Soviet Union and take forever the belt of fertile black soil. There Germans of the most valuable, Nordic type could breed and multiply. For a start one hundred million, next two hundred million, enough to rule the world during the next millennium.

In this plan he calculated it would be less expensive to win over Poland on his side, which would simplify and speed up the task. He never had a moment's doubt that given the wonderful promises and beautiful prospects, the Poles would feel unable to reject them. His first move was to drop the economic war against Poland, a reversal that was profitable for both sides, but he as author took most of the cream. Next ended the unfriendly press dispute, ironing out all the wrinkles with one quick dictate. Created a new network in Poland, brutalizing the old German Organization (DV), rather unfriendly to Poles though still within the limits of the law. Its place took a new JdP (Jungdeutsche Partei), which appeared kind and superloyal to Poland, but only initially. As the Polish government said the final "no deal," all this love at a moment's notice changed to hate and violence).

The Poles gladly negotiated a no-aggression pact, but did this with both their important neighbors, Germany and the Soviets. Both the pacts proved to be false, shady dealings, neither of them straight. But every friendly gesture returned the Polish side; the Poles wanted peace indeed. To be sure, with Germany's rapidly growing military potential, Poland was careful not to irritate her neighbor. The increasingly frequent visits of German dignitaries met with a polite reception, but these visits were not returned. The result was that Hitler's carefully calculated projects seemed at first to run not bad.

But Hitler's proposal was unreal, impossible, a failure, from a cause which was, to be sure, irrational: there was a great, if only one-sided love of the Poles for France. From the time of Napoleonic wars, even before, from the partition of Poland contemporary with the French Revolution, France remained in the minds of the Poles a country of freedom and a second home. Nowadays she got credit for Poland's revival, though it was in fact largely Wilson's doing, France had less to do with it. But anyway she got the premium of trust, cost free. All the Poles regarded France as their best friend, a quarter of them as a second homeland. Most of them would fight and die for France as well as for Poland (the percentage might vary locally, but this was roughly correct where Angus lived).

France became a substitute homeland to the enslaved people and for a century they placed their hearts there. If the contemporary Polish government, decided, that with the power in Hitler's hands there was no alternative but to agree and give in to his demands, it could not survive and carry out such a decision. The result would be like that seen in Yugoslavia in 1941; there would be a revolution within the day. Another government would take over, by a people's consensus. Although the Polish government always declared democratic principles, it did not in fact always apply them, which made it less than popular among citizens. But exactly this made the government sensitive to public opinion; any serious outrage of sentiment would cause a fall.

Angus' mother on her return journey traveled with two high Germans officers and talked with them. She had excellent German and they guessed her a sure "Berlinerin" (in part through the merit of Angus' godmother, they gossiped daily and prattled as long as ever they could). Now she repeated to Angus their words. They seemed practical and interpreted the situation so: "Hitler built for the Poles a golden bridge, and proposed a splendid future. But in their infatuation they preferred to listen to such warmongers as Churchill, Eden and Duff Cooper. The whole Polish campaign was unnecessary, a loss for both sides. If only Pilsudski were still alive, he would have never allowed this to occur. Alas, his successors have neither such authority, nor courage to take on themselves the responsibility, they lack the imagination to understand the genius of Hitler."

She didn't dispute, reserving comment for Angus: "I almost said: Du bist verrückt, mein Kind, du musst nach Stralsund, wo die Verrückten sind, da wirst du gesund."

Stralsund was the well-known mental asylum; incidentally the same place, where Ludwig von Beck proposed to put Hitler, see further.

Mother didn't like Pilsudski, but she was sure, if anybody could imagine that he would throw his authority on the side of Hitler, this one should consult too a mental doctor. It Pilsudski had lived, the Germans were likely to get at least once a real beating. Poland could not win the war alone, but Pilsudski newer would allow his country to be manipulated from a distance, by some stupid bugger, who didn't know neither the place nor the local conditions.

Neither mother nor son could remember at the time who this Duff Cooper was.

Some time later they were able to read the German version in an official propaganda volume Dokumente zur Vorgeshichte des Krieges (Documentation of the Preliminaries to the War), like a "white book" by Ribbentrop. Besides a host of accusations against Poland and England, the idea was substantially similar. Also many German soldiers and officers repeated: Yes, the Polish soldiers fought well, alas the political management failed the Army. The Fuehrer had the best goals, if only your Marshal Pilsudski were still alive, they would negotiate and this all would never happen. Angus didn't know the language, nevertheless if he heard and understand a word about the matter he was angry. Probably Hitler was trying to explain to his followers the mistake he had made. The personal blunder caused his hatred of the Poles.

In essence, this is a case of the unwanted prophet and the Unbelievers. Cursing them is a standard procedure.

Near the end of September on all the houses, like a wallpaper appeared great posters with a picture of a Polish soldier, invalided, with bloodied bandage on his head, tottering on crutches, with a great headline: "Your doing, England!"

The Poles accepted these placards badly, the only comment was to turn around and spit without a word. The propaganda wholly missed the target. In fact, Poland fought alone and not one of the Allies lifted a finger, but this never for a moment reduced the people's confidence.

- Something unexpected must happened, we don't have the full information, but they will beat the Germans shortly. -

If anyone let himself to say a critical word against the full trustworthiness of the Allies, he would lose all friends. Perhaps worse, become suspected of treason, of taking side with the Germans. In a deserted place, maybe lynched.

The only explanation for so much expense and trouble could be the former propaganda had prepared the Germans to believe the Poles would not fight. Hitler had persuaded the Poles, or maybe proposed an offer not to be rejected and sure they had to bend. Now, he had to reframe it something like: "the Poles already half agreed, but at the last minute the perfidious Albion paid more by a check without backing. Also, gave free hand for the Poles to commit any crimes against the Germans. In result, these subhumans turned treason. Disgusting savages without a culture, uncivilized, there is no way to hold them to their word. But the genial Fuehrer could not be deceived, he reacted in the nick of time and now is doing justice to them".

Clearly this poster addressed to the Germans, for to the Poles this did not make sense. In fact, it appeared only in the areas where was some German minority, or to be sure on the other side of the former border, near Poland, rather rare at the heart of Polish lands. Only the Germans believed in every word of Hitler, who never made a mistake, the all-knowing and all-mighty.

Offended megalomania, that was the cause; Hitler, like Stalin, step-by-step lost contact with reality. Dictators, as the former suzerains, enclosed in a cluster of yes-men, see only what they want and hear as well the same.

Hitler had prepared a design for action, planned down to the last detail. He expected first that he could persuade Poland and next England to his side. He had already decided what role they were to play in his performance. Well, at the early stage one could anticipate many possibilities, but with time it became obvious neither Poland nor England was prepared to go along with Hitler. Hitler didn't want accept the facts, reacting with wild rage. He could be never mistaken or misled, it was the sin of these wrenched worms who did not appreciate his genius, but in fact they would recognize quick and badly, the mistake lay on their side. The punishment would be so severe, the whole world would remember never to disappoint the great Hitler. England, as well as Poland, had to be harshly corrected, but England still lay beyond the reach of his hands, Poland alas in.

Capsule: A bad dream, an ugly fantasy, a black scenario. How would it have affected WW II if Hitler had been able to persuade the Poles to sign the Anticommintern Pact and remain neutral in the conflict with the West? That is, if his Lithuanian provocation had about succeeded.

There is no need to repeat that Poland would never have accepted Hitler's proposition, for anyone who was there it goes without saying. But those who did not see, who only heard reports, some of them don't understand this, and ask now if there was not any smarter, if even more egoistic course, in taking which the country might have suffered less. Considering this, one must remember that Poland lost more than six million citizens, one in five, the population twice decimated. A terrible toll, no other country paid as much, not even the aggressors nor any country that (though unwillingly) supported them. So let's allow for a little fantasy - only a fantasy, given that (with or without Poland) Hitler never could have won the Second World War. This presumption is not obvious, rather done because if this happened, it would mean the end of our civilization. Anyway not any further history, no more progress and no evolution of humanity could follow. If our planet should ever be visited and examined by some interested alien, their only concern could be with the evolution of the remaining animal species, not people. In the past many civilizations have declined and died and others resulted, but this time it would be global, humanity is no longer in a position to make such big mistakes and should learn from the last.

The first part of the black scenario is evident: Hitler according to his timetable, attacks France in 1939 and conquers even quicker, as in 1940. After this remains only England, which in 1939 wasn't ready for defense, the RAF could not seriously oppose the Luftwaffe in the battle for control of the sky, and its fleet alone was not enough to prevent the invasion.

The final try to close a deal with Poland took place in the last week of March 1939, one week after the cost-free takeover of Czechoslovakia. Even after public display of friendship for Poland from the first day of rule in Germany, the intensive diplomatic talks in 1938 remained inconclusive. Poland was playing for time and Hitler was in a hurry. So on March 22 he took with military force Memel (Kłaipeda) and proposed the whole rest of Lithuania to Poland as deposit, in front payment, advance installment of good faith on his splendid promises. But the Poles didn't take the appetizing offer, gave polite thanks and responded the first possibility to consider a change of alliances would be not until 1940. Until then they were bound by the existing treaties. This was the climax, after the unacceptable answer remained only pressure. (According to Hitler's analysis, German military superiority would increase until 1940, last about a year and then decrease, never mind prognoses of his mental ability. Nevertheless he could not risk attack on France with the Polish Army on his back.) So resulted the unwanted war, Poland fell, but won time for the Western democracies.

However, if instead Hitler could conquer France in May 1939 in a blitz campaign, before the English expedition corps arrived and English blood streamed, maybe in the hopeless crisis England would decide for negotiations. The fact remains, Hitler wished this much, which is why he allowed in 1940 for evacuation from Dunkirk. Also the journey of Hess was not a mental aberration but an attempt to realize the second of his unrealistic dreams of his leader (the first concerned Poland). Hitler had nothing to win by war with England at the moment. To begin with, he classified the country as soundly Germanic (if demanding a thorough purification). Next, in a reasonable future he wanted become a "Protector" of the whole British Empire, which in time would allow for a smooth takeover.

In 1939 Hitler could count on a divided sentiment: still some partisans in England, if in the minority, some of influence, powerful and rich, whereas in 1940 no one still awarded Hitler any sympathy. And in 1939 if Hitler's proposal of peace were not accepted, despite the favorable conditions, he would be able to start an invasion with the probable result of breaking the most heroic resistance. Or the other alternative might be, the British government would continue the war on emigration, probably in Canada. In fact Roosevelt proposed this to Churchill even in 1940, also move the fleet to US seaports. In such a case, probably Hitler would create in England something like a quisling government, maybe with another King.

Anyway, Hitler would hold all Western Europe in control and for a time have no concern about a possible second front. He could turn all his attention and hate on the Soviets.

For the moment Poland had to stay neutral, even Hitler in his maniacal dreams was not so unrealistic to demand the Poles should fight France and never proposed this. (Probably some of the most ardent admirers of France would flee illegally and fight for France as volunteers, but not so many that this could make any real difference.) Poland's task, after joining the Anticommintern Pact, should be to guard Germany's back against a possible attack by Stalin for as long as would be necessary for the campaign in the West. Next, prepare an all-out attack on the Soviets with Germany. Considering the poor condition of the Red Army, Poland could manage that much.

Probably Stalin according to his fashion would delay the decision. If at all, he would begin the offensive only if Hitler had engaged a large part of the Wehrmacht overseas, to invade England. But even then Poland would have only one problem, how and where to prepare quarters for a massive number of Soviet captives. It is a known fact that even in 1941 the Red Army soldiers surrendered rather easily to the Germans. They already knew the hell waiting in Russia and hoped any change could be only for the better. It took all the bestiality and fury of Hitler, the bloody butchering of the captives, to turn the Red Army soldiers into desperate, fearless fighters.

Next there would come the forceful thrust by Hitler. At first a triumph and a new wave of captives, but soon they would feel the difference, the end of funny business. Would decide it is much better to fight and die, than to fall alive into German hands. Still the Germans would be able to advance with speed, but after some hundreds of kilometers they would meet a surprise, a huge belt of fortifications.

The renowned Stalin Line was built not by him but by competent military experts (mostly executed next by him). At Stalin's orders it was disarmed, demoted and destroyed from the moment he, in alliance with Hitler, occupied half of Poland and decided the Line to be unnecessary. The work continued through the autumn and winter of 1939, the whole year of 1940 and up to June 22 of 1941. Even later, because Stalin didn't withdraw the orders and not a soul dared to ask him. So in fact the fortifications still were being stripped right before the approaching German divisions.

It is anyone's guess, what could motivate Stalin to dive into deepwater and at the same time destroy the life belt. He may have decided it was now only an unnecessary barrier to transport, especially for the army preparing to take Europe. Or it may have been a gesture of goodwill and obedience to Hitler, which would deceive him for a time. Something like the dog does, when flopping to his back he offers to his heir the uncovered throat and belly as well as all the most tender zone of his flesh. Or different, a gesture like burning his ships, crossing the point of no return with a clear purpose: from this moment there shall be only an offensive, never a withdrawal. Whatever the motivation, it was the most insane decision, which cost Russia many millions of dead; a catastrophe and destruction beyond anybody's imagination. It was as if an electrician working with high-voltage took off the isolating gloves and boots, a plain idiocy.

If he had made such a move only for himself it would have been for the best. But Stalin set in deadly danger millions of his subjects, while keeping his own person in security. Such a deed alone would be enough for the whole to Russia to curse his memory forever and ever, as if the other tragedies he caused were not enough.

In 1939 no armored and mechanized army of the world would have been able to cross this fortification line, especially in a direct march. It may have been less modern and not so sophisticated as the Maginot Line, but had a vast advantage: it was deep in an inaccessible terrain, an uncultivated environment. Such obstacles could attack only infantry on foot, at best with artillery support. Nevertheless, the access must be built by engineering troops, paying expensively with blood.

It would be a second Verdun on a much greater scale. In fact, Hitler indeed wished for rivers of blood, he believed that millions of dead is what makes the victory and the status of the commander. He wanted to outstrip the legend of Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and all such past heroes. However, he would prefer not exactly German blood, Polish would be as good and cheaper. Surely, the first shock troops attacking on foot could be Polish, the Germans would push them, shooting at their backs, as they did with the Kalmucks in 1944.

Clearly the Poles would not like this and would shoot back, a massacre would follow and the Polish government would try to get out of the war. Probably there would result such a scenario as in Budapest, the SS would unexpectedly attack the King Castle in Warsaw and the seat of the government, capture the ministers and the President. Maybe the maneuver would even be led by the same ruffian, Korzenny. The legal government would be liquidated, and in its place the Germans would create one, consisting of collaborators and traitors in Hitler's service. Anyway, Hitler would want to punish the Poles, who did not accept the honor to die for him and Germany. No longer keeping up appearances, he would take by force the men as cannon fodder and execute all who dared to protest. The only result would be an armed resistance, which would infuriate Hitler even more; he would make a terrible example, leave no one alive. If not exactly this, some other conflict must occur, because of a natural difference: the Poles are born rebels, there is no way they could agree with Hitler and his atrocities for long.

Alike development, as happened, but the end result would be much worse, because simultaneously would follow a civil war between the Poles. A part of the soldiers might remain loyal to the Germans. Some part would remain because of cowardice, not all Poles are heroes; surely the average for all people is about the same. And the bad ones, they were a problem anyway. But they were kept in check, separate. It would be much worse if they were already organized by Hitler, in the worst case in the SS. The toll when the united Poles fought the Nazi was terrible, what it would it be, if not only a few criminals, but a bigger portion of Poles were to collaborate with the Germans in good faith? And the most ugly part of this impossible, unreal nightmare would be that some Poles might become infected with Nazi ideology. In Poland too lived some radical nationals, but they behaved straight and proper, fought in harmony with all the people, died but never turned traitor. As the Poles sang, "We in the country without Quislings, Petains..." Better not even imagine, that a part of them could remain with Hitler as convinced converts, what a shame to the nation. And what chance would the proper Poles have, if some part of them backed Hitler in the mass-murder of their own people.

Poland had some taste of this black scenario next, under Stalin's rule. He managed to organize the bad and the cowards in his service.

So it is never so bad that it couldn't be still worse, and would sure happen much worse, if the Poles had accepted Hitler's propositions. Paradoxically, only life under Stalin's rule next could be better, all the countries fighting against the Soviets and allied with Germany were persecuted less than Poland. Stalin understood traitors from experience and felt always sure he could control them. He preferred traitors, hating honest men without blame, because never knew what to expect from such strange creatures.

As explained several times, such an alternative never was real, yet there was one short moment, on the 22nd of March and maybe also the 23rd and 24th, when the proposition interested a part of the radical nationalists. Only a small fraction of the Polish youth.

The temptation has already been described in Chapter 1. Now is the time to explain why Hitler's provocation, his take on to push Poland into annexing neighbor territory, to walk the Polish Army into Lithuania found some response among Poles. Saying it straight, it would be to apply armed robbery, the same bandit's way as Hitler did.

The case of Lithuania was a special one. Poland and Lithuania had almost five hundred years of common history. At first, united, they built a great multination state (liberal, a modern conception at the time). Next, together they fought for independence. Only near the end of the 19th century followed a split between partisans of continuing the union and partisans of separate countries. After WW I, when recovering independence, this family, in-house conflict increased sharply, thanks to German General Staff. It was doing everything possible to assure that after withdrawal of the German Army the control remained in the hands of people who agreed with the German conditions. Now, that doesn't mean German agents or creatures, they were honest people with their own true political vision and their own programs and backed by longtime partisans. However, the Germans choice was selective, only those who were noticed to fit with German expectations. To be sure, such informative action and introductory talks, even without definite settlements, conducted the Germans not only in Lithuania, it was a standard procedure in all countries where the German Army was leaving, Poland among them. (For example so appeared Pilsudski as a chief of Poland, he neither agreed to any special concessions, nor was a friend of the Germans, but they preferred him over the Polish Committee settled in Paris.)

Next the German secret service supplied further backing and funds for increasing in Lithuania the national feeling with a strong anti-Polish edge. This was done as a means to hold East Prussia, which for hundreds of years had voluntarily accepted the Polish-Lithuanian multinational Union. Now the Germans wished to prevent the re-creation of a common Polish-Lithuanian Union. Economically, the effect of such a geographically coherent state would be prosperous for the population, but the German government considered it a danger. Anyway, it is difficult to hold a territory communicating with one country only, a foreign one. Because of this, Germany, financially supporting East Prussia, upheld Lithuania as well, as long as their contacts with Poland remained bad.

On the other hand, the people in a large part of Lithuania, including the former capital, wished to continue the traditional union or had even polonized. Now they formed a separate state, called Central Lithuania and later decided to integrate with Poland. This was a mistake, as by remaining within the traditional borders they would have had a chance in the first general elections to win the controlling vote in Lithuania.

Angus felt emotionally involved, because with his name he suspected the roots of his family to be Lithuanian. However Father explained that in fact this supposition was not true and told him a little about his family.

A Lithuanian who was determined to remain within the union, or perhaps polonized, was Pilsudski himself, the first chief of state, next Marshal and later in fact the real, if informal chief. He was emotionally involved much more strongly than Angus, and he was in good company, many traditional patriots felt the same way. On the other side were those who claimed the union was unprofitable for the Polish people, all the advantages would go to Lithuania and all losses to Poland.

That being so, it is as plain as the nose on my face, the unexpected German attack on his close protege, taking the port of Kłaipeda by armed force, must have been a shock to Lithuania. More so, at the same time sending a message to Poland, an invitation to take all the remaining territory. In fact, also a shock to the whole civilized world, an act of hooliganism in politics. But if Poland accepted the offer, all the civilized world would strongly denounce, criticize Poland, only Germany and probably Italy would give their full approval. By the very act Poland would irrevocably declare itself on Hitler's side.

Obviously Germany, who had Lithuania in control and had invested much money there, could have no interest in biting off a piece of cake which anyway was all her and offering to Poland all the rest of it. At the same time kicking in the pants the little friend so long protected, if there were not higher aims. Before, as the German wolf jaws crushed at least the head of the Czechoslovakian fish, Hitler threw to Poland a bite. Now he took only a bite and offered almost all the remaining body as appetizing fat bait for the next game, Poland.

The only time he found any response, but only about thirty thousand of the hot, inexperienced youth, about one per mille of population marched for the aggression on Lithuania. The rest of society, even the part dedicated to Union, behaved responsibly and maturely, emerging with clean hands from this dangerous trial. Any other alternative would have ended ugly.

Personally, if I dared at all to express my little, stupid guess, I would suppose that this provocation was one of the strokes of genius by Hitler, proposed especially for trapping the imagination of Piłsudski. It was known, he felt especially woefully the separation with Lithuania. Hitler considered himself a top psychologist and some of his ideas made an impact on the not-so-smart politicians, for example he was able to manipulate Chamberlain and Daladier, and catch many smaller fishes. However, the chances to cheat Piłsudski were small.

In 1934 Hitler only started his career, had too little information and as working hypothesis this may be examined. But in 1935 Piłsudski died and Hitler could only regret his "wonderful" plan with the "perfect" lure. Piłsudski can't defend his memory from the tomb, but he deserves not a blame for something imagined about him by a vicious desperado.

Piłsudski was a man of action, at his best when something went wrong. He had a long practice in conspiracy and applied "action direct" long before Hitler turned to politics. Next took on his conscience a military coup and two other breaking of law with strength, but never turned a dictator and upheld the democratic institution to his death. If anything, he was rather a forerunner to authoritarian type like De Gaulle.

This study shows that Poland could not prevent the national tragedy with any of her own doings. It was just bad luck to be in a bad place at the wrong time. The action was correct, any other would have just ended worse; but if any radical change was impossible, still there were possible little changes in small details. There is a known proverb "the devil sits in the details." By a smart play, maybe it would be possible to get better results with the bad cards.

In politics, Poland was right, but a little too eager. Recognizing first the danger from Hitler, Polish diplomats told this to deaf ears. But later, as the Western democracies awoke already too late, Poland remained their only hope for preventing immediate invasion of their own homes. Now the alliance was necessary not only to Poland, but to France and England as well and desperately. But Poland was so happy her partners at last were reacting, that she offered all she had at her disposal unconditionally and remained with nothing more in reserve. It was a bad mistake for the Foreign Minister to close a vague deal. When Poland was most needed, all mutual duties should have been specified in detail. It was bad business, as if someone invested everything in the first round, and his partners, who bought their shares later, eliminated him, taking all profits for themselves and his first investment on top. Minister Beck closed the deal as if he was playing with gentlemen. A diplomat should know better. Probably the Allies would have accepted at the time any reasonable conditions.

Nevertheless, if France believed blindly in the Maginot Line, and England felt safe across the sea, maybe it would be better to delay a little more. Save France in the nick of time, as the Maginot Line would be already broken behind the front. Hitler according to his modus operandi would engage the whole army in one direction and leave at the Polish border only a weak screen of troops. Maybe Poland should deceive Hitler, accepting his proposal. Not a honorable thing to do, but didn't Hitler break both the international law and his word? What about the No-aggression pact with Poland? Why should the Anticommintern Pact be any better? Hitler was so sure of himself, he would probably never consider that some smaller country dared to attack him.

Or even better, do it like Italy, agree to most of Hitler's proposals, but play for time. Poland was not ready for war; maybe like Italy, she could demand aid in armaments or any similar conditions.

Capsule: A foul swindle: enforced by France, campaign plans - engaging the Wehrmacht deep into Poland and a false promise of offensive on Hitler' bare bottom from the West.

The French top command had in 1939 only one true plan: taking advantage of the myth about the unconquerable Maginot Line, direct the campaign away from the French border, for example in Poland. With some luck further afield in Rumania and the Balkans, next maybe in Nah' East and so on. Meanwhile the whole world would send in reinforcements and step-by-step, the French would amass so many arms and armies that finally they would hold the undisputed advantage. Then they might advance to negotiations of the cease-fire and soon the peace conditions without fighting any decisive campaign. It would be a comfortable war: not a bad plan, though to pull it off it was necessary to find more fall-guys like Poland, willing to expose, well, let's say the neck and take the beating. That's why France accepted and would accept any more Polish demands. But naturally, the most convenient way would be only to promise, wash the hands and do nothing, exactly so the French top commander behaved.

Anyway, the treachery to Poland is only chicken-feed compared to Czechoslovakia. There, France not only sold an ally down the river, but also backed the aggressor and taking his side, pressed her ally to surrender and on top of it, humiliated him, not allowing him a voice at the conference. With such a partner it would be better to take extreme caution. Whereas despite this, Poland continued to treat France if not exactly as a knight without blemish, at least as a fair, honest friend and this was the cardinal mistake.

The French may be and often were and acted just splendid, but not all of them. Right at the top reigned remarkably foul creatures. In the country of gentlemen too, none were present in the government. Poland acted too credulous, naive, forgetting her own interest; committed a suicide for foreign benefit.

The French top command never seriously considered the alternative of fighting. He did not believe in possible victory, even though together the allied forces of the West had more men at arms than the whole German army (both in the west and the east). The propaganda slogan from French billboards, "we are stronger" (with a world map, it looked impressive), was a simple truth. France had also more tanks, artillery, even airplanes. During the Polish campaign, when Hitler used there nearly nine tenths of all available troops, by beginning of September the French supremacy was about twenty times. At the end of the month still ten times, much more in heavy arms. And in addition, the Maginot Line existed, maybe not a wonderful line, unbreachable, but still a strong fortification. On this base it was easy to start an offensive and in case of failure it allowed a safe withdrawal; a comfortable minimum of risk.

It seems impossible that with so strong a hand and against an enemy with such weak cards and able only to call one's bluff, the game was not won. More so, the strong hand simply passed right before the match, without even trying a bid. In the next rubber, played in 1940, the cards fell another way, there was no obvious superiority. But even so, the Allies had some advantage. Nevertheless the French top command, not simply afraid, but in wild panic, as in hypnosis or a bad dream saw in Hitler some fateful, divine will, not to be overcome. Almost a stampede of a sheep herd before a wolf's pack. The compromising stink of the generals in horror influenced all the troops. Of what could these men be so badly afraid?

Not even of their own death, some of them were not exactly cowards, not in the physical sense. For example General Georges, commanding the Army Group in Flanders, took his own life. It was called, rather irrationally, a honorable escape.

Maybe it was a case of some mysterious, vague psychosis, which sometimes spreads contra any logic. Or rather the commanders were afraid of their own incompetence. They were unfit for the place, complete zeroes, and the lasting stress that this truth might come out was too much for them. By some smart back way they came, or rather crept like serpents up to Olympus and they couldn't face the downfall.

Except the Great Revolution, which made waves taking right from the bottom exceptional men, becoming for the Napoleonic epopee, France has had bad luck with its generals. Or rather it was the bad luck of soldiers and ranks to serve under weird commandants. It was a close circle, a caste of commanders with a heritage warrant, every generation more obtuse, unfit, nevertheless more arrogant, boastful, vain, sure of himself and his position.

It was a long tradition of degeneration, evolution in reverse. Some part descended from the ancient old aristocracy, who lost their splendid world and were seeking a replacement, where like demigods they could brutalize again the ordinary yeomen' cattle. The others followed the fashion. The officers corps forgot any mutual bonds with the ordinary soldiers, treated them like material rather than human beings and lavishly disposed of their lives. First they thought it not much worth, and second they did not know better. It is an accepted fact the whole time of WW I the waste of lives in the French Army was greater than in the German. Even in the defensive battles, even defending the fortified positions, even the stronghold Verdun, what is strange. One must need a special gift to accomplish such a result. No wonder the poor brutes, soldiers, lost confidence in the professional commanders.

Fortunately, the German officer corps was not much superior, too wooded-headed, arrogant, insolent and consisting of a closed caste with a long tradition. Yet again on the whole in the "Wehrmach" there was a little more place for knowledge and competent, able men. Occasionally even the soldiers were allowed to think. The upper crust also came from a closed circle and not by its own merit, but by protection, family position or the power of money. And with a strong belief that they were built from a better material and anyway, wire-pulling is more important than personal worth. Men, who never learned and did not want to. But it was easier to find newcomers who worked seriously and meant business, professionally; they wanted in life more than only reshuffling the same cards, playing games to occupy a better inside position.

For sure, it were the Germans who discovered most of the new lines in warfare, as placing the machine guns in front of troops (and machine gunners in the top elite). Next, the art of modern trench warfare. Finally, the loose array and spreading of troops, allowing the men to act intelligently on the battlefield. Individually penetrate and infiltrate the front instead of laying hecatombs of soldiers, wave after wave in a consistent, proper array under rapid-fire. Well, but this followed only after many bloody tries, long and woefully beating their heads against the walls of Verdun. To the astonishment and wonder of both German and French command and staff, one single platoon of infantry simply by mistake, seeking shelter in artillery fire, took by chance of fortune the fort Drummond, the terrible "coffin lid." They paid toll only to their own artillery fire, in a place where many thousands had died before in vain. Yet the new discoveries rapidly spread not on one, but both sides of the front.

The last German offensive in July 1918, conducted with smart scattering of the small troops, allowed to maneuver on their own, according to situation instead of to set orders, appeared the most dangerous of all. It pierced the target, ruptured the French front, previously considered impenetrable. But Germany had by this time spent its strength, had no more reserves, and a new force landed in France, the fresh US Army.

Alas, it was precisely the won war which created the dull season, the comfortable atmosphere of bragging and self-praise in the French General Staff. Instead of learning from their blunders, they boasted not only the achievements, but the whole works, both good and bad strokes. Worst of all came, when Marshal Foche died and the top authority came to Marshal Henri Philippe Petain. He was the former Chief from 1917, dismissed according to the urgency of the Allies (the rotten opinion of his own soldiers naturally not taken into account).

He never distinguished himself with creative thinking, but had one talent only: he was a gifted gendarme and executioner of his soldiers, a firm man with a heavy hand. The walking terror of his army, but joy to the enemy because he set an unbeaten record. In the defense of the stronghold Verdun there perished fifteen hundred French soldiers against a thousand attacking Germans and he achieved this through rigorously applying the rules. On the other side, he introduced discipline and was just as hard on himself as on the soldiers. Only he never applied to him the military court and the shooting platoon, maybe because they had already to work overtime under his command. In short, he condensed in one person all the faults of the officers' corps.

Finally after the war, he became not only a coryphée and authority, but also a paragon and almost demigod to the officers' corps. The straight and upright person with a narrow mind may sometimes cause more evil than the odious but clever wretch, especially if he lives too long. Best example, how bad a hell the world would become without the natural death of the old.

Formally Marshal Petain did no more service, but it would be a bad mistake to consider him a petrified emeritus. In the Army nothing could happen without his approval. His house, moderate, if not exactly spartan but at best bourgeois, became a king's court to generals and officers competing for the Marshal's consideration and protection. The outsiders dreamed of access at any price: one word of the old Marshal could make, or break a career.

Alas, the victory in war, although won not thanks to, but rather despite the top command, meant that even the obvious faults and mistakes of the Marshal and the other commanders, were praised as virtues. The distance between the manure of common soldiers, the poor brutes "poilu," and the splendid, admirable blossom of officers, who finally won the bad war (nobody asked, at what price), deepened. But in the memory of the citizens, who for the time of the war must serve as torpid, enslaved subjects, remained the terrible price. They paid for the victory with their lives, agony, pain and diseases. The people lost all confidence in those who should be their leaders, teachers, protectors, keepers and often tutors - but in fact it was better to avoid them as an enemy. No mistake, under Marshal Petain and his chosen associates the soldier should properly be more terrified of his officer than of the enemy.

Nothing new, such thinking or rather thoughtless lunacy had haunted for centuries, not only in France. But at least with some conception, not only by dull, obtuse minds. Marshal Petain was by conviction a monarchist, a partisan of enlightened absolutism; democracy he judged as disastrous and considered it the reason that France, a country without proper discipline, had not a chance against Germany.

The conditions in the French general staff as well as top command were influenced by the frequent changes and lack of a stabile government. Obviously the strength of democracy, its superiority, rests on the possibility of swift changes of competent men on the top; the ablest, most gifted may comparatively easily puncture the sky. The personal exchange is a natural process and runs in an institutional way, or at least should. In other systems the people on the top remain there too long, sometime permanently, creating a barrier for the fresh blood.

However there is known a degenerative form of democracy which had many times happened in history, caused by splintering of the main parties into many small groups and squads, unable to form a consistent majority. Instead there rules a closed and permanent circle of individuals continually changing position, coming alternatively to control or remaining nearby and all the while trying to bite, to oust one another. It is still the same pack of cards, only always reshuffled. The population only ostensibly takes part in the elections, they change only the combinations, but introduce nothing substantially new. New people can never be added to the closed cluster. It is a sort of virtual democracy with all the defects of oligarchy, but without its benefits, it is too weak, there is no working space, any definite action is impossible.

Such a state has come about many times, even in the direct democracies of the ancients. In Poland it was the cause of the crash of the old Res Publica and after the WW I it was the cause of the Piłsudski coup d'etat in 1926. In France the change of constitution by De Gaulle after WW II happened for this same reason. So far, the only effective solution is the pattern of the two-pole pendulum, functioning in England and the US. Until now it has efficiently prohibited the accrual of such a closed circle. However, the human mind continues to introduce still new discoveries and it remains to be seen if the solution remains effective.

The point is, France for years hadn't a stable government and was unable to plan long-term action of any importance. Some people claim that by the homicide of Barthou, the fascists erased the only French politician of large stature (it remains a question, whether a terrorist coup may change the future of the whole country). But with a weak government, the general staff and the top commander inherited a strong, independent position. More, they began to rule as a supergovernment with the army as a state inside the state. The opinion of the staff and the future Chief Commander in case of war, was of extreme importance, no way the government could contradict it. But the military had no master plans, presenting only the paralyzing fear of any war.

The great guru, Marshal Petain was not afraid, but created a muddy theory of the supremacy of fire over any movement. At the start of his career, like all his colleagues, he was a dedicated partisan of attack, offensive at any cost. Only initiative resulted in victory. To be sure, an attack of disciplined and properly organized troops, masy, if one does not count the toll, go far towards breaking the enemy line. The mass employment of machine guns caused unbelievable hecatombs by such tactics, in WW I France lost about five million soldiers, mainly due to the traditional stupidity and dull slowness of her commanders. General Petain changed his opinion, recognized the power of modern weapons, rather too much, assuming that any attack on a prepared line of defense must end in calamity.

Again slow to notice, how easily that final German offensive in July 1918, arranged in an unfamiliar pattern of scattered troops allowed use their own wits and initiative in enterprise, penetrated the French positions arranged according to the classic tactics. He missed, maybe by a green-eyed envy, as the offensive of the Field Marshal Foche rolled back the long prepared and fortified German front. He was unable to realize the complicated matter, how much the use of armored vehicles, especially tanks and the increasing power of aviation again changed the rules of the battlefield. Marshal Petain believed firmly the party which attacks first, crashes first. It is enough to wait for the enemy attack to win the war.

The proposed Chief Commander of the French army, General Maurice Gamelin, followed his master's beliefs about offensive, he never serious considered such a risky move for one moment. Although approved by the Marshal and being in his confidence, the two did vary in one little detail: Gamelin also disbelieved in the possibility of shielding and defending France. France paid for its border fortifications unlikely sums of money, for which it would be possible to equip the mightiest army in the world. Alternatively for a small fraction of this cost, supply weapons to the Allies and fight the war with foreign hands. The cost was already too great for the country, breaking its finances and its currency. Some said the real calamity caused shady affairs, bribery accompanying many great engineering works. It may be in part true, one should not underestimate the whirl of big money in such vast transactions. However, Maginot personally was an honest man and his work and the technical achievements admirable. On the other hand, it was an expense beyond feasibility; the cost of Chinese wall was small beer in comparison.

However, France after WW I planned its budget allowing for the reparations, which never materialized. Never mind the cost of war, but the aggressor never settled the robberies, contributions or devastations and never paid its debts, not to mention the interest. At the beginning the financial position was good and the accounts taken too optimistically. Next, all were trying to get as much as possible of the good fortune for themselves, which resulted in total financial collapse.

General Gamelin was a gifted bookkeeper and had an imposing knowledge of how to demand money, also a top expertise in how to deal with Parliament. He demanded again impossible sums and got them from the despairing representatives. And bought a lot of modern, top weapons. He had the spirit of a true collector and wanted a lot of toys, this hobby needed a lot of money, then more money and finally money again. But not for any warfare, these wonderful toys might become damaged, break down. Simply glimpsing the arsenals, any enemy should fall to his knees and surrender.

In his address to the Reichstag on the first day of war, Hitler boasted about the power of the German Army, saying he had invested in it ninety billion marks and six years' work. He didn't mention, he did it on credit, without the interest the cost would almost exactly equal the German debts (with interest, about twice). Certainly, for Poland astronomical money. But French Army still outdid the Wehrmacht, with about twice the number of tanks, even more in artillery pieces, more vehicles. The planes about equal, some of the German ones modern and better, but not many. If it were only a matter of number of weapons Hitler would lose the war in the first round and quickly. Even without the little detail that Hitler had engaged almost all his top troops and weapons in Poland. But the weapons and numbers don't fight the battle alone, only the men. Almost all the equipment fell next year intact in German hands, as the Czech had earlier. (By 1940, German had already adapted the Czech tanks and for the next game had an almost equal number of them as the French.)

But Gamelin, almost pathologically unable to take a decision, also exterminated generals and officers who dared to suggest anything. He remained paralyzed in 1939 and in the next year he took any crash or whipping at Hitler's convenience, never reacting himself. With the taken French arsenals, the German military power about doubled.

Hitler performed all moves that Gamelin considered inappropriate, unlikely, contrary to the art of warfare, strategy and tactic, dangerous, leading to a full catastrophe of the army, acting against the rules. He was right, fully so, but only if Hitler had any opponent.

For the Polish people, the most woeful was that all the self-sacrifice in the first year of WW II was in vain. Perhaps it was fortunate they didn't know the full truth, thinking that their fight and contribution, taking on themselves the full fury and weight of first year of WW II was necessary. That they were protecting the Allies with their own bodies and buying the essential time for friends to mobilize and arrange the forces, to spread the wings. They recognized the truth only in June of the next year, in the gruesome moment when the echoes of obituary bells announced to all Poles what they considered not a peace, but the end of the world. After the calamity of France, through the Polish lands followed a wave of suicides, first of many outstanding men and women, the most tender and sometimes neurotic intelligence, but also of youth. The despair was even greater than after the Polish campaign, because for days it seemed the war was finally lost and all hope vanished. Angus, too, experienced these moments and wanted only to die. But happily, it appeared that England, like Poland, would still carry on with the fight and among the youth the overriding opinion was that if to die, better to do so fighting the enemy. Only such a death has some sense.

Nevertheless, all these disasters befell the democratic countries only because the French Army did not use profitably the time, generated by the desperate struggle of Poland. And not only for a quick victory, which would have been sure if the French had acted honorably according to the international treaties. They also did not learn the simple pointers from the Polish campaign - and they should have, indeed. They could have studied it themselves, or let themselves be tutored by those who had been through the experience, they could have made some deductions which would be useful later. For example the jamming of principal public ways, caused by the population fleeing from the air terror. Or how to face the onslaught of German mechanized and armored force. In the battle by Kutno, the German tank corps got cut off by Polish flank attack and would have been destroyed if the German Air Force hadn't supplied it with fuel and munitions. This was so serious, that Hitler personally arrived to take over the command. It would have been an excellent lesson, when the Germans tank pierced the front via Arden. The French infantry would be not any worse, attacking from both flanks. They could cut off the German's mailed spike. In the Polish campaign, the Germans managed to come out successfully only with full reign in the air, whereas in France they never had full control. On the contrary, the French aviation lacked only the offensive spirit, not the planes.

At least so it was until the moment of the unexpected German offensive against the Allied airports and the planes. Well, but why unexpected? There again the French could accept a little tutoring from their already experienced partners. In the Polish campaign, the Germans attacked Polish airports in vain. Poland had only few planes compared to Germany, but none of them was destroyed on the earth, only fighting in the air. Poles always expected that an air-offensive on the airfields is natural, not any inappropriate violation of custom. The regular airports were empty, the bombardments ineffective and Poles shot more German planes than they lost. Yet the French for a longtime refused planes even to the most experienced Polish pilots and insisted on training them again. Worse still, they would not accept a word of comment or advice from the Polish officers, who had already fought and had experience. Not only for towards their own soldiers did the French commanders commit the sin of arrogance and stupid vanity.

The English acted no more honorably and loyally, but at least more in practical way, with more common sense. They did not have an expedition corps on the Continent and could not decide about the French offensive. They declared to engage the Luftwaffe but did nothing through the whole time of the 1939 campaign. They never fought a single German plane, the only action was dropping some leaflets; as commented Goebbels, in the German towns where there happened to be a temporary lack of hygienic paper. They explained the RAF was not ready and could not realize the promise declared by General Ironside during his visit to Poland in 1939. If this was true, if the RAF was unable to fulfill her Ally duties, one may imagine what would follow, if Poland had accepted Hitler's demands and remained neutral in the first phase of WW II. If after a speedy conquer of France the Luftwaffe began the offensive, it could bombard England to its hearts content. There would be no battle over England, if RAF were still unable to fight.

However, the English effectively seized the opportunity and time created by the Polish campaign and prepared their defenses. And afterwards, they accepted the Polish squadrons in the RAF, never regretting it. In the Battle over Britain, the Polish pilots had proportionally about twice the number of shot down German planes. This happened not because they were any better, but more experienced, most of the British pilots were still young greenhorns who got experience in battle side by side with the Poles. Finally, the RAF even accepted the Polish order of battle and Polish array in line-up as more efficient. The Poles soon gave up regretting their sacrifices, seeing it was worth it, done in a common cause, apt and rational.

However, these comments are dashing out in the future, in the year to come. Now, in the third week of September 1939 the French offensive was overdue about ten days and in fact never happened. But much worse than the outright treason and throwing the ally to the wolves, was misleading, misguiding him, by the false information fed from the French top command. In fact, the Polish top command was deceived on purpose but aimlessly, without any sense and any advantage to the deluders.

The design of a plan prepared by the French top command in case of a common war, demanded from the Polish ally a deep retreat, without fighting any battles before the French offensive came about. At a minimum to the line of the river Vistula and better even further, right to the southeast corner of Poland, near the border with Rumania (associated with both Poland and France). Only there should be the place and time of the final resistance. This was fatal strategy, such a plan was impossible. Leaving the country and the population without protection from the enemy applying wild terror and inhuman repressions was unthinkable, could result in riots within the army. The only advantage of the Polish Army was its men, deeply motivated and patriotic, wanting to fight and defend their country and people.

The Polish Chief Commander, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły tried to realize as much as he could, but not without fighting. His worst mistake was that he tried at all to fulfill these idiotic, disastrous leads. He stopped functioning as the Commander-in-Chief of the army of a suzerain country and acted as commander of a detached front or only a detached sector, believing naively this was a common interest in a common cause. In such a position he remained to the end of the campaign and bad luck, he was good at this. He would make an excellent commander of a detached group, receiving and executing the orders, he surely should play the second fiddle, not the first.

Anyway, a deep retreat of infantry, imagining soldiers running away on foot before the trucks of the motorized enemy was unreal. Not the best soldiers in the world could retreat hundreds of kilometers, marching by night and fighting by day. Men are not machines and must regenerate their strength, sleep and rest; the motors, the trucks will outrun them in the end.

Poland from the start was in a bad position, poorly armed and not prepared for war. The best choice would be to fight in stationary positions to the end, as long as the soldiers could hold the arms. Forget any retreat; forget the neighboring territory, the never-ending crisis, wherever or not the enemy pierced the front. Just go on fighting, man against man, use the only superiority of the deeply motivated and patriotic people. Fighting to the death they would have a better chance, the human value would be more essential.

A clear example is the defense of the coast. The most known and famous is the battle at Westerplatte. However, it was only a fragment and rather a symbol of heroism. But the whole coast was defended formidably. The Polish colors did not retreat, only stubbornly fought and died on the decreasing territory for about three weeks. (Saying stationary, one should add elastic; there were no fixed fortifications and the fight conducted with constant attacks and counterattacks. The terrain changed, but decreased, about the 19th of September fell the port and surrounding land. But the Peninsula Hel held out in defense against German supremacy so great that it will be better not counted, because it may seem unbelievable. It surrendered only the following month, as the last scrap of free Poland. Well, even afterwards fighting did continue, but these troops were moving.

Another example is the defense of the towns, the capital Warszawa and Lwów. The only sensible and efficient course would be a stationary defense, no matter what happened around.

With the great supremacy of enemy numbers and weapons, the campaign anyway must end with a calamity, but the fighting would take longer.

In such a case would the toll be greater? Surely not, only the disarmed and defenseless people could next be murdered in mass. As long as warfare continued the chances of survival were better. The Poles too late noted the unarmed might be killed easier and quicker. Probably even the toll of the fighting soldiers would be less, in the chase of the physically exhausted men competing with the motors more died than in battle. It was also true that later, after the numbers of the defenseless murdered victims increased, the Poles began to fight back and this again decreased the number of murders.

Hitler's attack was not like any civilized war. The occupant never kept the international law on the civilian population, nor in fact any laws, neither human nor divine. If anything, it was like the fights of the Don Cossacks that Angus' father described: the main was to stay on your feet, he who fell down, died. The Poles and the Jews were to be exterminated, the Germans started with the Poles. But as the Poles began to fight again, the Germans had at the moment not enough available power to continue and turned to the Jews as an easier prey.

Probably fighting on the spot, without retreat, many isolated fragments of the Polish Army could have held out to the winter. If so, after the deep frost came, they could have recovered a great part of the lost territory, because the Wehrmacht was disastrously ill prepared for sharp winter. The winter of 1939/40 was extraordinarily cold and the German soldiers would be - well, they were unfit for battle and helpless. It may seem a fantasy, but I saw it with my own eyes, even the sentries in giant boots stuffed with straw could not stay outside and sought a little warmth in the buildings. They could not shoot, nor turn on the motors, it looked funny indeed, the whole Army paralyzed. One platoon of Polish infantry could make prisoners of war of a whole German company or more. That is exactly what happened, why a small leftover troop of Major Hubal (not ignoring his personal merits) could fight in open field to the spring of 1940, many times beating the much bigger German troops.

In fact Hitler had experience only from the Western front, where the winters were mostly not too cold, only the rain and mud, little snow and not for long. He was deficient in imagination for anything he didn't see. And he had saddled his generals already in 1934 and again, brutally in 1938, no one dared to point out to him the most obvious faults.

In 1941 the winter again flabbergasted the Wehrmacht, but this time they were better prepared for it. Well, so-so, still not enough. Anyway, comparing to 1939 it was big progress and the winter was not so raw and sharp. But in 1939 it was much worse, maybe only the "Alpenjaeger" could remain fit for battle.

Capsule: End of the 1939 campaign. Woe to the cheated suckers.

In the last week of September, the German newspapers reported heavy fighting in Poland and some patrol activity on the West Front. The warfare shoved a long way back, but did not slacken in intensity. On the south from the Lublin, around Roztocze and Pokucie one after another erupted desperate, dogged battles with Polish troops. Following the directive, avoiding any conflict with the Red Army they tried to pierce the terrain already occupied by the Germans in essays to break through to the Hungarian border. It was a series of do-or-die, frantic, almost suicidal onslaughts with generals and officers in front of the attacking troops, the dissolution of the Army. Nevertheless about a hundred thousand of the soldiers and ranks got to the Hungarian internee camps after laying down their arms at the border, about twice as many more got through to Rumania. Next the men ran away from the camps and from around Europe traveled to France to continue the fight in the Polish Army there. After surrender of France a great part of them got through to England, the less lucky were interned in Switzerland. From there, there was no way out, Switzerland was encircled. But at least they could survive there in humane conditions.

The German papers boasted about victories - but though they indeed happened, not always the Germans were the winners. The first branch of a new military formation called "Waffen SS" (independent of the Wehrmacht), a regiment "Germania," was attacked by surprise with cold steel. Without a shot (shooting restricted in a dark night) it was so badly beaten to heel that it could never rebuilt. The shock was so severe that survivors released from "Waffen SS" service found their way into an asylum in care of mental doctors.

Besides the southeast Poland, north still fought Warsaw, Modlin and the Peninsula Hel, the only place remaining, after the heroic Costal defense finally broke down there on September 19 with the suicide of Commanding Colonel Dąbek. But the peninsula still held on, after the failed attacks on firm ground and several attempts to embark troops from ships. Hel had only one battery of heavy artillery with four long-distance pieces, however placed on firm ground and shooting very precisely. The enemy ships always got the worst of it. It has already been mentioned, the Polish Army helped itself to the officers of KOP (a small semi-professional Army or rather service for protecting the east border). Here a little curio may be, some high professional officers of this battery were transferred from KOP only months before.

On the 28th of September surrendered the capital, Modlin on the 29th, the Peninsula Hel not until the 4th of October (the surrender was agreed on October 2nd). Even then some troops in the field fought on. In the last great battle on the 4th and 5th of October by Kock one division of German motorized infantry was beaten, the second would have been, if not for lack of ammo. This was the cause of the surrender agreed on the 5th, and taking place on the 6th of October. (The regular Army depend on delivery of ammunition, the regular soldiers can't fight without it. Guerrillas solve the problem easily: kill the enemy and you may help yourself to his ammo - see Chapter 12). After this remained still some little troops, the Polish Army never gave in as a whole, if most troops had to.

The patrol activity on the West was at first announced by the French as the beginning of the great offensive but was limited to sending a few patrols on foot, the greatest consisted of twenty-seven men. In this were twenty-seven divisions; the Poles could ask, why so few. According to the treaty one of the partners should aid the other, whoever was attacked first, with the substantial bulk of its army in one week, in case of unexpected difficulties in ten days at the latest. The only demand Hitler made to Poland that counted was that it should remain neutral in case France was attacked first.

But even only twenty-seven divisions would be enough against the seven of the German on the whole West Front in the first weeks. These patrols met no resistance. They moved freely about five kilometers deep (at a front about twenty-five kilometers) in the direction of Saar and then hold on, awaiting further orders, but none followed. All in all, the French took about hundred square kilometers with a few little villages and hamlets, then the French top command concerned by a lack of resistance ordered them to stop. Next some minor troops were introduced in the taken terrain, but the entire motion cost the French Army five men killed by a fire exchange, as two patrols met. Well, there were more victims, several hundreds of them: the POWs. After a time the Germans began sending in night patrols that regularly took the French sentries, it was necessary to send new sentries even up three times in one night. The POWs talked through megaphones to their colleagues on the other side, about how comfortable they were and how good the Germans are. On the other side, the French were concerned about how deep the German intelligence had penetrated the Army, they must know every little detail, the ciphers and codes must be broken. This belief grew, as the 5th Morocco Division, right on arriving, was greeted by the megaphones in the Arab language. But the Moroccans were more suspicious and did not surrender and the Germans stopped playing Old Shatterhand, it become risky. In fact, the Germans got only as much knowledge as the POWs told them and this was nothing much, nothing to worry about but a psychological show. However, maybe Hitler had some real high source of information in the French top command or government. He was too carefree, for a longtime placed in a risky, vulnerable position between two fires.

On the 12th of September General Gamelin wrote a letter to General Georges. (Joseph Georges was a candidate for Commander in Chief but did not want to compete for the position, being an honest man with a conscience and not a great strategist he believed himself to be unfit. He did not exactly resign, but in fact supported Gamelin and now commanded French Army Group before the Low Countries.) "We must hold in mind the eventuality that it may be necessary to let out of our hands a little of the terrain conquered on the forefront of our fortified position between the Mozelle and Rhine rivers. However if the bulk of German troops continues the passage in direction of the Balkans...there could be no objection to consolidating on this conquered terrain." There is not any satisfactory comment.

General Maurice Gamelin believed he had grounds for satisfaction. Exactly this day, September 12, at the conference of the Allies in Abbeville he announced his decision about stopping any offensive action, as if there was any. Poland was not represented or even invited; Britain still had no troops in the field and had nothing to say, so France's opinion remained the only one.

There is a known dictum of Napoleon or rather Talleyrand (also Maurice) about an army of lions led by sheep, but the second part, about the much more dangerous army of sheep commanded by a lion, does not apply. Hitler could be never compared with a lion, rather to a rabid wolverine, demanding only blood and more fresh blood. Now he was keeping up appearances, but in future he lost all self-control and wanted any blood, even that of his own people and wished to destroy them all with the whole country too.

The Polish Commander in Chief, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły was never informed about this decision, deliberately deceived. On that same day he edited his order, "Guidelines for concentration of troops on the south" (of Poland), pointing out the river Dniestr and the terrain near the Rumanian border as the final line of defense.

Five days later the Soviet invasion confounded these attempts.

The border of Rumania also crossed the Commander in Chief, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, with the government and the important person of establishment. He several times changed the decision, wanted to return to the Army, finish the fight and eventually his life in the country. Even chose the officers who volunteered to go with him as well as fetching for them and him the infantry carbines. Finally, he let himself persuade by the diplomats that, being the one who had closed and signed the deal (the staff arrangements being a part of the Ally Treaty), he must talk personally with the partner. To recreate the Polish Army and represent the Polish side before the French government. That is the best way to serve the Polish Army and care for the fate of the soldiers and officers, quitting now their country to continue the common battle.

However the fact that he was sold down the river and deceived while acting honest and honorable, placed him in the worst possible position. He was unwanted in France. The French Commander had never any doubts, no conscience, surely felt no shame, but it would be rather uncomfortable to meet eye to eye the man he cheated. Despite all guarantees, the Polish Commander in Chief was never allowed to continue to France. The same concerned all the members of government and the President who finally got free, but only after disclaiming his public roles, as a private person. It was embarrassing for Rumania, who was an ally of Poland and of France, but the state in a rather risky position did this on the direct demand of France as well as Germany. So Rydz-Śmigły fell in a trap, interned by his confederates on demand of his ally, supported by his enemies.

The new Polish Government in Exile formed in France a coalition of parties, which in fact did have a majority of votes, but thanks to some dubious legal gimmicks and loopholes remained in opposition. The French insisted and demanded a change of Polish Government not in interest of democracy, the internal affairs of Poles left them unmoved. But they preferred to deal with new men, not with these, with whom they had closed a deal and whom they had cynically, treasonably defected. Who might now put forward some stipulations.

This change turned for good, because the new Government in Exile was by formed a great, charismatic born leader. General Sikorski was a man Poland needed and he met with a total approval of the Polish people. Throughout the whole war Angus never heard of any objection, not from a single person.

The former government had remained in control for thirteen years (from the time of the coup d'etat sanctioned by Piłsudski). Now it had exhausted the people's confidence and the catastrophe of the war made it outright hated by a big part of Poles. Both the government and the former Commander in Chief were universally denounced and condemned not only for their mistakes in the campaign, bad preparation of the Army, overconfidence. But especially for this, that they did not perish honorably with flying colors, but decided to run.

Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, interned in an amicable country by former friends and allies on urgent demand of his allies at arms, many times analyzed and resolved in all details the bygone campaign. He could not lay his finger on one point which could have been done in another manner. He simply did all the time, what he had to. He performed as well as he could the instructions of French Staff. In the most critical moment, he even forbade the General Kutrzeba initiative, which might have turned the luck, ended with a success. General Kutrzeba found the moment when the German Army attacking Warsaw was out of balance and pleaded for a decisive battle, wanted to strike with all the available power of Army Poznań from a flank. Surely an all-out attack would have created havoc in German 8 Army. But the Commander in Chief allowed only a limited attack, with three Divisions arranged in "stairs" so they followed in steps, one after another. The unexpected early shock soon passed. Rydz-Śmigły followed the intent and purpose of French Staff, pulling as much as he could of the Polish Army on the right bank of Vistula, retreating to the far corner of Poland. Only there should he engage most of the German Army. In so doing, he gave the French ally a clear run, free field on the West Front. For this he allowed Army Poznań to perish, because if he had accepted General Kutrzeba's plan, it would thus have developed into the decisive battle, too early and not distant enough. Well, maybe this was a mistake, because he still underestimated the technical supremacy of the Luftwaffe. From the moment Army Poznań brought on herself the whole attention of the enemy it was not possible to retreat to the right bank. But anyway, this was only a detail. He realized the main task and there was no time to regret the soldiers, the officers, not even the armies. It was a war and the soldiers die for their country, this is natural. But the main point is, most of the enemy troops were exactly where the stronger partner wanted them, now having best chance to end the war with a definite victory.

At the cost of a thumping toll he did his part of the deal, all, everything the French wanted. Draw after the Polish troops all the powers of the Wehrmacht into the extreme corner of Poland, in a terrain without infrastructure, with bad roads. The Germans had no chance to extract their Army, especially the heavy weapons. It was worth everything, every tribute, every loss, payment of blood, Hitler could now only watch speechless, how the French troops would simply stroll into Germany. Right away the war was already won, although nobody would remember him, the glory of the deciding coup, the celebrity, the reputation, the walking on velvet was ready for the command of the ally. But the days continued and no French offensive threw the Wehrmach to its knees.

Did he waste his Army in vain? This was right over his head. Why, for what reason could the French throw their only present-day, efficient confederate to the wolves, why should they feed him false information, lead him into a raspberry thicket, if they did not want to consume the profit of it? If the French had not interfered, he would have fought differently. The result would be probably the same, but it would take longer. Surely it would be only to the French advantage, if Poland would fight longer and use every opportunity to beat, if only occasionally, the aggressor?

And yet, contrary to the plain logic, this bad nightmare never seemed to stop. One day followed another and remaining hope vanished, it became clear the French did not want to fight, the expected offensive was a lie, no reaction of France was to follow. And Marshal Rydz-Śmigły had to remain isolated in the cage here. It was a comfortable cage, not a hard one but stuffy because he could utter not a word of justification. There was no one who could hear him with his voice effectively silenced. All the Polish people and soldiers cursed his name, and he could not even plead his innocence, Thanks to the men who conducted, commanded him to this place. Nobody heard him anymore and nobody wanted to.

Capsule: German hero, a knight without blame, his life and tragic fate.

The same day, in the end of September another general tensely expected the French offensive, looking for fresh news from the West Front. This was the best strategist that Germany had, although rather a theory man with an analytical mind, exact, accurate, bright and shrewd, in a moment taking in new horizons. Perhaps better at reflection than at swift action (although not without ability to take the necessary decisions and action, as was the case with Gamelin). The General-Colonel Ludwig Beck was the Head of German General Staff up to the time of the Sudeten Crisis. Next Hitler dismissed him from this position and from the Army, because of his peaceful open-mindedness.

Ludwig von Beck was a gentleman produced by an old school from the days when the General Staff increased its importance and value, step-by-step becoming the top institution, the Mecca of the German Army. Not only the collective head office, from which issued all commands and directives, but the supreme college, a top academy and an educational institution. All the top officers had to finish it. Perhaps still more, some quasi-monastic crypto organization and camaraderie. (Although there never existed any formal or secret organizational norms, except the strong tradition accepted across-the-board in the Army.) In sum, probation, a trial period in General Staff was intended not only to allow the elite of the officer corps to gain the skills, but also the craft of character. Fix the marks, necessary for future top commanders.

This pattern remained even after the lost WW I, in result of which the General Staff was dissolved, but secretly survived under a changed name, "Truppenamt" (troops office). And so it remained in the early days of Hitler's regime, although many important decisions were transferred to the "Oberkommando des Heeres" (OKH).

Originally the General Staff was a central and sole disposition center for the Army and a universal Stock Exchange for professionals, to a great extent independent of the Commander in Chief or rather in effect on equal terms. Surely the Commander in chief (who in the past had to serve a term of probation in the General Staff) could give the orders, but on their path to realization they had to pass through the General Staff. The Chief of Staff shared in the responsibility on par with the Commander in Chief. (The author's private, silly guess is, the conception was originally a sort of safeguard from side of the professionals against the titled Commanders in Chief, princes, kings, even the Emperor himself. They might be not always competent, so this rule functioned as a hedge against all people in control). And that's why Hitler, who never accepted a shared power, decided to break the spine of the General Staff at the first opportunity, with all the informal structures and traditions of the Army. (The institution which remained during Hitler's rule used the old name, but in fact had neither the role nor the power of the old General Staff.)

The German General Staff did not have best marks in the world opinion, especially after WW I. However, in fact it evolved for better. Like many institutions on the brink, it became in a time of decadence a set of people of higher standards, both intellectual and moral. Ludwig von Beck was the epitome, an outstanding man, straight, remarkably educated, bright and civilized.

This is not the biased opinion of a Pole, because Ludwig von Beck was never friendly to Poland or the Polish people. On the contrary, he bore rather an irrational resentment for them, which might have been his only flaw. Being a conservative, he presented the conclusion that the lands once expropriated (robbed by force) from Poland and half digested over a hundred years and more, should remain in Germany. If all the people living there were only treated fairly, they would be better off. Returning them to Poland he considered a deliberate humiliation of Germany and spite from the side of the victors, the French rubbing salt in the wounds. He was still a partisan of monarchy. But the old Empire, "Imperium Romanum of the German Nation" would be still better, if in a slightly changed shape. Also, he still considered Bismarck a great man and his predecessor Moltke a paragon and aspired to copy him, which was no longer possible.

However, he considered only a defensive war to be just and the sole task of the Army should be defense of its country and people. That being so, he considered Hitler the essence of evil. He quickly oriented himself to the realization that this fellow would destroy all on which he laid his hands. All the achievements of his people over hundreds of years, the civilization of his country and any other. As much of the world as may be within reach. A vicious desperado, at the same time deceitful and cunning, who would never abandon power till he had wrecked not only the ruffian in the brown uniform and all the other animals from his private Zoo, but all Germany.

Von Beck anticipated the course of events, almost clairvoyant, yet he had the experience shared by many people with the power of foresight. The so-called "Besserwissers" (knowing better) are not accepted in society. They usually talk to deaf ears. He could not expect that even his friends and close associates would, on his word only, oppose Hitler.

More so, as this was an enormously dangerous task and a terrible adversary. Recently without the blink of an eyelid he had arranged the death of Schleicher and von Bredow, and that was no trifling matter, these were players and gamblers of the top league. Schleicher especially was not only a resourceful old fox, but a living legend of the Reichswehr, the men worshipped his reputation. Soon afterwards Hitler erased Blomberg as well as Fritsch in a set-up prepared by Hitler's private secret service, the SS. (Fritsch was finally vindicated at the trial, he produced evidence the charge was an obvious lie and provocation, and he was reestablished in the Army. But only to the position of commanding one artillery regiment, fortress artillery to be exact, meaning a distant and isolated place, vanishing in oblivion.)

Gen. Beck's exit was fairly lucky, only a transfer to reserve without more reprisals, the Army generals inferred that Hitler was little by little becoming more civilized. But von Beck knew that this leniency was due only to the legend of the holy grail. It was little known in public, but Hitler was surprisingly superstitious, believing in witchcraft, sorcery and magic, but only the black variety. Maybe not exactly in "old wives' tales", but much in "nursery tales", especially if from the dark ages. He thought twice, if the execution might concern a man whose pedigree over the ages might, as the story goes, be guardians of this wonderful article. First, he dared not to insult the unknown majesty and second, he hoped in time to succeed in making amends. After ingratiating himself over time with the whole family of Beck, they finally might credit him with the secret, supernatural power. He had been known to indicate that he respected the secret and the silence in this matter, but if someone were to confide in him and allow to pass into his hands such an item of power, it would be a blessing for Germany. Indeed, for the whole world, and he would know how to repay such man beyond any expectations.

Now von Beck felt a cold tremor run down his spine, he saw clearly the whole picture: his country was in the hands of a man who should go to the mental doctor to have his head examined and quickly. He looked in the eyes of a madman who might cause infinite catastrophe to his homeland and his people. Also he could not get rid of a feeling that this creature was going to dance, well, maybe only walk on his grave.

No kidding, Hitler seriously under seal of deep secrecy ordered a large-scale hunt, adventuring expeditions seeking such famous, legendary objects as the goblet called The Holy Grail, the Ark of the Covenant and others. In a nutshell, the movies by Spielberg are not only an entertainment production. Hard to believe, but there is a grain of true history at the core. Hitler invested heavily in the project, alas not so much the armory projects could be delayed. He did this too free of cost, on credit.

Hitler said he did it rather skeptical, but even if the chance of success was low, with success the gains would be colossal. The legends which lasted so many centuries and were believed by so many people, had to have some solid ground underneath them. No difference if the treasure were Christian, Jewish or any other religion, any would do, if only the article was genuine. (He had in fact already got one such artifact, the lance of Saint Mauritius, which he suspected because it seemed rather unlikely to his mind, that a German Emperor would give a true treasure to a Polish King.)

It is astonishing how anyone could simultaneously believe in the Ark and murder the Jews, or credit in the Christian relics and feel scorn for the Christian ideas, trying to deny them and as well the religion. It's a riddle and the only explanation is, Hitler believed in mumbo jumbo, his was the magic world of a moron.

Ludwig von Beck repeatedly felt the cold tremor, the presentiment of his death in Hitler's presence. He understood plainly that his country and people were in the control of a sick monster, but only he and a few others knew the truth. The only power that could save them was the Army, and the only man in the Army who had enough authority, knowledge and expertise to effect salvation was himself.

Therefore on him rested the duty and debt; he could not seek excuses, no matter how great the personal danger. In the depths of his soul he feared this unpredictable degenerate, but the proper course was to fight. Never mind the foreboding, if he directed himself by fear and intuition he would came down to the level of Hitler. But the dread was well-founded, remaining near Hitler with such a task was like marriage to a rattlesnake or tiger. Von Beck accepted his death if necessary, but not in vain; he wanted to save his county and all humanity. However he wanted not a coup d'etat, blood and killing. A noble idea, but not practical.

Certainly, taking anyone's life is worst evil, but on the other side any man and any society has the right of self-defense and sometimes there is a commanding choice, who may live and who die. One death may mean saving many lives. (At least, so justifies himself the author.)

Anyway, Beck recognized the situation and decided to act despite the outcome, but the time was still not right. Hitler was on the crest of popularity, had many dedicated partisans, a clear majority of Germans worshipped him.

In hindsight some would censure Beck for Fabian tactics, delaying matters, but this a plain nonsense. If he did try effect change immediately, during Hitler's days of good fortune the Army would not act. Not only the plain soldiers, but even the military leaders, including his friends would decline the proposition. He would achieve nothing, only remove the only power which could eventually bring Hitler down, never mind the suicide warrant for himself. A failure would mean only more control to Hitler, and definite loss of hope.

The first serious arrangements for the removal of Hitler were made during the Sudeten crisis. People expected an energetic reaction of the Western democracies, or at least a serious military warning from France and her allies (automatically including Poland). A war on two fronts for which Germany was not prepared, all the German people dreaded. So Beck planned to catch Hitler by military force, followed by a communiqué of illness and put him into a mental asylum. The plan was simple and rational, perfectly so.

Later the same plan, different only in details, was again prepared after the start of the war. Hitler should be arrested with the beginning of the French offensive. He should be extracted speedily, before the expected crash of the German Army, so Germany still could save a position of power at the cease-fire negotiations table. Killing Hitler should be prohibited, but this time the possibility was taken into consideration, if he may get free.

The scene seemed impossible. Hitler behaved like a drunken hooligan in a full waiting room, robbing one after another the passengers and even the strong and big only backed away and allowed him to terrorize the weak. One thug terrorized the whole world and found followers, as if there were no true men at all, well, to the time of Churchill and the wood-headed simpletons, the Poles.

Alas, such a good opportunity to dispose of Hitler never reappeared. Step-by-step, the army inflated with many new men, the young grown in worship and devotion to Hitler. Result of compulsory education in Nazi youth organizations. Also the officer corps increased with men dedicated to Hitler, with the victories grew his clique and the percentage of fanatics in the Army. As if this were not enough, Hitler set up special troops, detached and independent Waffen SS, an elite of scum, but also picked, terrific warriors. Besides the true fanatics, there were many who considered the war good business, worth the risk and Hitler an ideal chieftain. He left them plenty of occasion for robbing people not only institutionally, but also in private and promised still more. Many got rich quick, almost all gained something, and after 1940 Hitler and the war became popular.

Beck's connections, weight and influence in the Army command dropped, he was never reactivated to any official position and was constantly aware of being under a close observation by the Gestapo, RSHA, SS-intelligence. All the possible secret and official agents. That he nevertheless held on to his contacts and continued the conspiracy and activity, may be considered only as a miracle of God or as magic. He was left free because of Hitler's hopes of winning the prize of wondrous power. The lingering hope was revived right to the end as promise of a wonderful new "super-weapon" which would turn the scales of the war. (Now this term accounts to the rockets, but originally it must have had another source, Hitler never believed much in technical progress and quite deliberately stopped many programs which might have resulted in technical supremacy.)

General Beck survived many dangers and years of tension, never resigned and was able to try again only in 1944 when at least the generals and professional men could see there was no way to win the war. But the plain soldiers still idolized Hitler and the final effort to save Germany met with failure. Anyway, von Beck was an outstanding man and great hero; there may be some equal but surely not any better. He could not avert his homeland's tragedy, perished in an attempt But saved the honor both of the Germans and of all humankind. If the guardians of the Holy Grail existed, they would be proud of him.

About a month later, in the third week of October, Angus heard detailsabout the executions of the hostages. In Poznań no such public executions occurred, from Greatpoland he heard already some alarming news, but unclear. Angus at first thought the reports concerned only the bloody events connected with the earlier advance of the German Army at the front. Anyway, he had at the time few contacts; he and his mother were living desolate and depressed (him reading books). But then he got details from a primary source, meaning his own family. His uncle, his mother's brother, was one of thirty-six hostages taken and nearly one of the thirty shot in one of the little towns, Środa near Poznań, on the 20th of October 1939.

There was not any charge, no incident, neither any warrant nor grounds for reprisal, nothing; all this happened unexpected. Only afterwards it became known, this was part of a broader action. In all the little towns and some big villages of Greatpoland hostages were taken and shot, on average between twenty and thirty. They chose the most reputable and esteemed people, butchering them in a clear act of terror, labeling this as a preventive measure. At the same time again they fixed on the streets the advertisements, that killing of any German would result in shooting a hundred hostages. All this happened only in Greatpoland and bordering western provinces incorporated now into Germany. Not on the territory of the so-called GG, General Government, something in half a reservation of wildlife, half a colony for natives (Poles). Afterwards it became an intelligent guess the purpose of these murders was softening up the civilian population. After terrorizing the people, Germans met no resistance as they began to deport and displace them to GG, robbing them of all private property.

At the time, however, one could only guess. Some people believed the Germans, knowing the high patriotism of the natives, were acting to prevent any armed resistance or guerrilla movement, to turn the Poles into servile slaves. But this was nonsense, nobody could dream of armed resistance. There were not the right conditions, only about two hundred kilometers from the Berlin. Whatever the feeling, the inhabitants of Greatpoland were not crazy maniacs, they fought, on the whole efficiently, only if they had a chance of success.

Such an experience broke some people. Angus almost could not recognize his uncle, who in one night, awaiting death in the morning, changed both psychically and physically. The big, tall, muscle-bound man, robust, loud talking and jovial, was now shrunken and decreased, his dark hair gone white. A quick-tempered companion, swift of tongue, wanted not to speak at all and from this time feared his own shadow, became servile to the Germans. He never took part in any resistance movement, in no circumstances would even allow such talk. On the other hand, he surely never caused any harm to his compatriots and never did anything against the Polish interest. In short, he became not a traitor, but a broken man and remained so. Angus could not understand how any living creature could change so much in so short a time, lose all spirit.

There was much family talk, his wife commented, how much luck the uncle had: the Germans had taken thirty-six hostages but had orders to shoot only thirty. They let the extra six go and he was one of them. Neither she nor the uncle dared to say the truth, what in fact happened. Or maybe the mature members of the family guessed the truth, but preferred not to tell the children, anyway Angus heard the full story only after the war.

In fact the so-called luck of the uncle was his quick-witted wife. She immediately paid a visit to the local commandant, a captain of the Wehrmacht and left not a stone unturned until she got to him face-to-face. She did not arrive with empty hands. Before saying a word, she took out the gold coins, the so-called golden "pigs" which meant the German ten mark pieces from the time before WW I with the face of Wilhelm II, the Emperor. She had twelve of them, which would be about equal to three ounces of gold, a little more than three twenty-dollar pieces (these German coins had a little higher proof). The uncle, a well-to-do shopkeeper, kept a part of his "mad money" entrusted in gold in case of a black time, and it was exactly such a time now.

To start with the aunt delivered the money and only then presented her petition for the arrested husband. She didn't plead to let him free, only requested a little time from the Commandant, as much as might be necessary to familiarize himself with the circumstances and to get information about her husband. He was, she stressed, a quiet and disciplined man (up to the time he was not, but afterwards much so), never failed to obey any rules and invariably respectful of authority. In short almost an angel and world would be a much worse place without such a model citizen. (This cut no ice, every one of the hostages had a clear account, was deliberately selected from among the most reputable and well-to do citizens, the best known in the community. It was precisely these most popular men who best fit the purpose of the Germans, terror.)

Aunt wanted to add also her personal jewelry, but this the captain didn't accept, finally agreeing to her plea took only the coins, promising to look into the case, but nothing more. He had his orders and must carry out them, so couldn't guarantee anything. Only hearing this talk, he was taking a risk, if this got to be public knowledge, no doubt they both could be shot. But if there should be any possibility of help and he could do it without much risk for himself, he would try; the result uncertain. Meantime he could hold the currency for her. It shall remain all the time at her disposition.

It just so happened the next morning the thirty hostages happened shot in the market of the little town, but the six superfluous ones, by a coincidence including Uncle, were dismissed. Aunt was not the only quick-witted of the wives. After the war they talked more freely and she was able to find out that some others also were quick to offer hard cash. At least three confirmed this and in fact, gave more. She had no contact with two others, but probably they did the same.

Yet a wife of one of the shot, told her friend that she tried the same path, offered also a ransom. It consisted of five golden pigs, all her rings and a high sum in Polish currency, which still had a good value, accepted in all the shops. But the officer again took only the pigs. Nevertheless the naive window considered the officer a proper and honest man, warm hearted. He returned to her the coins and regretted very much, being unable to earn her husband's release.

A clear case of governmental terrorism, there is no other term or name for shooting of civilian hostages to set an example in the occupied country. On the margin of it, the local commandant decided to pick also for himself some profit. The hostages, all known and well-to-do people, he picked from a list of even richer candidates, with some in reserve, maybe forty or fifty names. Next he sent out his brigands (in such a mission, they no longer acted as regular soldiers) and they captured all the citizens available. Those who offered the fattest ransom were excused and the rest, exactly thirty persons, shot. He needed thirty cadavers for the next morning, but he held them all to the last moment, arranging in fact a sort of silent auction, a private garage sale. The top offers for the six men released brought him a nice handful of gold and the rest the dead bodies. If the mission might be rather annoying and dark, it surely had its gold lining.

These are the basic facts, but probably the officer came on the idea not in one moment of inspiration. Probably he must have the knowledge, maybe the experience and expertise from former times. In Germany, before liquidation of the Jews, they always first milked them dry. The Nazi not only allowed and encouraged such procedure, but this was the standard way to get more end more dedicated party members. And it become also a standard procedure later in Poland, Angus' mother too paid a ransom for her son.

Surely the Germans accepted the outbreak of war without any enthusiasm, with a heavy heart. But in time, the mood changed. Step-by-step the Germans become convinced the war, the aggression creates a good business. Hitler deliberately demoralized the Army, letting the opportunity and pressure for robbery, allowing each to take his own share in the looting procedure. And in some part he succeeded. Here was a chief who allowed every soldier, if the occasion should arise, to get rich and promised much more. Every one of the German soldiers should expect after the victorious war a large piece of land with serfs to cultivate it, or a prosperous business, industry or trade, confiscated from the former land or business owner. An immediate robbery was like an advance on account. No wonder, after a time the soldiers began to worship Hitler, especially as at the start he went from success to success.

Poland as the first occupied country became an experimental territory, with the western provinces, especially Greatpoland at the top. Only some months later did the Germans introduce the experimental methods of organized state terror in the rest of occupied Poland. Still much later in all occupied countries. Following this, so it happened with state and individual robbery.

The first days of October started the return of the runaways, who began their escape earlier and ran farther than Angus, most to Warsaw. Hearing the reports, Angus and his mother inferred they had some luck in their misfortunes. The loss of personal belongings and assets was almost nothing in comparison to what others had suffered. The worst was the terror from the air. The German air force right from the start began a barbarous warfare against the civilian population. The panic on the overcrowded roads and rail lines made the air attacks efficient and tragic. In his directive to all military commanders, Hitler expressis verbis demanded killing as many people as possible, declaring the main task to be not to take territory, but of lives. As examples he cited Genghis-Khan and Tamerlane, great warriors who killed millions and were remembered now only for their victories, forgetting all the rubbish about a humane warfare.

Unlike the Army, where many cadres and officers kept a sense of soldierly honor, norms and values from before the time of Hitler, the "Luftwaffe" was a creation of Hitler and Goering, without any restraints. The flyers carried out the orders regardless, hunting the civilians like game with an unrestricted hunting permit. To many aviators such a war, without personal risk and easy, in comfortable conditions like on the practicing range delivered deep satisfaction and a tremor of excitement.

One must admit that such acts - although they obviously broke the international law as well as all signed treaties, which anyway for Hitler were of no importance - were effective indeed, both in Poland and later in France. The panic among the population, the mob which belched and tried to run in opposite directions under the rapid-fire, created havoc on the main routes and blocked also the movements of the defending Army troops.

The only difference was that in Poland such warfare of terror against the civilian population started right from the beginning of the war (in fact a few hours before). On the west at first there was no active air fighting, all the power was concentrated on Poland. In the next year too. In west for a time the Luftwaffe restricted attacks to strategic objects. No attacks against the population, until Hitler ordered a major offensive which accompanied the terrorist attacks on the defenseless population, copying the pattern of the Polish campaign.

Perhaps they did it exactly because the French, Belgians, Hollanders and Britons would calculate, this could never happen to them. That such barbarian means may apply only in faraway countries, like in Poland and maybe in Ethiopia. That in the West of Europe the Germans would not cross over the bounds of civilization. This way, they were catch unawares. Only in England the Britons made the right deduction from the Polish campaign and made the proper preparations. There the German sport-hunters could not apply themselves to the most popular game, killing the unarmed prey. They had enough to do, full hands of labor, fighting with an armed opponent. A premium share in the battle was had by the Polish pilots, not because they were any better, but because they had already fought and knew the enemy, their tricks and ways. So now the individual hunt ended, for the Germans remained only the pleasure of bombardment, but even for this they had to pay and dearly so.

In the Polish campaign, beside the bombers, the runaways feared most the diving bombers, the so-called Stukas, which with a loud whistling sound of aerodynamic brakes drove some people out of their mind, almost dropping down to earth during attacks. Luckily they had only a small reserve of bombs, but dumped them precisely on target. Still, most dangerous for the people were the joy-riding hunter planes. Appearing out of nowhere and without warning so fast the people had no time to drop to the ground, they left behind a way blocked by corpses. Angus just once met such a sports lover, who after the first pass came back and tried twice to hunt down his mother. Luckily this was only a dirt road, not crowded at all and with a shield of trees, but he could imagine what could happen in an open, crowded place.

Angus didn't like the critical comments about the Warsaw defense. The runaways whom he met considered this rather idiotic. A gesture costing dearly and without much strategic value and sense, because the Germans, after the first unsuccessful tries, repulsed with heavy toll, refrained from further storming and for a change went to a heavy bombardment by planes and artillery. Against this Polish Army could do nothing. In fact, they told, from the time the Wehrmacht stopped trying to conquer by tanks and armored troops, which the Germans applied at first and paid for dearly, it would have been more rational to end the defense. To say it plain, fight only as long as it was worth it, taking advantage of the enemy mistakes, but surrender at the moment when further defense was no longer worthwhile. Angus was full of indignation because of such reasoning - even later, when he had the time to think clearly, emotionless, he never shared the opinion. The siege and defense of Warsaw may have been a desperate action, but beyond the strategic importance, which can't be ignored, it had a great significance and left an impact and example for the rest of the fighting country. In fact, for the whole free world. It is not any exaggeration to say, with this heroic resistance on the capital concentrated the full attention of world opinion.

By comparison to the later Warsaw rising, it was more effective. At a lesser cost, the moral and propaganda effect was much greater. Maybe, if anything, the resistance could have continued a few weeks longer and this would have been enough for the whole war, it would not have been necessary to fight again in 1944. Anyway all the young people whom Angus met afterwards and talked to about this, much regretted being unable to defend Warsaw, to take part in the battle. So did Angus, only he would have preferred to be able to defend Poznań.

The second motif which occurred in the stories was that of treason and especially activity of the V Column. Angus remained unconvinced, because he knew from books that usually after all lost wars, the societies concerned develop a psychotic disorder, a regular hysteria on the matter of treason. This is simply the easiest way to explain the defeat.

No question, the V Column existed and tried its worst, especially pushed by the Nazi Foreign-organization Center not only through appeals, but also by warrant orders and often by the direct application of intimidation and warnings. The German minority in Poland knew only too well from the time of conflict between the JdP and the old German organizations, these warnings were not empty and opposing Himmler was not healthy at all. The Germans were tightly organized, for all of them Hitler represented full authorityl and his proxy Himmler acted in his place.

But on the other hand, the V Column action was not effective and had not much value in the war, because the Germans are not born with the guerrilla instinct as are the Poles, who have this in their genes. Now inasmuch as what concerns signals for enemy aviation and pointing out the targets for bombardment, this happened, but was an idle doing. The Luftwaffe neither wanted nor needed this help, they didn't seek strategic spots, they bombed any point where people collected, and preferred terrorist onslaughts on civilians to fire on soldiers, it was both safer and more fun. The soldiers could possibly shoot back. If their commanders did not specifically order the flyers to, they rarely reacted to signals.

The third and most frequent topic was condemnation of the former government and the Commander in Chief. The judgment not just, as already told, but at the time, after the recent failure, unanimously accepted by people. Not only because of the defeat. The Polish Army could not single-handedly beat the Wehrmacht. But rather because of the bad appearances. Poland lost the war in just one month and four days (or six, including the time of laying down the arms). In the public sentiment, it was not only a crash, but also a major, compromising discredit.

Well, in the next year France with Belgian and Holland, supported by the English Expedition Force lost the campaign in not fully six weeks. About a week longer than Poland, but they had much stronger Armies, more soldiers, more and better arms and greater territory. No other power attacked them from behind (well, not mentioning Italy, but it was not a serious attack). The Germans paid a much lesser toll and had few losses. The appearances, the discredit were much worse. The sense of shame vanished, but there was never a sense of compensation. On the contrary, the mood changed to a black, deep despair and multiple suicides. And the war could have been so easily won in 1939!

Angus tried hard to find anyone who presented another opinion. Unlike the others around him, he not only worshipped the Polish colors, but influenced by the radio, school and most of the press, also the "Grandpa" Piłsudski and after his death the next Commander in Chief and the Government. Against judging of his parents and almost all of his close companionship, in the family circle he always defended and took the part of these, considering them heroes. That being so, he could not accept now the complete upheaval of all values. But, however eager he sought and spared no labor, nevertheless he found not one soul who shared his sentiment. All the people in consensus blamed the calamity on the military command and the government. Well, no wonder; in case of a success the big bosses would not deny the fame and the honor, so they could not deny the responsibility in case of failure. Poland had not much chance. Anyway as the known paradox would have it, " the chariot of the state sails on a volcano." In politics treason is frequent and honesty rare. Now the Allies not only threw their confederates to the wolves, but deliberately misled them, directed them with false messages to the brink of the abyss and pushed them in.

But this can't excuse the fools, engaged in serious foreign affairs without the necessary qualifications. It is much more difficult to cheat an enemy who expect the worst, than a trusting ally and so the allies are most frequent cheated; elementary, my dear Watson. He who wants to take the power and rule the country at any cost, even by morally dubious methods (so it was with the party called "sanacia " after Piłsudski' death), must prepare to pay dearly, if he loses.

Also the Commander in Chief, although neither fainthearted nor a weak fool, dealing straight and competent, was unfit for the business. He was before excellent as second in command, but not expecting to go under his own stream, he sought a higher authority and with Piłsudski dead, subjected himself uncritically to Gamelin. This was the worst mistake of his life and even in Rumania he never believed the general of such a glorious and distinguished army could behave so vile and false.

Anyway, nothing could change the trust of the Polish people in final victory and quickly. Both France and England declared war on Germany, so they would want to keep their word and their debts. They wouldn't do this, if they did not want to fight. If they didn't take advantage of the solo battle of Poland, they must have a still better plan. In no circumstances - was the general belief - had Germany any chance, as soon as the offensive of the united Ally armies began, with its clear superiority. We here cannot know the whole situation, can't know the strategy secrets, but without any question, working on our behalf are the best of best professionals, clever and experienced. Anyway, France walloped the Germans not long ago, and when Germany was much greater and mightier, France much weaker than now. Some differences occurred in calculating the time it might all take. The optimists, including at first Angus, calculated the time in days, at worst in weeks, whereas the pessimists in whole months. During the six years of war, the chances changed many times and drastically, but these calculations never. It was like a man carrying a weight over his strength, who at every turn expects the end of the way. The point was, never losing hope, always holding out a little longer. The worst must be over now, no one can imagine anything still worse. In a short time the mighty Germany will crash and after the first collapse the downfall, the calamity will follow in a Blitz, as it happened before.

Funny. More so, as in fact the opinion was correct. There was no need for the long, macabre and idiotic war to last all those damned years.

Angus' mother was a pessimist, she seriously considered the war might continue even for several months. Also, she had already survived the WW I and had experience, the gist of it being, that before anything goes better, it usually turns worse and first it is necessary to survive those bad times. And especially that even after the war, the difficult days may continue. That's why she was so much affected by the material losses. They had more luck than many others, they had survived so far and come back to the house, which too remained in one-piece. But in the flat remained only furniture and the heavy or less valuable objects; the first choice, all that they took with them on evacuation, was gone. The son is not worth his bread, unfit for such a crisis - she was sure of this at the time, as indeed to this day. A judgment naturally preposterous, absurd, unjust, wrongful and false. But on the other hand rather acceptable and practical, because in result the duties divided so: in Angus competence remained the most inspiring, important doings, as for example the war and world politics. The daily worries he willingly left over to Mum.

All the Poles had then an implicit, unreserved confidence in French genius, honor and especially in the French Army with their top command. As for England it was common knowledge that they never lost a war - if sometimes a battle. So, if England is with us, the fate of Hitler is bad indeed. Soon this mad wall painter, the pun was not justified, Hitler never painted rooms but pictures and rather small ones, never successful, but this happens to many painters and brought him no dishonor. Different from his other business, after changing profession; he should felt shame.

Mum in all took ten valises and bags, calculating, this is an evacuation train for the railway personnel, so the railway somehow will take care of them. She could not know when they would return home, if ever, or if the house would remain safe and whole for their return. In result she packed all the valuable personal belongings including clothes and underwear, part of the bedclothes, sheets, blankets and table linen, even a few food supplies. Few food, because Mum never agreed with the panic and didn't hoard food, considering, war or no war, in Greatpoland always was and shall remain enough of it. Nervous about food, well it would be like worrying about coal in Silesia. Greatpoland always was a basin of food and here was always food enough, even in the time of WW I, which lasted not a few months, as expected now, but four years and a few months more. All the time, Greatpoland fed Berlin, and continued to do so for some years after.

Before the rising in 1918 the worst urgency and strain for the Germans, often proving very effective, was the threat of delaying the transports of food to Berlin. Later, the quick cease-fire also was affected not only by the strength of the victorious coalition, but in big part by the need of returning to the regular provisions traffic. It was in the interest of both sides. Without Polish food, the Berliner people would go hungry, causing social stress. On the other side, the Polish farmers would have no customers and remain poor with the unsold supplies. The price for food would go down beyond the limit of sound calculation, rather unexpected after the war, for the producers a bad catastrophe. Well, the food was also necessary in some regions of Poland, but the transport there was not functioning properly. The transport to Berlin was excellent, functioning and organized for many years. A few years later the economic or tariff war between Poland and Germany, unlucky for both sides, was in fact not only a pressure which should oblige Poland to bow down to Germans demands. Rather a deep, planned change by administrative methods of the market and commerce mechanism.

The task of this powerhouse was to set up alternative mechanisms of food commerce, removing the Polish food from the market. It was a step needed to prepare for a future war. If Berlin relied on food from Poland, preparing for war would become quite unpopular. So the supply line was deliberately cut, but before the new ways developed, the market reacted badly, the supply was for a time disorganized. The years of the third decade were rather difficult in Berlin and the people angry. A reason which helped Hitler come to power.

Anyway, the point was, Mother considered a reserve of food unnecessary and up to the moment had bought none. (With exception of salt, which was not a local product and that being so, she decided it better to have some twenty kilos reserve.) Up to now, the decision seemed right, the food was still ample and the prices stable. But now, she unexpectedly decided to store some supplies. So much that if necessary, they could stay-at-home and never go out on the streets, until the end of the war. After the bad experience no more running away, no evacuation. She decided now, better to provide a safe hole with all necessary and hide there. If she had done so before, she would now be better-off.

On the other hand, her experience from WW I told her, the problem is not only the time of war, but also the time after. She remembered the lack of everything and decided first to restore the household to the former level and afterwards make a reserve of everything that is necessary, from soap to yarn, cotton, wool, shoes, whatever. In the years following the First World War, it was impossible to buy anything at all and the prices turned unreasonable, resulting in a devaluation. The worth of money fell almost to zero. A second cousin of hers sold a house and after some time bought for the sum two boxes of matches.

Nowadays Angus heard every day: "My God, we had twenty-four tablecloths, six of them embroidered by hand, and now we have only five left, the oldest and worst. And the bed linen? The same, there remain only the old sheets; the same with pillow cases, even with towels. The handkerchiefs shall not be enough to the end of war, especially if there is a difficulty with soap. And we have nothing to dress ourselves, a wonder that we are able to go out on the street. Some luck, that we still have the coats and the heavy, warm dress, I could not pack them all and besides, the weight was too much and anyway I was sure, the war would be over before the winter. Supposing the winter may be frosty and the warming inadequate, the houses have not enough coal-coke, the furs may be useful; Angus may take total cover in Father's."

But the weather was still fair and warm. Mother considered this one more reason to start immediately, first buy the clothes and next whatever could be necessary in the house.

At least there was no problem with the money. Father, evacuated with the mobilized railway direction the first day of war, got in advance three months' salary. He left almost all of this with Mother, saying he did not want the money, they would all be taken care of on their way (to Angus' astonishment, Mother never protested). Anyway, the war was bound not to last as long as that and Mum had better keep the household money. Besides there were the savings in KKO bank, after buying the FON bonds there remained several thousands which the parents took from the account and then there was Mother's secret reserve, she always liked to have some just in case. Running away, they paid only the cost of returning by taxi, on the way nobody wanted money from the refugees. Now she planned to use all the money and quickly, before the paper could lose its worth, buy all necessary belongings as for a long siege. As much as could fit in the flat, because she calculated possibly a long stay without exit unless urgent.

One of Mother's many cousins had a warehouse called "A Wardrobe House," by the Old Market. Normally Mother did not buy there, because he denied any rebate to his multiple family. However, nowadays their position changed, the poor refugee, who lost everything while running away, could buy at cost. Next, even better, it was established between the parties that she pay always half of the price, but privately, hand-to-hand, avoiding the official cash desk. It was neither philanthropy, nor a sudden flow of family feeling. All the greater tradespeople and landowners got wind that soon they might expect compulsory German overseers, called "Treuhaenders." Nobody imagined that this was only a beginning, a first step to plain robbery of all possessions without any compensation, under the threat of a loaded rifle. Just the same, the well-to-do people became concerned and some in advance began to barter a part of their possessions for anonymous money. During WW I, requisitions were an everyday matter, yet the German Army treasurers never honored after the war the scrupulously written scrip.

Nowadays this could happen again, however if the rumors were true, the Germans up to now had neither prepared a legal pattern of account, nor were yet printing the requisition vouchers, so there should be still a little time. Nobody in their worst dreams would believe in the simple, yet effective method of taking all property without any formalities by armed force.

Also they restricted not this method only to the great fortunes. The fat bits, the factories and works, capital possessions, great farms came first under managing the Treuhaenders, because they should not just give these away to anybody. In the future, the richest bites would be saved for the most important and worthy Germans. The most sharp and shrewd came to the concourse table not empty-handed. The decisions would be made by the Party organs on the step of the "Gau" (district, on average greater than the Polish "województwo"), meaning the full control was in the hands of the "Gauleiters." Only the greatest estates and fortunes were given away by the Gauleiters according to directions from the top, by the great moguls.

Nevertheless, the major surprise was that it was not a robbery limited to the rich, but applied also universally to the ordinary Polish people. One day, the occupants arrested an owner of a house or flat, a workshop or a farm without any warrant or any paper at all and took him out. The next day in his shoes came the new, German boss of the farm or house or flat and he now owned this house, flat, working place and whatever, including the still warm boots.

A new and unexpected pattern; even after the crash of the Roman Empire and wandering in the Germans, or in the Dark Ages, for example of the Norman conquering of England, they divided the possessions. A part for the conqueror, a part stayed with the former owner. Now all the population in the occupied zone would have nothing left and no rights, if only a black eye or the bullet. Angus' mother, not knowing the future, was in a sweat buying and transporting the goods for some other families. For the Germans, who would take her flat well managed, spick-and-span, with all the assets and goods.

The entry with butchering of hostages, the shooting and homicides the occupants aimed not against any specific people. It was a pure (or rather dirty) act of terror. The mass genocide by developed industrial methods would follow in future. In fact, the millions of the dead abolished into oblivion the reminiscence of the mere trifle, about two thousand taken and shot hostages. But at the time, it was a serious warning for the prepared victims of robbery and therefore for this, they picked out the well-to-do and reputable hostages.

Meanwhile Angus' mother worked for all she was worth, regularly shopping and transporting twice a day as many goods as she was able to carry. After that it was necessary to unpack it all and put the flat in some order. According to this timetable, they came over to a late dinner; all the other meals Angus now prepared. It was to him no problem; no worry with buyin food, in Greatpoland there was still an abundance. The prices remained stabile even though Greatpoland was now supporting an increasing number of underfed Germans, who in amazement noted the difference in supply and sent the packages to their families in Germany.

Nevertheless the bread, rolls and milk still could be bought for peas, as they say. There was neither lack of butter nor meat, if only some difficulty with coffee beans, which was not a concern for Angus, but a great worry to his mother.

Allegedly, some primary schools had started teaching again, but Angus' school remained closed and Mother wished him not to attend any other. Especially, as these functioning schools had to teach only according to German rules, meaning without any lessons unnecessary for the Poles.

Their aim was only to produce Polish serfs for the German masters, servants or at best unskilled hands. From the program were removed history, geography, even such neutral subjects as physics and the natural sciences.

On this point, Angus fully agreed with his mother, such a school was not a genuine school. Nevertheless, he felt rather badly the lack of his colleagues. However, he couldn't met them now, it would be necessary to make new contacts and for a time he couldn't be sure who was who.

Now Mother did not allow him to go out to the town, because Poznań had ceased to be a friendly and safe place. Rapidly arrived more and more Germans, just going down the streets one could meet disaster. They introduced new, humiliating orders. For example, the Poles could not travel in the first wagons of the trams. Walking along Polish people must make way to the Germans, stay back with a bare head, which Angus probably would not do. Not attending to those laws could result in punishment, from an instant beating to the arrest and experience of prison discipline with possible fatal end. That is why Angus' mother wanted him not to go with her if only to carry the buys, telling him he would only give her nerves. She would worry all the time over him.

However, the waiting for France and England to commence finally a regular warfare and wallop the Germans, the inertia, the passivity got him down. He finished all the books from the library, next the house and again from the library, but could not change them. The Germans closed the library and the Polish books took for recycling. It was a common, big deal, but the mass of the books was so great that some of the collections located in the closed churches survived to the war's end. On his last visit to the library, he had borrowed many books, some practical, as for example one about drinks, how prepare and serve the exotic mixtures, sorbets, cocktails and so on. Mother bored him always with what a gentleman drinks and how and he wanted at least once to know better. Maybe the final victory in the war would create the opportunity. There was also some book about the art of chiromancy, with all the unoccupied time he read it and learned every line on the palm, in future it was useful occasionally.

But the most interesting and important were the adventure books for boys, and he especially valued the ones describing the historic fight for freedom, Poland's independence. The two top ones concerned the rising in Greaterpoland in 1848. He read these again and again, with tears streaming down his cheeks. One, titled Stach Wichura (like Stan Hurricane or Whirlwind) was about a young boy who managed to go with an insurgent company and in the end perished in the final battle, the tragic siege of a little town Książ. All soldiers and officers die in the battle. The town got torched down to a cinder, the Germans finish off even the wounded. Yes, he wished very-much he could wrestle so and perish, like the story heroes.

Anyway, Angus had much time to think over the particular question and long before knew, what a proper man should do. Poland got enslaved before and survived one and a half centuries, all the time fighting for freedom. He should seek out some secret society, enter into it and with his entire power struggle against the occupant. Attached to the resistance, prepare himself and with the others snatch the weapons at the right time. It was as plain as the nose on his face.

The only problem was, he did not know how to go about this. He could not ask anyone, it would not only prove inadequacy, but such an attempt could end badly. Considering the psychosis of treason, the person asked could suspect him of the worst goal, maybe even of espionage for the Germans. he could explain himself as innocent, but as what? An irresponsible person, a mental case, at best a stupid idiot. It would place him badly, in future any organization, even if he found one, would forever ban any contact with him.

According to the information taken from the books, any new member proposed candidates from among his colleagues, close friends, whom he knew and could vouch for. It was very well, but this was not way for him. He had now no contacts with his colleagues, in fact with any boys or men. He saw people like the fishes in an aquarium, behind a glass plate. Maybe he was overdramatizing, there was not a glass plate, but the possibility of getting in touch rather similar.

In fact, from the time of returning to Poznań up to now, he had conversed only with Mother and he considered it rather doubtful that she might have a contact with any secret organization. This was a conclusion from her reminiscences of the times as Poland was in slavery and then revived.

She must have had some bad experience, because her comment was: "Too often such a delicate work is taken by people without proper qualifications, and in result the worry and harm fall on the heads of simple suckers, who believe them. Too often it happens stupidity makes worse bargains than malice, yet the stupid ones come away luckily and the jeopardy and sometimes destruction occurs to the simple, naive but proper people."

Angus was sure that in any crisis she would react right instinctively and proper, as a good Pole. On the other hand she believed in limited trust, a limited confidence, and would not join any secret organization. If she received a secret newspaper, she would throw it in a fire.

More so, even if she were herself a head of some conspiracy, she would never tolerate in this her son and never but never allow him make any contact. Only mentioning the subject to her would be a heavy mistake.

But there existed another possibility: the heroes in the books sometimes made the happy meeting by pure chance. On their path of private resistance they casually meet a secret organization. The likelihood was not great, but it existed and with time, it might bear effect. Well, with time, it might take years and Angus had not so much time; the war would not take as long as all that, he must hurry. After long consideration, he came on the idea that if he could not find a secret organization, he must create a new one. Even a small group has a better chance of contact, than a single person does. Angus had not a bloody notion how this new organization should act, but the first step was finding the candidates. Then one shall see what follows next.

In the same street, next door in the same house lived a boy his senior but who also had finished five classes. One of the few with whom Mother allowed him to play, but Angus found him boring and had no interest. The parents of this lad decided he should become a great musician, he had long hair and was even more a mummy's boy than Angus. He constantly practiced the fiddle, which Angus, on whose ear an elephant had stepped, could not appreciate and anyway had not the temperament. Now however he made a try, but the result was negative. Although Angus talked only generally without any detailed proposals, the boy reported everything to his mother, who gave Angus to understand that his company was not welcome any more.

Beneath his flat in the same entrance lived another boy a little younger and attending another school; Angus considered him still half a baby. They got friendly and visited often one the other, playing miscellaneous games. In fact, it was Angus who went down to his house more often, because the boy in his flat had a regular billiards table. The boy did not live there all the time, only while he attended the school being in the care of his aunt. Nowadays he was not in, but the simpatico elderly lady welcomed Angus, she lived all alone and had nobody to chat with, which was for her the only entertainment.

From this day Angus visited her often and told her all the rumors and tales he heard, then they discussed the events and prognoses. Two misses with the boys, but the third time a lucky stroke; he needed the discussions as much as the elderly lady and at least he could talk with someone. Following this positive experience, he decided take a broader view. If he could talk neither with his colleagues, nor make new contacts with boys of similar age, why not begin with elderly women, he knew some in the neighborhood and occasionally exchanged a few words. In a flat a level higher, directly over his head, lived three such women, who worked in a notary's office, but now for weeks had remained in the house. They also showed much interest in news about the war. In a short time Angus developed more contacts, all in all with six elderly women, who would have been astonished indeed if they had known they were the "sure in" candidates for future members of conspiracy. Angus temporarily delayed the moment, meanwhile running his news agency.

Step-by-step, the daily chats turned into a regular information service, if he did not manage every day, he supplied this at least every other day. Angus repeated everything heard about the war, but only the good news, comforting their hearts. For example about the great marine battles between the British and German ships, mighty arrangements of France and England, aviation raids on Germany. Also, the comments of many VIPs and diplomats on the point of Poland, obviously full of high recognition.

Angus told all, even if he disbelieved something. One way or another, the Germans must crash soon, but now, the poor people in the cruel yoke suffered and despaired. A few comforting reports, even if untrue, might make survival a little easier. The main was, support the spirit and avert the breakdown before the final victory. They all needed some consolation.

So, Angus began to make up news similar to the mentioned specimens. Of the falling yield in German armament works because of Allies' air raids, about a famine in Germany. (Great exaggeration, there never was a real hunger, but in fact at the time of Hitler's reign the Germans ate rather badly. Years after the war one may say, the tables turned, the Germans took the place best served and it were now the Poles, who began to eat badly.) About some wonderful French tank, just now going into mass production, the Germans are no match at all.

One of Angus' fantasies became so successful that it ran around half of Poznań and came to him back again. It was just after the surrender of Warsaw, the warfare in Poland reduced and ended, but still continued the defense of the peninsula Hel. In Angus' information service, the Polish troops there received support from the English Fleet. The British sent not only the vessels, but also the planes and next would prepare a landing.

"Wonderful! But is it sure?"

"My dear lady!" - persuaded Angus with some heat, "what more assurance may you need? Judge for you. The Polish troops account for a few thousand men and a few pieces of artillery, we have no more planes, and our ships have also sailed away. There were too few of them, they fight now in and for England". - At the time were some rumors about the Odyssey "Orła," "the Igle," but the exact name unmentioned - "How could they oppose such a power? Against them the Germans mobilized a great supremacy of troops and a powerful aviation, a strong marine, no way our boys could defend themselves without the English Fleet and Air Force. And surely, it is not without a cause. This is the bridgehead, where goes ashore in future the Polish Army, as did before the former Haller troops. The Allies shall wallop the Germans from the west, and our Army from the other side."

Obviously, Angus' version must be impressive, since a couple days later Mother came home saying she had heard this from a trusty source. Alas, the next day Hel surrendered after long-standing defense. The last territory of free Poland fell into German hands on the 4th of October (a lthough some mobile troops still fought). To be sure, the Germans were unable to catch there any English people or an English vessel, so smart and efficient was the British withdrawal.

Supposing there were not any British at all, Angus remained unconcerned. So much worse for the Britons, they should be there. Sure, the backing of Hel by the Fleet or at least the RAF would be hundreds of times less risky and costly than the venture of Dardanelle in WW I and would make a stronger hit in the world press. The First Lord of Admiralty was the same man who took the gamble before and was a hot partisan of action. The only explanation is, with the "Phony War" he may have lost his eggs. It would be a splendid opportunity for a heroic stance, world exhibition and propaganda effect at rather a low cost.

This news quickly faded into oblivion; anyway, it was only chicken-feed in comparison to the next revelation. The Good God himself allowed for a miracle. Precisely on the 8th of December, on the Day of the Queen of Polish Crown, The Holy Mother Maria was to recreate Poland. The prophecy was specific, with full details it provided all that happened up to this day (to be sure, after the fact), good grounds to believe also in the future. Everybody did so.

Only Angus did not believe the date, December 8. What, the war may continue for the next two months and even more? Impossible, it is an absurdity. Maybe on the 8th of December they would sign the peace treaty, but surermany would fall earlier? Also he didn't respond to the idea of a miracle. Although much religious like his father and more so than Mother, he rather felt unconvinced that God meddles so directly in human conflicts. If He does, then more discreetly.

In history never happened a miracle on invoice, foretold in advance. God did not intervene so openly for any country, also not for Poland. There had been many tragic events, for example the almost one hundred and fifty years of fighting for freedom, both ourselves and other nations. Well, they called the last great battle the Miracle by Wisła (Vistula River), but this miracle was solidly prepared by humans and the deity only gave his approval discreetly, nobody noticed it. But for now, there were no troops in Poland which The Holy Virgin Maria could bless.

He shared his doubts with Mother and received a shocking response; mother advised him to keep his private opinion to him and never contradict an overwhelming public belief. The people do not like this and do not like the "knowing better" people, adults and even more so the young. Always the faithful took offense against the doubtful.

She rather thought the war would go on to the next year, and not because the French could not move earlier, even now. They obviously didn't care, they had own plans and Poland and fate of the Poles were small potatoes. They would be happy if they could close a deal with Hitler, but this was impossible, because he had an appetite for their hides, not interested in bargaining and they had no next candidate to throw into his jaws. So finally they would have to fight and achieve a victory, owning a military supremacy. For Angus it was an outright blasphemy, but not against God, only against France. All the Poles worshipped this country. Angus almost threw himself with his fists on his mother; a clear proof of how right she was.

Every year in October began in all churches the rosary prayers, public evensong service, but now they were special. The churches were full up with the people weeping bitterly, all on their knees. It was a shattering experience; Angus had never set eyes on anything like this and held the memory for the rest of life. He felt as if he stopped to exist individually, extending and displacing himself, a part of everybody's pleas. They all pleaded God with tender hearts for the liberty of the land, forgetting their own fate. Also the first time he heard, besides the standard "Boże coś Polskę," the old sacred hymn from the time of the uprising:

"With the smoke of brands, with spray of brotherly blood
To You, o Sire flies this voice
It's a terrible begging, the last groan
Such a prayer turns the hairs white..."

Some days later the priest appealed to the people not to sing anymore, lest the Germans close all the churches or do something worse. The tune became silent, but the unaccompanied sobbing made an even deeper impression.

Angus attended a church under the invocation of St. Michael the Archangel, but in all churches in Poznań, the pattern was the same. His mother agreed the impression was splendid, but shattering and too much for her nerves and depressing, so she walked in the church only occasionally. Angus went every day for about a half of month, after that he found a new way of life and new occupation, which left him less and less time. Yes, he had to curb even the most vital doings, like reading.

Walking along Śniadeckich Street on his way to the church, Angus every day went by the large, modern building of the High School and Lyceum of Business, direct opposite the Collegium Anatomicum. Now in these premises worked some weighty military staff, protected by multiple sentries, checking the arriving cars; in there worked many officers. Without question, this must concern some important affairs. Alas, Angus could not learn anything, he was not able even to read the freaky, queer letters and anyway they contained no information, only some prohibitions and warrants.

Even before, he thought he could go to the nearby station and watch the trains rolling by. However, the conditions for systematic observations were lacking; Mother allowed him to go out and about only in the close neighborhood. However, here the conditions were just perfect.

From the first moment, he was sure that he faced an extraordinary opportunity right under his nose. Even such an inexperienced stinker, greenhorn as he, might find some weighty secrets. Make observations, that for more competent and clever people might have a meaning. That is, if luck remained with him and he was able to contact some secret organization or the right people. He considered at length what he could do, before coming to conclusion that a task for which his mental capacity would be sufficient. He may write down the numbers of the arriving cars. He decided to go every, at least every second hour, memorize the car numbers and then at home write them down in a notebook. At first, the memorizing was difficult, but with time he upgraded his memory and corrected the technique, associating the numbers with various happenings and figures.

The knack remained his whole life or rather to senility. At his best, he could memorize up to five complete numbers and symbols, after a time he started adding the car color and type (sometimes he had fewer cars to memorize, if any). In the years after the war, he remembered phone numbers as easily.

Angus became more and more convinced that he took the right choice. Sure, he was not fit for a regular ace of secret service. However, it is a known that besides the spectacular successes, there is a place for hard-working, insignificant people, without whom the aces could not be so effective. He believed in his fantasy, the small peas that he collected might be useful in the future and for about three weeks he remained quite satisfied. In this time, he wrote down a full exercise book and hid this in the cellar with the greatest treasure, a book of the family, which according to tradition belonged for a time to the Polish national hero Kościuszko. After this, he began the second exercise book with the next series of numbers and dates.

On the 8th of November about 9 am Angus noticed a black Mercedes 170, standing near the corner of Śniadeckich Street and the way to Wilson Park, near the former exposition pavilion of American people of Polish ancestry. The car parked several hundred meters distant from the Staff building and was empty, so Angus took at first no interest in it. However, finding nothing by the Staff terrain he took a closer second look on the way back.

On the backseat lay two wads of documents of the half sheet format, from one of the wads several pages had slipped down near the window. He could tell they were official forms, but could not read the contents. However he recognized that among the print appeared handwritten names, surnames, and addresses. Yes, it concerned probably Śniadeckich Street. But he dared not remain glued to the window any longer, not wanting to call attention to himself.

He went slowly towards home, thinking hard, but a reflection came, he walked back and after looking round, for seconds bent to the glass pane. Well, his speculation was a certainty, he saw it with his spiritual eyes as clearly as five weeks earlier the British Fleet around the peninsula Hel. Yes, among the print were written the street names and numbers. On the one page, he saw a name which rang a bell; he probably had heard it before. For sure, they were the writs of arrests, probably the Germans were planning a mass catch, maybe taking the next hostages. Only he knew this and must tip the people off.

The first task would be to seek the entrance number and check if there appeared the name which he saw on the paper. He found it and it seemed correct, but he didn't know the surname. For a moment, he was going to buzz and deliver the warning. Then came the second thought: But what could he say? Were they likely to believe an unknown boy? Bringing the news that they had to run and immediately, they probably would take him for mad, stupid or worse, for a provocateur. Anyway, there were hundreds of those warrants, one warning would be not enough.

Better to think twice and get more information, watch the motorcar though so carefully that nobody would notice him. He should not come repeatedly close to the car, looking for more details hardly visible in the papers, never touching the latches. By causal chance he had become a bearer of a message important to his people; to deliver it he must use precaution.

Returning home, he tried to make observations from his window or from the loggia, but it was no-good. Leaning out as far as he could, he could see only the middle of the street, the sidewalks and the car were invisible. Nevertheless, in about an hour's time he could see two men crossing the road to the place where the car stood and after a while coming back. They came from the blocks on the opposite side of the street, probably from the end of them, where stood the office of the Cooperative. Angus came down and walked along the street, passing by the motorcar still in the same place, but with only one packet of papers on the rear seat. Instead, someone had left there a dark leather coat, such as the Gestapo men used. It seemed probably, the two figures did come from the auto to the Cooperative office, maybe arranging there some formalities or comparing addresses. They could leave the papers behind wanting not prematurely call attention. Anyway they needed to explain nothing, they could make any demands, make notes or simply order facsimiles without giving reasons.

Of course it was only guesswork. Angus was always great at imagining and now the ability was working with full power. He walked a little down Sniadeckich Street and then, to think better, sat down on a bench by Washington Square, where he could see both the entrance to the Cooperative office and the Mercedes. At noon he returned home, came out again and did see the motorcar, but then missed it unexpectedly about one o'clock.

Meanwhile Angus composed because of inadequate information a full imaginary picture of the future, status, pattern and script of what may, or what should happen. He had no doubt the Germans were preparing in Śniadeckich Street, in the houses nearby, a great action, mass arrests. It endangered multiple people, according to the thick bundles of documents a great part, maybe all the inhabitants. Exactly now had occurred the only, rare incident, exactly similar to those described in the books. By a pure chance, he had earned knowledge of the secret, on him fell the duty and honor to save lives.

It would not an easy task to tip off all the people. But with luck, he had a satisfactory instrument, his information agency with all the old women. They would repeat and repeat the news, until the street and all the buildings buzzed with the tale, boomed with the message. All the prospective hostages or prisoners would be cautioned at least several times from many different sources. None with anywhere to go to, would sleep at home for a few nights. Angus in his calculations missed a small, but important point: people believe in incredible tales if they want to believe them. But they don't accept anything, even if it is probable, which they want not to happen (this is a well-known premise of any con business). In addition, to say it straight, Angus' warning at the time seemed like a fantasy.

What should follow? He could do nothing more for them, it would be "each man for himself", no guarantee of safety only a question of luck.Sure, the Gestapo would go mad. Some escapers may be caught, but a lot would run away. On the other hand, with his position established, now came the time to create a genuine secret organization, starting with an open talk with the elderly ladies. There was one flaw: a boy of eleven years could be not in charge of a secret society. Not one of the adults would accept that. Anyway, he did not want the role, but must take it temporarily, until finding some solution. For the time, he would present himself only as an errand-boy from some mysterious great chief, whose face nobody knows. Someone who works between enemies in a dangerous, high position and communicates only by one trusted person of his own choice. But why did he chose only a kid? Simple, a young child may go unnoticed.

Angus wanted not to continue the mystification longer than necessary. He expected that this action would help him to find a contact with a secret organization, because this case would become a matter of many tales. The Polish people would know that somebody cares and protects them and in result some real secret organization would contact the new one. Then Angus would explain that he acted so, because he had to. He hoped much they would allow him to stay on, maybe he could do something useful. For example continue observing the cars, watching the staff as before and cataloging the numbers.

It might be a good beginning, and afterwards he would try to do the best he could. If he managed well, maybe in future, step by step, they would allow him to join in dangerous and difficult actions. For sure, adults are heavily discriminatory towards kids; nevertheless, there happened some exceptions. According to the books, some boys proved themselves so good and efficient, that their deeds were the subject of great tomes. He would start already with a not too bad record.

These hopes were naive and silly; however, the dead, empty universe, in which he vegetated passively, lay already behind. And what might be before him?

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